Hoffmann v. Young

Decision Date29 August 2022
Docket NumberS266003
PartiesMIKAYLA HOFFMANN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHRISTINA M. YOUNG et al., Defendants and Respondents.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court

Superior Court San Luis Obispo County, No. 16CVP0060Linda D Hurst Judge.

Counsel: Andrade Law Offices and Steven R. Andrade for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Horvitz &Levy, Dean A. Bochner, Joshua C. McDaniel, Christopher D. Hu; Henderson &Borgeson, Jay M. Borgeson and Royce J. Borgeson for Defendants and Respondents.

Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred.

Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Liu and Groban concurred.

OPINION

CORRIGAN, J.

Under Civil Code section 846, landowners generally owe no duty of care to keep their property safe for others who may enter or use it for recreational purposes.[1] There is an exception to that statutory negation of duty, however, when a landowner expressly invites someone onto the property. The question here is whether that exception applies when the invitation is extended, not by the landowners, but by their live-at-home child who acts without the owners' knowledge or permission. The trial court ruled that the exception did not apply because there was no evidence the landowners personally invited the plaintiff to come onto their land. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an invitation by a landowner's live-at-home child operates to activate the exception unless the child has been prohibited from making the invitation. (Hoffmann v. Young (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1021,1024 (Hoffmann).) Neither court interpreted the statute correctly. Here, we hold that a plaintiff may rely on the exception and impose liability if there is a showing that a landowner, or an agent acting on his or her behalf, extended an express invitation to come onto the property. Plaintiff did not meet that burden below. We reverse the Court of Appeal's judgment and remand the matter as explained.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants Donald and Christina Young lived with their sons, Gunner and Dillon,[2] on property they owned in Paso Robles. Donald also designed and built a motocross track on the land.

One day in 2014, 18-year-old Gunner invited Mikayla Hoffmann (plaintiff) to go motorcycle riding. The next day, he drove plaintiff and her bike to his parents' property, unloaded the motorcycle, and provided her with protective riding gear.[3]He told her to ride on the driveway while he took a "warm-up" lap on the track. Instead, plaintiff entered the track and rode in the opposite direction from Gunner. Their bikes collided, and both were injured.[4]

Plaintiff sued Donald, Christina, Gunner, Dillon, and a business owned by Donald. She asserted claims for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability based on negligent track design, and (3) negligent provision of medical care.

Donald's company settled. The Youngs were all granted summary adjudication on the negligence and premises liability claims, successfully arguing that those claims were barred by the primary assumption of risk doctrine. After plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ concluding there were triable issues of fact that precluded summary adjudication of those claims as to Donald and Christina. The trial court reinstated those causes of action against Donald and Christina alone. The provision of medical care claim was allowed to go forward against all remaining defendants.

On the day before trial began, defendants moved to amend their answer to add an affirmative defense of recreational use immunity under section 846. That section provides in relevant part that a landowner "owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose."[5](§ 846, subd. (a) (section 846(a)).) Plaintiff opposed the motion. With the parties' agreement, the court deferred ruling.

As the trial progressed, however, questions repeatedly arose as to whether defendants would be permitted to amend their answer and whether the recreational use immunity defense was applicable. On the fourth day of trial, while plaintiff was still presenting her case, the court revisited the outstanding motion to amend. In opposition, plaintiff argued first that the motion was untimely. Plaintiff's counsel asserted that "we would have pursued discovery quite a bit differently" if plaintiff had known defendants would claim immunity under section 846. Second, plaintiff invoked the express invitee exception, which provides that section 846(a) "does not limit the liability which otherwise exists for [¶] . . . [¶] [a]ny persons who are expressly invited rather than merely permitted to come upon the premises by the landowner." (§ 846, subd. (d)(3) (section 846(d)(3)).) Plaintiff argued that Gunner's invitation abrogated any immunity under section 846(a). The trial court again deferred ruling.

On the sixth day of trial, the court and counsel discussed the verdict form. Defendants argued the form should include a question regarding recreational use immunity. Plaintiff repeated her arguments that the motion to amend was untimely and the defense was inapplicable. The court again postponed its ruling.

Two days later, after plaintiff had rested, the court granted defendants' motion to amend, concluding the express invitee exception of section 846(d)(3) was inapplicable as a matter of law. It reasoned that neither Donald nor Christina had expressly invited plaintiff onto the property. Instead, it was Gunner, a nonowner, who had invited her. Accordingly, in the court's view, the general rule of section 846(a) shielded the parents from liability.

At the close of trial, the following facts were undisputed. Donald and Christina had never met or seen plaintiff before the accident, and she had never been on the property before. Neither parent personally invited plaintiff to enter their land. Gunner did not ask his parents' permission to invite plaintiff to enter and did not tell them that he had done so.

Before jury deliberations, the court entered a directed verdict for Christina on the negligence and premises liability claims because there was no evidence she had any role in the track's design or maintenance. The jury returned a verdict for the defense on all claims. The court did not ask the jury for findings on the express invitee exception because it had previously concluded that the exception did not apply.[6]

Plaintiff moved for a new trial, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing defendants to amend their answer to allege an affirmative defense under section 846(a); (2) excluding certain evidence relevant to the application of the express invitee exception; and (3) ruling that the express invitee exception was inapplicable. The trial court denied the motion.

A divided Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial on the two claims related to the immunity defense.[7]The majority held that "where, as here, a child of the landowner is living with the landowner on the landowner's property and the landowner has consented to this living arrangement, the child's express invitation of a person to come onto the property operates as an express invitation by the landowner within the meaning of section 846, subdivision (d)(3), unless the landowner has prohibited the child from extending the invitation." (Hoffmann, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024, italics added.) Because there was "no evidence that Gunner's parents prohibited him from inviting guests onto the property," the majority concluded that "Gunner's express invitation of [plaintiff] stripped his parents of the immunity that would otherwise have been provided to them by section 846." (Id. at p. 1024.) The dissent would have affirmed, reasoning that only an invitation issued by the landowner or by someone expressly authorized by the landowner can give rise to the exception.

II. DISCUSSION

We are called upon to decide whether an invitation made by a nonlandowner, without the landowner's knowledge or express approval, can satisfy the requirements of section 846(d)(3) and abrogate the landowner's immunity under section 846(a). This is a question of statutory interpretation. Our task is to ascertain the Legislature's intent and effectuate the enactment's purpose. When a statute's words are clear, their plain meaning controls and "we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history." (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.) While the words of a statute provide the most reliable indication of the Legislature's intent, we do not construe those words in isolation. Instead, we harmonize the enactment's various parts by considering the provision at issue in the context of the whole statutory scheme. (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83.)

A. Landowner Liability and Recreational Use Immunity Under Section 846

The general rule is that a landowner "owes certain affirmative duties of care, as to conditions or activities on the land, to persons who come on the land." (6 Witkin Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, § 1224, p. 474.) Section 1714 provides that every person "is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property ...." (§ 1714, subd. (a).) Under section 1714, landowners owe a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing their property in light of the foreseeability of injury to others. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119...

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