Hogan Transfer and Storage Corp. v. Waymire

• Decision Date: 29 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. 2-177A1,2-177A1
• Citation: 399 N.E.2d 779
• Parties: HOGAN TRANSFER AND STORAGE CORPORATION, and Aero Mayflower Transit Company, Inc., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. John WAYMIRE, d/b/a Waymire Instruments, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 779

399 N.E.2d 779

HOGAN TRANSFER AND STORAGE CORPORATION, and Aero Mayflower

Transit Company, Inc., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. John WAYMIRE, d/b/a Waymire Instruments, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 2-177A1.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fourth District.

Jan. 29, 1980.

James L. Beattey, Indianapolis, for appellants (defendants below).

Maurice R. Petit, Robert E. Trout, Indianapolis, for appellee (plaintiff below).

YOUNG, Judge.

This case was transferred to this office in December, 1979 to relieve a disparity of caseloads among the districts.

Hogan Transfer and Storage Corporation and Aero Mayflower Transit Company, Inc. (Hogan-Mayflower) appeal the judgment of the trial court awarding damages to John Waymire, d/b/a Waymire Instruments (Waymire) for negligence in transporting an electronic instrument from Indianapolis, Indiana to Reading, Pennsylvania. The following issues are presented for review:

I. Whether the judgment of the trial court is contrary to law as unsupported by the evidence;

II. Whether a receipt and acknowledgment on the bill of lading by consignee General Battery Corporation that the instrument was received in apparent good condition and without notation of any damage makes the judgment contrary to law;

III. Whether the award of damages exceeds Hogan-Mayflower's contractual liability;

IV. Whether Waymire's proof of damages is speculative, unsupported and fails to follow the established precedent for proving damages.

We affirm.

Waymire developed a prototype battery testing unit for General Battery Corporation (General Battery) in 1971. The instrument was designed to test the life cycle of automotive batteries and consisted of an electronic cabinet, six and one-half feet high and four feet wide, containing sixteen separate units mounted in two rows of eight, fifteen power supply units and a timer and master unit. When the instrument was ready for shipping, he contracted with Hogan-Mayflower to transport it from his place of business in Indianapolis to General Battery's plant in Reading, Pennsylvania. On August 5, 1971, Waymire and Hogan-Mayflower's driver loaded the instrument onto the truck, with the front or face of the instrument against the wall of the trailer. The instrument was covered with blankets and secured with straps. Hogan-Mayflower delivered the instrument to General Battery on August 9, 1971. Lamar Fitzgerald, an employee of General Battery, signed the bill of lading acknowledging that the instrument had been received in apparent good condition, but it was later discovered to be damaged. Waymire repaired the instrument, filed a notice of claim with Hogan-Mayflower which was denied, and instituted this action. Trial by the court resulted in a finding of $6,700.00 damages for Waymire with a set-off of $141.75 in unpaid freight charges for Hogan-Mayflower. Judgment was entered for Waymire in the sum of $6,558.25.

This case involves an interstate shipment of goods by motor carrier and is, therefore, governed by the Interstate Commerce Act, more particularly the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11), made applicable to common carriers by motor vehicle by 49 U.S.C. § 319. The Carmack Amendment states:

Any common carrier . . . subject to the provisions of this chapter receiving property for transportation from a point in one State . . . to a point in another State . . . shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it . . . and no contract, receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall exempt such common carrier . . . from the liability imposed; and any such common carrier . . . so receiving property for transportation from a point in one State . . . to a point in another State . . . shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon, whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not, for the full actual loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it . . . notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation of the amount of recovery or representation or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which it is sought to be made is hereby declared to be unlawful and void: . . . Provided, however, That the provisions hereof respecting liability for full actual loss, damage, or injury, notwithstanding any limitation of liability or recovery or representation or agreement or release as to value, and declaring any such limitation to be unlawful and void, shall not apply . . . to property . . . received for transportation concerning which the carrier shall have been . . . expressly authorized or required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property, in which case such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect than to limit liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the value so declared or released . . . .

I.

Hogan-Mayflower argues there is no evidence of record to support the judgment of the trial court, no evidence of any act or failure to act on its part resulting in the damage claimed. It further contends the admissions of record show that the damage, if any, was caused by General Battery.

The court in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Elmore & Stahl, (1964) 377 U.S. 134, 84 S.Ct. 1142, 12 L.Ed.2d 194, set out a carrier's liability under the Carmack Amendment.

The Carmack Amendment of 1906, § 20(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, makes carriers liable "for the full actual loss, damage or injury * * * caused by" them to property they transport, and declares unlawful and void any contract, regulation, tariff, or other attempted means of limiting this liability. It is settled that this statute has two undisputed effects crucial to the issue in this case: First the statute codifies the common-law rule that a carrier, though not an absolute insurer, is liable for damage to goods transported by it unless it can show that the damage was caused by "(a) the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; (d) public authority; (e) or the inherent vice or nature of the goods." (citations omitted). Second, the statute declares unlawful and void any "rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever" purporting to limit this liability. (citations omitted). Accordingly, under federal law, in an action to recover from a carrier for damage to a shipment, the shipper establishes his prima facie case when he shows delivery in good condition, arrival in damaged condition, and the amount of damages. Thereupon, the burden of proof is upon the carrier to show both that it was free from negligence and that the damage to the cargo was due to one of the excepted causes relieving the carrier of liability. (citations omitted).

Id. at 137-38, 84 S.Ct. at 1144-1145. The court further stated:

The general rule of carrier liability is based upon the sound premise that the carrier has peculiarly within its knowledge "(a)ll the facts and circumstances upon which (it) may rely to relieve (it) of (its) duty * * *. In consequence, the law casts upon (it) the burden of the loss which (it) cannot explain or, explaining, bring within the exceptional case in which (it) is relieved from liability." (citation omitted). We are not persuaded that the carrier lacks adequate means to inform itself of the condition of goods at the time it receives them from the shipper, and it cannot be doubted that while the carrier has possession, it is the only one in a position to acquire the knowledge of what actually damaged a shipment entrusted to its care.

Id. at 143-44, 84 S.Ct. at 1148. The carrier's burden of proof has been likened to a res ipsa loquitur. Fulton v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, (8th Cir. 1973) 481 F.2d 326, 333, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040, 94 S.Ct. 540, 38 L.Ed.2d 330.

Hogan-Mayflower argues that Waymire did not make out a prima facie case, citing Elder & Johnston Co. v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., of Indiana, (1953) 94 Ohio App. 358, 115 N.E.2d 179. The court there held that the rule that, where the shipper shows the goods were received in good condition by the carrier for shipment and were delivered in a damaged condition, a prima facie case of liability is made against the carrier has no application where the goods, after being received by the consignee, are transported to another portion of his premises where the damage is discovered and there is no evidence of the care exercised by the consignee in transporting the goods. It is unclear whether the Ohio court was applying federal or state law, as it cited no authority for this point of law. Nevertheless, Hogan-Mayflower asserts the facts there are foursquare with those of the instant case. The damage was discovered after the instrument had been unloaded from Hogan-Mayflower's truck, but we find a significant distinction. The Ohio court clearly stated that "there is not a scintilla of evidence showing the care exercised by the plaintiff's employees in handling the crates from the time they were taken from the truck until they were opened on the third floor." Id., 115 N.E.2d at 180.

In the instant case there is more than a scintilla of evidence showing the care of General Battery's employees in handling the instrument. Both Herb Yoder and Lamar Fitzgerald, employees of General Battery who assisted in the unloading, denied that they or any other General Battery employee had damaged the instrument during the unloading process. At least two employees steadied the instrument while Yoder placed it on a forklift...