Hoggan v. Fleming

• Decision Date: 15 July 2010
• Docket Number: No.20090399-CA,No.070902181,20090399-CA,070902181
• Citation: 2010 UT App 195
• Parties: Robyn Michelle Hoggan,Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ranee Boley Fleming aka Renee B. Fleming; Karen B. Gamonal aka Karen Halterman;Joyce H.Crockett;John D. Hoggan; Leo v. Jolley;Rosalee J. Keele aka Rosalee M.Haslam;Estate of Kriste H. Street; Estate of Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan Jolley aka Elizabeth Duncan; and John Does 1-100,Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

2010 UT App 195

Robyn Michelle Hoggan, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Ranee Boley Fleming aka Renee B. Fleming;

Karen B. Gamonal aka Karen Halterman;Joyce H.Crockett;John D. Hoggan;

Leo v. Jolley;Rosalee J. Keele aka Rosalee M.Haslam;Estate of Kriste H. Street;

Estate of Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan Jolley aka Elizabeth Duncan;

and John Does 1-100, Defendants and Appellees.

No.20090399-CA

No.070902181

Utah Court Of Appeals

FILD: July 15, 2010

Samuel M. Barker and Jeffrey A. Callister, Murray, for Appellant

Matthew N. Olsen, Midvale, for Appellee John D. Hoggan Brett N. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees other than John D. Hoggan

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Not For Official Publication

The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg

Before Judges McHugh, Voros, and Roth.

ROTH, Judge:

Robyn Michelle Hoggan (Wife) challenges the trial court's order dismissing her quiet title claim pursuant to rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.

Rule 41(b) allows a defendant in a bench trial to move for dismissal following a plaintiff's case-in-chief "on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). "Under [r]ule 41(b), the court may dismiss if (1) the claimant has failed to introducesufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, or (2) the trial court is not persuaded by that evidence." Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999 UT App 167, ¶ 8, 982 P.2d 581 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the trial court grants the motion for dismissal because the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case, we review the propriety of such action as a question of law for correctness. See id. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case but the trial court dismisses the claim because it is unpersuaded by the evidence, the trial court must make findings to support that dismissal. See Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Grossen, 1999 UT App 167, ¶ 9 ("In effect, the rule allows the trial court to weigh the evidence, to draw inferences therefrom and, if it finds the evidence insufficient... to render a decision for the defendant on the merits." (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We review those findings for clear error. See Grossen, 1999 UT App 167, ¶ 10; see also Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 1144 (requiring that appellate courts view evidence in the light most favorable to the findings). Wife challenges the trial court's finding "[t]hat the placing of... John [D.] Hoggan's [(Husband)] name on the title to the property [at 687 Third Avenue (the Property)] by America First Credit Union [in conjunction with the 1991 loan] was not intended to convey an interest to the [P]roperty to [Husband]."

In October 1991, Wife, Husband, and Husband's mother, Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan Jolley aka Elizabeth Duncan (Mother), took out a $25,000 home equity loan from America First Credit Union so that Wife and Husband could make improvements and pay back taxes on the Property. As a condition of the loan, the lender required that Mother execute a quit claim deed transferring ownership of the Property from herself individually to herself and Husband, "a married man, as joint tenants, but not as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship." The deed was duly recorded on October 23, 1991, the day after it was executed.

At the bench trial on Wife's claim to quiet title in Husband, ¹ Wife presented the recorded quit claim deed as primafacie evidence of Husband's ownership of the Property. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(1)(a), (d) (2000) (creating presumptions that a recorded deed was genuine, voluntarily executed, and delivered); In re Estate of Ashton, 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that by using the words "joint tenancy," "the title holders intended to create a valid joint tenancy" with rights of survivorship). Following Wife's case-in-chief, Husband² moved for dismissal, asserting that Wife's testimony established by clear and convincing evidence that "[Wife] ha[d] no interest in the [P]roperty" and that "the deed in 1991 was never intended to convey [the P]roperty to [Husband]," "the purpose behind the quit claim deed... [being] to obtain the loan." See generally Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 110 (Utah 1991) ("A conveyance is valid only upon delivery of a deed with present intent to transfer."). The trial court agreed and dismissed Wife's complaint with prejudice.

By virtue of the deed's recording, Wife was entitled to the presumptions that the deed was genuine and voluntarily executed, that it created a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, and that it was delivered. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(1)(a), (d); Ashton, 898 P.2d at 826. A person challenging the validity of a deed must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the deed was not delivered or that the grantor lacked intent. See Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 240, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (1966). Because Wife met her burden of establishing a prima facie case, the dismissal was granted under the second variant of rule 41(b). Accordingly, we must consider whether the trial court's finding supporting the dismissal was clearly erroneous. See generally Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 1147 ("Findings are clearly erroneous if they are against the clear weight of the evidence or if the appellate court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.").³

Viewing, as we must, the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's finding that Mother lacked the requisite intent to convey the Property, seeid. at 1144, we hold that the finding was not clearly erroneous. Rather, the record shows that the challenged finding was supported by evidence that the trial court could have considered to be clear and convincing.

Wife admitted at trial that in executing the quit claim deed, Mother did not intend to convey the house to Husband:

[Counsel:] So what was the purpose of the quit claim deed?

[Wife:] So that we could get our equity line of credit.[⁴]

[Counsel:] The purpose behind the quit claim deed was not to convey [Husband] the house[?]

[Wife:] Not at that time, no.

(Emphasis added.) See generally Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984) ("Where a deed is executed with no intent to transfer a present interest, it will be invalidated by a court in equity."). This testimony was consistent with Wife's other statements about the nature of the agreement between Mother and Wife and Husband with respect to the Property. Wife conceded that she and Husband moved into the Property with the understanding that they would make improvements and pay property taxes in lieu of rent. Indeed, she testified that the agreement only gave them the right to live in the home rent-free and did not create an ownership interest. Wife also admitted that she and Husband needed the loan money to fulfill their obligations under the agreement with Mother. Wife further testified that she, Husband, and Mother entered the agreement with the intention of Husband and Wife improving the Property to make it ready for sale.⁵ The Property was listed in 1995 but did not sell. Based on Wife's testimony as a whole, it was not error for the trial court to conclude that the presumption of a conveyance that arose from the recorded deed was refuted by clear and convincing evidence.

The trial court's finding is supported by the record and therefore is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's dismissal of Wife's claim with prejudice under rule 41(b). Affirmed.

Stephen L. Roth, Judge

WE CONCUR: Carolyn B. McHugh,...