| Hoffman v. Times

• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CAMPBELL, CHANCELLOR.
• Citation: | Hoffman v. Times, 16 A.2d 814, 125 N.J.L. 450 (N.J. 1940)
• Decision Date: 12 December 1940
• Docket Number: No. 17.,17.
• Parties: HAROLD G. HOFFMAN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. TRENTON TIMES, JAMES KERNEY, Jr., AND TRENTON TIMES CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

16 A.2d 814

125 N.J.L. 450

HOFFMAN

v. TRENTON TIMES et al.

No. 17.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Dec. 12, 1940.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The function of a request to charge is to draw from the court a declaration of the law, coupled with an instruction to the jury, how, and the manner in which, it is to be used and applied by them in reaching a conclusion upon the issues before them. Anything short of this would lead the jury into the realm of uncertainty and speculation.

2. A mere abstract statement, without any instruction to the jury as to its applicability to the cause being tried, is valueless.

3. A request must stand or fall by the language in which it is presented to the court unless modified by counsel. If a modification of such language, however slight, is required in order to entitle the party, as a matter of strict right, to have his request charged, it is not error to refuse to charge such request.

PARKER, HEHER, and PERSKIE, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Middlesex County.

Action by Harold G. Hoffman against the Trenton Times and others to recover damages for libel. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Pitney, Hardin & Skinner, and Charles R. Hardin, all of Newark, Worrall F. Mountain, Jr., of Morristown, and Douglas M. Hicks, of New Brunswick, for appellants.

Harry Green, of Newark, and George L. Burton, of South River, for respondent.

THE CHANCELLOR.

This appeal is from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff-respondent against the defendants-appellants for alleged libelous publications. As to these, a retraction was demanded but, it is charged, was not made.

Numerous reasons for reversal are assigned; some have been waived and are not argued, and those remaining go to trial errors; to all of which we have given meticulous study and consideration, and we do not find that any make for reversible error and none require any particular mention except four, of which we shall speak later.

Nothing of value can be gained by any attempt to recite or array the evidence.

The questions of liability and damages, or the merits of the cause, so to speak, are not before us. Both of these questions were settled adversely to appellants, by the jury, and later the damages were reviewed and settled by the trial judge under a rule for a new trial.

As previously pointed out there are only four grounds that appear to us to call for any particular mention: (1) Refusal to non-suit; (2) refusal to direct a verdict; (3) refusal to charge request number fourteen, and (4) refusal to charge request number fifteen.

1. and 2. There was no error in refusing to nonsuit or direct a verdict. There were facts, admitted and controverted, designed to establish appellants' guilt or innocence of the alleged libel and their liability to answer in damages therefor, which required submission to the jury and it would have been error to have withdrawn them from that body.

3. There was no error in refusing to charge request fourteen.

Its language is: "The payments to two of the fourteen employees, namely; the $200 paid to Elizabeth L. McLaughlin, and the $150 paid to Albert B. Hermann, were not authorized by Statute. These two employees held positions for which so-called line item appropriations were made by the Statute, and the Statute provides that the incumbents of such offices or positions shall not receive compensation in excess of the amounts provided in the Statute. The payments to these two employees were, therefore, illegal".

Hereby two unassailed questions of fact, as to payments to two employees, and appellants' construction of the Appropriation Act (P.L.1937, Ch. 177, p. 586) are set forth, and nothing more.

We may assume, for present purposes, that both are correct but the fact cannot be escaped that the request is incomplete and impotent for the following reasons:

One of the most important duties of the trial court is to expound the law to the jury. Broadwell v. Nixon, 4 N.J.L. 362; Rowland v. Wunderlick, 113 N.J.L. 223, page 226, 174 A. 168. Generally the office or purpose of instructions by the court is to inform the jury as to the law of the case applicable to the facts in such a manner that the jury may not be misled; in other words, to advise the jury as to what is the law applicable to a certain set of facts, if they find the existence of such facts from the evidence. 3 Blackstone, p. *375; 3 Chitty Gen.Prac, p. *913; 64 C.J. p. 511; 14 R.C.L. p. 725.

A requested instruction must comply with the requirements governing instructions as to matters of form and substance in order to entitle the party presenting it to have it given in the charge to the jury, 64 C.J. p. 858, and is subject to the same test.

The function of a request to charge is to draw from the court a declaration of the law, coupled with an instruction to the...