Hogan v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 68188

• Decision Date: 20 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 68188,68188
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: HOGAN et al. v. MAYOR & ALDERMEN OF SAVANNAH et al.

Page 555

320 S.E.2d 555

171 Ga.App. 671

HOGAN et al. v. MAYOR & ALDERMEN OF SAVANNAH et al.

No. 68188.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 20, 1984.

Rehearing Denied July 16, 1984.

Charles L. Ruffin, Carr G. Dodson, Macon, for appellants.

Patrick T. O'Connor, Charles W. Brannon, Jr., Savannah, for appellees.

McMURRAY, Chief Judge.

Peter J. Hogan is the president, chairman of the board, treasurer, and general counsel of Southern Intermodal Logistics, Inc. (S.I.L.). Mr. Hogan, along with one other individual, owns all of the shares of S.I.L.

Mr. Hogan was driving a company car in the City of Savannah at approximately 11:00 p.m. when he was stopped and cited for a number of traffic violations. He was detained by Savannah police and apparently his vehicle impounded. The following morning at approximately 7:00 a.m. a Savannah police officer, defendant Macy, undertook to transport Mr. Hogan to his company car in a City of Savannah police car. While attempting to locate the company car the police vehicle operated by Macy and occupied by Mr. Hogan was involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist.

Mr. Hogan and his wife filed this action for damages arising from the collision against Macy (the police officer operating the vehicle in which Mr. Hogan was a passenger), the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, Mitchell (the uninsured motorist), Twin City Fire Insurance Company (the uninsured motorist insurer for the automobiles owned by Peter Hogan personally) and Royal Insurance Company of America (Royal), (uninsured motorist insurer for the company automobile which was being operated by Peter Hogan prior to his arrest and for which he was searching at the time of the collision). Defendant Royal counterclaimed for declaratory judgment contending that the policy of insurance on the company car which it had issued to S.I.L. provided no coverage to Peter Hogan, who was not named as an insured under the policy.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Royal and against plaintiffs on the issues raised by plaintiffs' complaint and by Royal's counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Royal. Held:

1. Most of the language in the subject insurance policy appropriately reflects that the named insured to whom the policy is issued is a corporation, a legal entity but not a natural person. OCGA § 33-7-11 governing the providing of uninsured motorist coverage is by its terms universally applicable to natural persons and to other entities such as in the case sub judice, a corporation. The plaintiffs present the argument that in order to prevent excess verbiage in the insurance policy in question we should construe such terms as "family member" which under its usual definition would have no meaning in regard to a corporation so as to give meaning to it in the context of a corporate named insured. In other words the plaintiffs argue that Peter Hogan is a family member of S.I.L. and could have reasonably viewed himself as such in relation to the closely held corporation which is the named insured. "Family member" is defined by the policy as any "person related to you [the named insured] by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household including your ward or foster child."

"In construing an insurance policy, the test is not what the insurer intended its words to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would understand them to mean. The policy should be read as a layman would read it and not as it might be analyzed by an insurance expert or an attorney. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Collins, 136 Ga.App. 671, 675, 222 S.E.2d 828." Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Davis, 153 Ga.App. 291, 295, 265 S.E.2d 102. See also Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613, 615(1), 299 S.E.2d 561. After applying this test we find that the plain and unambiguous definition of "family member" precludes any reasonable reliance upon the interpretation advocated by plaintiffs as Mr. Hogan is clearly not the named insured nor a family member in relation thereto. As Mr. Hogan was not occupying the covered automobile at the time of his injuries he is not an insured under the insurance policy in question.

The uninsured motorist endorsement contained in the subject insurance policy which closely tracks the statutory language contained in OCGA § 33-7-11 does, in view of its comprehensive nature, contain references which are meaningless with reference to a corporate named insured. However, we find no intent to render meaning to the words of the contract distinctly different than their usual and ordinary meaning.

2. The provision of the uninsured motorist coverage providing payment of damages the insured is legally entitled to recover as damages from any uninsured motorist and which must result from "bodily injury sustained by the insured" is meaningful in a policy issued to a corporation (as opposed to a natural person) because it refers to those natural persons who are insured under the policy while occupying a covered automobile. Plaintiffs' contention that it is necessary to construe this language as providing coverage to Mr. Hogan, the alter ego of the corporate named insured, in order to render the quoted language meaningful is without merit.

3. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Roepke v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 350, 352(2), plaintiffs argue that the concept of "piercing the corporate veil" should be applied in the case sub judice so as to disregard the corporate entity (S.I.L.) and view Mr. Hogan as the named insured. Plaintiffs' theory has been characterized as a "reverse pierce" and described as "allowing an 'insider' to pierce the corporate veil from within...