Hofrichter v. City of Chi. Heights
| Decision Date | 18 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–15–3106.,1–15–3106. |
| Citation | 408 Ill.Dec. 695,66 N.E.3d 487 |
| Parties | Benjamin HOFRICHTER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO HEIGHTS, the City of Chicago Heights Police and Fire Board, and Charles Guiliani, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Policemen's Benevolent Labor Committee, of Springfield (Shane M. Voyles, of counsel), for appellant.
Del Galdo Law Group, LLC, of Chicago (K. Austin Zimmer and Joseph A. Giambrone, of counsel), for appellees.
¶ 1 Plaintiff-appellant Benjamin Hofrichter filed suit against his employer, defendant-appellee City of Chicago Heights, as well as defendants-appellees City of Chicago Heights Police and Fire Board and Charles Guiliani (collectively, defendants), on November 13, 2014, after he was passed over for a promotion one year earlier on November 13, 2013. Defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the basis that it was barred by laches or, alternatively, that Hofrichter's sole cause of action was administrative review. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Hofrichter appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 Hofrichter is a police officer for the City of Chicago Heights. On December 14, 2009, the Chicago Heights Police and Fire Board (Board) promulgated a promotion eligibility list (2009 roster) that named Hofrichter as the number one candidate for promotion to sergeant. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code) (65 ILCS 5/10–2.1–15 (West 2008) ), the Board was required to make promotions from the three candidates having the highest rating. The Code permits the Board to strike the eligibility list after three years, providing that no vacancy exists which can be filled at that time. Id.
¶ 4 In September 2011, the Board promoted candidates two and three from the 2009 roster, leaving only Hofrichter remaining from the original top three. No further promotions were made until 2013.
¶ 5 On October 23, 2013, the secretary of the Board sent an e-mail to all candidates, including Hofrichter, advising them that they could submit a request for military points to the Board for the new promotion eligibility list (2013 roster) through regular mail or via e-mail. Hofrichter responded via e-mail requesting to apply his military points.
¶ 6 On November 12, 2013, the Board drafted an agenda for its November 13 meeting, and the order of business included the cancellation of the 2009 roster, the promulgation of a new 2013 roster, and the promotion of two officers to replace sergeants who had retired in January 2012 and May 2013. The agenda was e-mailed to all sergeant candidates, including Hofrichter, the day before the meeting. Along with the agenda, the Board e-mailed the candidates the final 2013 roster, on which Hofrichter placed ninth.
¶ 7 The day of the meeting, the Board effectuated its agenda and cancelled the 2009 roster (on which Hofrichter was the highest ranked candidate for promotion to sergeant), approved the 2013 roster, and promoted two individuals (ranked first and second) from the latter roster. That same day, according to the Board's secretary, the Board "published" the 2013 roster.
¶ 8 Hofrichter's first challenge to the November 13, 2013, promotions occurred on November 13, 2014, when he filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (2012) ). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint alleging, inter alia, that Hofrichter's sole remedy to challenge the Board's action was administrative review. On March 23, 2015, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice.
¶ 9 Hofrichter filed an amended complaint one month later, in April 2015, repeating the allegations of the original complaint and adding a count labeled "Administrative Review." In that count, Hofrichter sought "review of all questions of law and fact" regarding the Board's conduct on November 13, 2013. Hofrichter further alleged that "[n]o notice of the Board's actions * * * w[as] personally delivered or mailed to the Plaintiff." In his prayer for relief, Hofrichter sought a declaration that defendants had violated his rights, promotion to the position of sergeant, and back pay.
¶ 10 Defendants again moved to dismiss the amended complaint contending that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the administrative review count was untimely and laches barred relief under that theory in any event. Alternatively, assuming the court had subject matter jurisdiction, defendants argued that Hofrichter waived his right to promotion under the 2009 roster by participating in determining his eligibility for the 2013 roster. Finally, defendants urged dismissal of all remaining counts because the sole remedy for challenging a final decision of the Board was administrative review. Following a hearing, the transcript of which is not in the record,1 the circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal followed.
¶ 12 We review a circuit court's order of dismissal de novo. Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Comm'n, 218 Ill.2d 342, 349, 300 Ill.Dec. 121, 843 N.E.2d 379 (2006). Turning first to the counts for administrative review and declaratory judgment, defendants raised numerous bases for their dismissal, but we conclude that defendants' reliance on laches is dispositive. .
¶ 13 Laches is " ‘the neglect or omission to assert a right which, taken in conjunction with a lapse of time and circumstances causing prejudice to the opposite party, will operate as a bar to a suit.’ " Lee v. City of Decatur, 256 Ill.App.3d 192, 195–96, 194 Ill.Dec. 614, 627 N.E.2d 1256 (1994) (quoting People ex rel. Heavey v. Fitzgerald, 10 Ill.App.3d 24, 26, 293 N.E.2d 705 (1973) ). A successful laches defense requires a showing that plaintiff's delay in bringing suit was unreasonable and that the delay prejudiced the defendant. Wabash County v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 408 Ill.App.3d 924, 933, 349 Ill.Dec. 411, 946 N.E.2d 907 (2011). Laches may be invoked to bar administrative review complaints (Christ Hospital & Medical Center v. Human Rights Comm'n, 271 Ill.App.3d 133, 137, 207 Ill.Dec. 745, 648 N.E.2d 201 (1995) ), as well as complaints for declaratory judgment, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint seeks monetary relief in the form of back pay (Coleman v. O'Grady, 207 Ill.App.3d 43, 51–52, 152 Ill.Dec. 11, 565 N.E.2d 253 (1990) ).
¶ 14 In this case, Hofrichter delayed filing suit for one year after learning that he had not been promoted to sergeant. In civil service cases, an unexplained delay longer than six months is per se unreasonable. See, e.g., Hauser v. Chicago Park District, 263 Ill.App.3d 39, 41, 203 Ill.Dec. 635, 640 N.E.2d 294 (1994) ; Kadon v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 45 Ill.App.2d 425, 430, 195 N.E.2d 751 (1964). Typically, this six-month time limit has been applied to cases involving public-sector employees who have been discharged and seek reinstatement as well as back pay; courts have explained that a delay longer than six months may "impair orderly procedures and work to the disadvantage of third parties." Kadon, 45 Ill.App.2d at 430, 195 N.E.2d 751. But we see no reason not to extend this logic to Hofrichter merely because he is seeking a promotion rather than reinstatement. Thus, because Hofrichter offers no reason for his 12–month delay, we conclude that the delay was unreasonable. See People ex rel. Cifaldi v. Wilson, 38 Ill.App.2d 302, 305, 187 N.E.2d 353 (1962) (); Coleman, 207 Ill.App.3d at 51, 152 Ill.Dec. 11, 565 N.E.2d 253 (15–month delay unreasonable).
¶ 15 Turning then to the issue of prejudice, Hofrichter contends that defendants were not prejudiced because his failure to promptly file suit did not influence defendants' conduct. Not so. Courts have found that prejudice to public entities is inherent in cases where an employee delays filing suit seeking back pay because if that employee is successful, the employer, if it has hired or promoted a third party, must pay the plaintiff for services already rendered by that third party and for which that party has already been compensated. Coleman, 207 Ill.App.3d at 48, 152 Ill.Dec. 11, 565 N.E.2d 253 ; see also People ex rel. Casey v. Health & Hospitals Governing Comm'n of Illinois, 69 Ill.2d 108, 115, 12 Ill.Dec. 695, 370 N.E.2d 499 (1977). In other words, prejudice results because the employer is "required to pay for the same services twice." See Bill v. Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, 351 Ill.App.3d 47, 62, 285 Ill.Dec. 784, 812 N.E.2d 604 (2004) ; Lee, 256 Ill.App.3d at 197, 194 Ill.Dec. 614, 627 N.E.2d 1256.
¶ 16 In this case, the Board promoted two officers in lieu of Hofrichter and has paid their salaries since November 2013. Thus, it would suffer inherent prejudice if Hofrichter's suit succeeded and it was required to compensate Hofrichter for the services those officers rendered over the past three years. For these reasons, we conclude that Hofrichter's claims for administrative review and declaratory judgment were properly dismissed on the basis of laches.
¶ 17 This leaves us to consider Hofrichter's section 1983 and section 1985 claims. Defendants contend that these claims were properly dismissed because Hofrichter's sole cause of action is administrative review. In response, Hofrichter maintains first, that the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–101 et seq. (West 2014)) does not...
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