Hoffman v. Tooele City

• Decision Date: 31 January 1913
• Docket Number: 2424
• Citation: 42 Utah 353,130 P. 61
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: HOFFMAN et al. v. TOOELE CITY et al

130 P. 61

42 Utah 353

HOFFMAN et al. v. TOOELE CITY et al

No. 2424

Supreme Court of Utah

January 31, 1913

APPEAL from District Court, Third District; Hon. Geo. G. Armstrong Judge.

Action by Frank Hoffman and others, against Tooele City and others.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment granting insufficient relief and defendants appeal from the part of the judgment granting relief.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Smith &amp McBroom, Weber & Olson, and Hurd & Hurd for appellants.

L. L Baker, and Booth, Lee, Badger, Rich & Parke for respondents.

FRICK J. McCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

This is an action in equity for injunctive relief. The matters upon which the aid of a court of equity is invoked are set forth in the complaint. The substance of the complaint, after setting forth the status and relationship of the parties to the subject of the action, is as follows: That in June, 1911, a certain election was held in Tooele City, pursuant to chapter 106 of the Laws of Utah 1911, a local option statute, in which election the question of whether intoxicating liquors should be permitted to be sold after the 30th day of September, 1911, in such city was submitted to a vote of the legal voters, and was by them determined against sale; that thereupon the city council of Tooele City, on the 18th day of September, 1911, attempted and pretended to pass a certain ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors in said city, and said ordinance prescribed certain rules of evidence, and provided for certain penalties for its violation. The ordinance is made a part of the complaint. It was further alleged that thereafter, and in pursuance of the provision of said ordinance, the officers of said Tooele City filed complaints in a court of competent jurisdiction against many of the residents of said city, charging them separately with having violated the provisions of the ordinance, aforesaid, and among those against whom complaints were so filed are the plaintiffs; that the plaintiff Bezeek was complained of and charged with a misdemeanor for having violated the provisions of said ordinance three times between the 29th day of February and the 8th day of March, 1912; that the plaintiff Frank Penna was so charged three times between the 11th day of January and the 8th day of March, 1912; that the plaintiff Alex Voyich was so charged once between said dates; that the plaintiff Fred Smith was charged once; that the plaintiff Frank Hoffman was charged twice; that the plaintiff Frank Pejnovich was charged once, and the plaintiff Alma F. Mallet three times, and all of the foregoing complaints contained separate and distinct offenses; that the officers of said Tooele City did prosecute said several complaints and charges, and threaten to continue to prosecute said plaintiffs for supposed violations of said ordinance.

The allegations upon which plaintiffs rely for injunctive interference with said alleged and threatened prosecutions are as follows:

"That to defend the said prosecutions severally, as the plaintiffs will be compelled to do, unless the said prosecutions are restrained by order of this court, does and will give rise to multiplicity of actions; that the plaintiffs herein, if compelled to defend said actions separately, will be compelled to expend large sums of money; that the said prosecutions are oppressive and unreasonable, and unless the said city is restrained from prosecuting the said actions by order of this court, the means of these plaintiffs will be totally consumed in defending themselves against said charges, and the plaintiffs herein will no longer be able to properly defend themselves in such actions, to the great and irreparable damage of the plaintiffs."

For a second cause of action it is alleged that, pursuant to the provisions of said ordinance, the plaintiffs have been charged with and prosecuted, and will continue to be prosecuted, for maintaining nuisances; and for a third cause of action it is alleged that, by virtue of a search and seizure provision contained in said ordinance, the officers of said Tooele City have seized and carried away certain intoxicating liquors, the property of said plaintiffs. It is also alleged, upon information and belief, that prosecutions based on said ordinance will be instituted against other residents of Tooele City. It is further alleged that said ordinance is void; the reasons therefor being stated.

The defendant demurred to the complaint for want of facts. The district court of Tooele County sustained the demurrer as to the first two causes of action set forth in the complaint and overruled it as to the third. Pursuant to the stipulations of counsel electing to stand upon their pleadings, respectively, the court then issued a perpetual injunction against the city on the third cause of action, and denied an injunction and dismissed the complaint as to the first and second causes of action. Plaintiffs appeal from that part of the judgment denying the injunction, and the defendants appeal from that part granting the same.

At the hearing we, sua sponte, questioned the power, or, at least, the propriety of a court of equity to grant the relief under the conceded facts and circumstances. Counsel for both sides, however, urgently requested that we should hear and determine the appeal. We accordingly heard their arguments upon the condition that they file a brief, in which they should refer us to the authorities in support of the contention that it is proper for a court of equity to grant injunctive relief in cases like the one at bar. Counsel have filed such a brief, in which they have referred us to many cases where courts of equity have granted injunctive relief, involving both criminal and quasi criminal prosecutions based upon ordinances or laws that were alleged to be void. They have also referred us to cases wherein the courts have denied such relief. Among the cases cited by counsel wherein courts have interfered are the following: Detroit v. Detroit, etc R. Co., 184 U.S. 368, 22 S.Ct. 410, 46 L.Ed. 592; South Covington & C. St. Ry. Co. v. Berry, 93 Ky. 43, 18 S.W. 1026, 15 L. R. A. 604, 40 Am. St. Rep. 161; Hall v. Dunn, 52 Ore. 475, 97 P. 811, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 193; Mayor v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239; Bear v. City of Cedar Rapids, 147 Iowa 341, 126 N.W. 324, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1150; City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 51 N.E. 907, 49 L. R. A. 408, 67 Am. St. Rep. 224. We shall not pause now to set forth the facts and...