Hognestad v. Rabideau

Decision Date17 March 2017
Parties Paul HOGNESTAD, Petitioner–Landlord, v. Lynne RABIDEAU, Respondent–Tenant.
CourtNew York City Court

John T. Keenan III, Esq. Albany, for PetitionerLandlord.

Lynne Rabideau, Pro Se.

THOMAS MARCELLE, J.

Petitioner Hognestad ("landlord") brought a non-payment proceeding (RPAPL § 711[2] ). The petition alleged that Respondent Rabideau ("tenant"), who ran a barber shop, had failed to pay any rent for six months. At the return date of the petition, the court allowed the tenant to provide an oral answer to the petition (22 NYCRR § 210.7 ). Instead of answering, the tenant requested an adjournment to obtain counsel. The court granted the adjournment but admonished:

Under the law, we have to resolve this case in ten days unless there is a mutual agreement otherwise. So you are going to have to work very quickly to get counsel. [Counsel] is familiar with these cases. Call [him] today and advise him that the Judge has set an inflexible trial date in one week.

On the day of trial, the tenant explained she had contacted counsel just the prior day. There was a problem—counsel was engaged elsewhere and could not appear. Tenant's counsel had talked with the landlord's counsel to obtain consent for a further adjournment of the case. The landlord refused.

At the end of its regular session, the court held a conference in chambers to determine if a resolution was possible or whether an adjournment might be consented to. Neither could be achieved. The landlord took the position that he and his witnesses took time from work and he lacked the desire to absorb that cost again. Further, given the court's trial calendar, the next trial slot would be two weeks away which the landlord deemed too long to be acceptable in his effort to regain possession of his property.

The court took tenant's request for the adjournment under advisement. The court researched the matter and found a decision on point. In Carlton Assocs. v. Bayne, 191 Misc.2d 54, 740 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup.Ct., Kings County 2002), the identical fact pattern was presented—a pro se party seeking an adjournment beyond the ten-day limit in order to get counsel. The court held that judges have the inherent power to adjourn a case beyond RPAPL § 745(1)' s ten-day limit (191 Misc.2d at 59, 740 N.Y.S.2d 785 ); (see also Paladino v. Sotille, 15 Misc.3d 60, 62, 835 N.Y.S.2d 799 [App.Term, 2d Dept., 9th & 10th Jud.Dists.2007] ) [citing Carlton Assocs. in reversing a trial court's decision not to grant an adjournment in a non-payment proceeding]. Despite this precedent, the court denied, in this case, the tenant's request for an adjournment.

It is no grand moment in judicial history when a court denies an adjournment; but neither is it a small thing to disagree with the learned ruling of another court. One of the most important roles of the judiciary is to articulate the logic behind its rulings. Courts distinguish, erode, adopt, adapt, harmonize and refine previous prior cases. These opinions, having been faithfully preserved by state and federal reporters for hundreds of years, provide the substance for advocates and judges to argue and reason. The judiciary's wonderful devotion to this cause allows the law to advance. Since this court's ruling disagrees with a decision dealing with the same issue, it is, therefore, incumbent upon it to explain why.

The crux of the problem resides in the time restraints which RPAPL § 745(1) imposes upon the trial of non-payment cases. RPAPL § 745(1) provides in relevant part:

At the time when issue is joined the court, in its discretion, may adjourn the trial of the issue, but not more than ten days, except by consent of all parties.

Whether a judge has the authority to adjourn a trial beyond the ten-day limit devolves into a twofold inquiry: (1) does § 745 permit a court, on its own accord, to adjourn non-payment proceedings beyond ten days and (2) if § 745 denies the ability of a court to grant such an adjournment, then does § 745 violate the separation of powers doctrine.

The answer to the first question turns on how § 745 is construed. In Carlton Assocs., the court "reject[ed] a literal reading of section 745(1) and [held] that section does not preclude the grant of an adjournment within [the court's discretion] beyond the 10 days prescribed by statute without the consents of the parties" (191 Misc.2d at 59, 740 N.Y.S.2d 785 ). For the reasons described below, the court cannot adopt such a construction of § 745.

Section 745(1) has two parts: (1) the proscriptive rule: the court may not adjourn the trial for more than ten days; and (2) the exception to the rule: unless all the parties consent. Each part of the statute needs to be examined in turn. First, the proscriptive part of the statute is cast in altogether definite terms. The legislature might well have composed the statute to say that non-payment cases be tried expeditiously. It did not; rather, the legislature chose a different route—it set a time limit, ten days. The court finds that when the legislature said ten days, it meant ten days.

The second part of the statute deals with the exception to the rule—a single exception—an extension beyond ten days requires consent by all parties. It could be argued that implied in all statutes (at least those dealing with procedural time frames) there exists an invisible yet inalterable exception that permits modification of deadlines when the ends of justice so require. In Carlton, the court found that this exception is implied given the inherent power of judges to control their calendars.

This court certainly accepts that such an exception exists in the case of scarce judicial resources. It may well be true on occasion that the court has more trials than trial slots over a ten day period. In which case, it would be impossible to hold a trial in ten days. The legislature cannot command a court to perform the impossible and is presumed not to have done so. Accordingly, courts have "the power to construe statutes as to rule out absurd and unexpected results." (Chatlos v. McGoldrick, 302 N.Y. 380, 388, 98 N.E.2d 567 [N.Y.1951] ). However, there should be no confusion on the limitation of this statutory canon-an exception can be created out of necessity but not for convenience. The justification to continue the case here, as in Carlton, was the unavailability of counsel, not the unavailability of a trial slot. Thus, under the present facts a statutory construction driven by necessity should not be employed.

The principle applicable here is the paramount rule that the judiciary should construe laws to animate the intention of the legislature. The starting point for discerning that intent is the language of the statute (Yatauro v. Mangano, 17 N.Y.3d 420, 426, 931 N.Y.S.2d 36, 955 N.E.2d 343 [2011] ). The words of the statute and what those words convey, in context, is what the statute means. And where, as here, a statute is unambiguous, the courts must give effect to its plain meaning (People v. Brown, 25 N.Y.3d 247, 250, 10 N.Y.S.3d 500, 32 N.E.3d 935 [2015] ).

Section 745's exception to the proscriptive rule is crystal; the power to adjourn a trial beyond ten days requires the consent of all parties. Again, the legislature could have chosen to allow an adjournment where justice so required. The legislature knows how to employ such exception—and frequently does—but it did not here.1

Thus, the court is left to conclude that the legislature knowingly chose to deprive judges of the power to adjourn a case without the consent of all parties.

Having concluded that § 745 fails to permit a judicial exception to the ten-day limit, the court begins a new inquiry—whether the legislature impermissibly invaded the providence of the judiciary by limiting a judge's ability to adjourn a case. This is a separation of powers issue.2

Although the doctrine does not appear as such in the State Constitution, separation of powers has "deep, seminal roots in the constitutional distribution of powers among the three coordinate branches of government" (Cohen v. State, 94 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 698 N.Y.S.2d 574, 720 N.E.2d 850 [1999] ). The Constitution gives each branch distinct roles: The legislative branch creates the law, the executive branch enforces the law, and the judicial branch interprets the law and decides cases and controversies that arise under the law. When one branch disrupts the ability of the other branch to carry out its function, the separation of powers principle is implicated. The courts are "the final arbiter of true separation of powers disputes" (Id. ).

The Carlton case nicely prosecutes the argument that § 745 violates the separation of powers. The argument goes that while the legislature sets the rules for litigation, its authority has limitations. In particular, the rules set by the legislature may not trespass upon a court's core decision making power. This core power includes the discretion to grant an adjournment for a party to get a lawyer. Nothing enhances the truth finding function (which after all is part and parcel of deciding a case) more than dueling advocates. Given this rather large benefit, the court concluded that "it is not competent for the legislature to preclude absolutely the granting of an adjournment in all cases regardless of the circumstances" (191 Misc.2d at 59, 740 N.Y.S.2d 785 ).

This is a fair analysis but it misses the point. The analysis is built upon the implicit assumption that § 745's ten day limit is a mere litigation rule. In most simplistic terms, legislatures enact two types of law. Substantive laws which grant rights, impose duties or proscribe actions and process laws which govern how litigation is conducted. This court believes that a ten- day limit is better viewed as a substantive law, which makes all the difference in the outcome of the case.

This belief is predicated upon the history...

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    ...Term, 2nd Dept 2009]). However, when an answer is filed and a matter is noticed for trial, (see RPAPL § 745(1); Hognestad v Rabideau, 55 Misc.3d 977, 979, 53 N.Y.S.3d 824 [City Court, Albany County 2017]), the court may enter the default judgment upon respondent's failure to appear, without......
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