Hogan v. State, 091417 MDSCA, 895

JudgeNazarian, Friedman, Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
PartiesSTEVE HOGAN v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Docket Number895
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
Date14 September 2017

STEVE HOGAN

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 895

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

September 14, 2017

Circuit Court for Carroll County Case No. 06-K-13-44823

Nazarian, Friedman, Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION [*]

FRIEDMAN, J.

This appeal concerns the timeliness of the trial of Appellant Steve Hogan. Hogan argues that the circuit court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss for a Hicks violation;1 and (2) denied his motion to dismiss for a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation.[2]

BACKGROUND

Hogan was charged in the Circuit Court for Carroll County with a variety of burglary and assault charges arising out of an altercation with a neighbor. Hogan's counsel entered his appearance in the circuit court on January 15, 2014, thereby establishing a Hicks deadline of July 14, 2014. Trial was set for March 24, 2014. On the scheduled day of trial, Hogan requested a postponement to allow for a neurological evaluation. The circuit court granted Hogan's request and rescheduled the trial for May 27, 2014. When the new trial date arrived, the State filed a motion to suppress testimony regarding Hogan's neurological condition. The circuit court determined that a hearing was necessary to consider the admissibility of the evidence. To accommodate the scheduling of a hearing, the circuit court made a finding of good cause and postponed the trial beyond the Hicks deadline of July 14, 2014.

On July 28, 2014, Hogan changed counsel, restarting the pretrial process. Hogan's new counsel filed pretrial motions, including motions to dismiss alleging violations of Hicks and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The motions were denied on November 13, 2014, and the circuit court set a new trial date of December 1, 2014.

The State was unable to proceed to trial on December 1, 2014 due to the sudden death of the prosecutor who had been handling the case. The circuit court granted the State's request for a postponement. Before the trial could be rescheduled, however, a competency evaluation was done at Hogan's request and he was found not competent to stand trial. After a lengthy delay, on November 24, 2015, the circuit court found that Hogan had regained competence to stand trial and set a new trial date of April 18, 2016.

Hogan's case proceeded on April 18, 2016. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted him of both burglary and assault. Hogan noted a timely appeal to this Court.

ANALYSIS

Hogan argues that the various delays before his trial violated Hicks and denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

I. Hicks

Hogan first contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for a Hicks violation because his trial was not held within 180 days from the date on which his first counsel entered his appearance. The State responds that this Court should dismiss Hogan's appeal because, pursuant to Rule 8-504(a), Hogan submitted an insufficient written brief. Alternatively, we are urged to affirm the circuit court because it did not abuse its discretion when it found good cause to postpone Hogan's trial beyond the

Hicks date of July 14, 2014. We agree with the State on both points.

The scheduling of a trial date in a criminal matter is governed by Section 6-103 of the Criminal Procedure ("CP") Article and Rule 4-271. Together they require that, absent a showing of good cause, "a criminal case be brought to trial within 180 days of the appearance of counsel or the appearance of the defendant before the circuit court, whichever occurs first." Choate v. State, 214 Md.App. 118, 139 (2013). This 180-day rule is "mandatory and dismissal of the criminal charges is the appropriate sanction for violation of that time period" if good cause for the delay has not been established. Ross v. State, 117 Md.App. 357, 364 (1997); see also Hicks, 285 Md. at 318. "For good cause shown, [however, ] the county administrative judge … may grant a change of the trial date" beyond the 180-day deadline." CP § 6-103(b)(1); see also Md. Rule 4-271(a)(1). For purposes of Hicks, a finding of good cause is only necessary for the court order that extends a postponement beyond the 180-day deadline. State v. Brown, 355 Md. 89, 108-09 (1999) ("[T]he critical postponement for purposes of Rule 4-271 is the one that carries the case beyond the 180 day deadline."). "The [circuit court] enjoys wide discretion in deciding good cause, and [its] determination carries a heavy presumption of validity." Tapscott v. State, 106 Md.App. 109, 122 (1995) (citations omitted). We review a circuit court's decision for "either a clear abuse of discretion or a lack of good cause as a matter of law." Brown, 355 Md. at 98 (citation omitted).

We first consider the State's request that we dismiss this aspect of Hogan's appeal pursuant to Rule 8-504(a). Even so, we choose to analyze the merits of Hogan's claim that Hicks was violated.

A. Rule 8-504

An appellate brief must comply with Rule 8-504, which provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Contents. A brief shall … include the following …:

* * *

(4) A clear concise statement of the facts material to a determination of the questions presented … Reference shall be made to the pages of the record extract supporting the assertions. If … a record extract is not filed, reference shall be made to the pages of the record or to the transcript of testimony as contained in the record.

* * *

(5) A concise statement of the applicable standard of review for each issue … .

* * *

(6) Argument in support of the party's position on each issue.

* * *

Md. Rule 8-504(a). According to the Rule, a brief must include all facts, including citations to the record, necessary to determine the legal questions presented in light of the applicable standard of review and the arguments that support the party's position. The Rule is mandatory and "[f]or noncompliance … the appellate court may dismiss the appeal." Id. at (c); see also Donati v. State, 215 Md.App. 686, 743 (2014) ("Because appellant has not presented sufficient legal or factual arguments for this Court to address this claim, we decline to consider it.").

For a defendant to prevail on a motion to dismiss for a Hicks violation, the party arguing that the rule was violated must acknowledge that Hicks has a good cause exception that allows for the postponement of a defendant's trial date beyond 180 days. The party must also cite facts from the record and make legal arguments to explain why there was no good cause for a postponement, or why the circuit court abused its discretion when it found that there was good cause.

Hogan's brief is insufficient in this regard, and therefore warrants dismissal of the Hicks-based portion of his appeal. Hogan simply recites the Hicks deadline and makes a conclusory statement that Hicks was violated. Hogan states that, "[t]rial in this matter did not commence until almost two full years after the Hicks date … Hogan repeatedly demanded that the trial commence before the Hicks deadline. … The Court of Appeals has made it clear that dismissal of charges [is proper] when a lower court allows a criminal trial beyond the Hicks deadline. … The conviction should be reversed." Hogan's brief fails to recognize that there is a good cause exception to the Hicks rule. He does not address the specific postponement that extended his trial beyond the Hicks date, nor the purpose for that postponement. He further neglects to acknowledge that the circuit court found good cause for the postponement, or make any consequent allegation that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding such good cause. Due to these omissions and Hogan's noncompliance with Rule 8-504(a)(4)-(6), we dismiss this portion of Hogan's appeal.

B. Good Cause

Notwithstanding this dismissal, we would not find, on this record, that the circuit court abused its discretion in determining that good cause existed to exceed the 180 day limit. "Although … there is no absolute or per se definition of good cause, " this Court has held that good cause for a postponement exists when evidence or evaluations necessary for the defense require a postponement. State v. Farinholt, ...

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