Hogsed v. Lancaster Area Schools Bd. of Trustees

Decision Date31 July 1984
Docket NumberNo. 0270,0270
Parties, 20 Ed. Law Rep. 746 Judith A. HOGSED, Appellant, v. LANCASTER AREA SCHOOLS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Respondent. . Heard
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

Jay Bender, of Belser, Baker, Barwick, Ravenel, Toal & Bender, Columbia, for appellant.

Bruce E. Davis, Camden, and James B. Richardson, Jr., Columbia, for respondent.

SANDERS, Chief Judge:

Appellant Judith A. Hogsed is a school teacher employed by the Lancaster County Board of Education and assigned to the Lancaster Area Schools. She applied for a transfer to a particular school and the superintendent of the Lancaster Area Schools denied her request. Ms. Hogsed thereafter initiated a grievance proceeding pursuant to section 59-19-510 of the 1976 Code of Laws of South Carolina. The respondent Lancaster Area Schools Board of Trustees upheld the decision of the superintendent, as did the Lancaster County Board of Education. Ms. Hogsed then petitioned the Circuit Court for a trial de novo pursuant to section 59-19-560. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of Trustees on the ground that there was "no genuine issue of material fact." Ms. Hogsed appeals. We reverse.

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only when it is perfectly clear there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Vaughn v. A.E. Green Co., Inc., 277 S.C. 392, 287 S.E.2d 493 (1982); Jones Leasing, Inc. v. Gene Phillips & Associates, S.C.App., 318 S.E.2d 31 (1984). All evidence and inferences which can be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Coleman, Admrx. v. Shaw, 314 S.E.2d 154 (S.C.App.1984).

Ms. Hogsed alleges the transfer policy established for the Lancaster Area Schools was not followed in denying her the transfer. The policy in question provides:

Factors such as the qualifications of the individual teacher, the teaching situation itself, and the background experience of the teachers should be taken into consideration in granting transfers. Other factors being equal, seniority shall carry privilege.

Therefore, our task on appeal is one of determining if it is perfectly clear from the evidence that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether this policy was followed.

The record contains a number of affidavits, depositions and letters revealing material facts which can be summarized as follows:

According to Ms. Hogsed's affidavit, she holds a Bachelor of Science degree in physical education, health and history from Appalachain State University and a Master of Arts in teaching from Winthrop College, with 12 hours of post-masters graduate study. She is certified by the South Carolina Department of Education to teach elementary school, social studies and physical education. She has taught physical education at the junior high and high school levels in the Lancaster Area Schools for a total of 18 years. In the early years of her employment she recommended the implementation of an elementary level physical education program to the superintendent and has often stated her interest in the program.

Ms. Hogsed's affidavit goes on to relate her efforts to obtain the transfer which she was denied. She says that in March 1981, she learned an elementary physical education program was being considered for the Lancaster Area Schools and made formal application to Superintendent Crolley for transfer to a position teaching physical education at North Elementary School. She says that in July 1981, funds were approved for the position and she contacted Superintendent Crolley again by telephone and inquired about her application for the transfer. She says he told her "that the school budget had not been completed and asked that I call him back again in a couple of days." She says that in early August 1981, she attempted to call Superintendent Crolley back but was not able to reach him and talked instead to his personnel director who told her the position had already been filled but she would be "next in line for transfer to the elementary physical education program." She says that three days later she finally reached Superintendent Crolley himself by telephone, at which time he told her that one Tina Broome Jackson had been given the transfer to North Elementary because he had recommended Ms. Jackson, she was certified in elementary education and she had requested the transfer before Ms. Hogsed.

Ms. Hogsed says further in her affidavit that she later had a conference with Ms. Billie Todd Smith, principal of North Elementary, and was told by her that she had not recommended anyone for the new position at her school and the decision to transfer the other teacher there was made by someone else.

In both his affidavit and deposition, Superintendent Crolley says he first interviewed Ms. Jackson in August 1980. He hired her to fill a junior high school physical education position and promised her the first position created in the Lancaster Area Schools for elementary physical education. According to Superintendent Crolley, he based his promise upon the fact that he knew of no other request for the elementary position. In addition, he said he had been apprised by Ms. Smith of her unusually high regard for Ms. Jackson's prospects as a teacher and her desire to have Jackson at her school. He acknowledges that in March 1981, Ms. Hogsed applied for the North Elementary position. He states the basis for his decision to give the transfer to Ms. Jackson over Ms. Hogsed as follows:

Aware of my promise to Miss Broome (now Mrs. Tina Broome Jackson) and the request of the North Elementary Principal for the...

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4 cases
  • Armstrong v. School Dist. Five, Lexington, Richland, Civ.A. 3:997-903-0.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • October 15, 1998
    ...289 S.C. 438, 346 S.E.2d 712, 715 (S.C.1986) (contracts incorporate State law); see, also, Hogsed v. Lancaster Area Schools Board Trustees, 283 S.C. 42, 320 S.E.2d 724, 727 (S.C.App.1984) (policies adopted by school boards are contractual, binding upon districts as well as their employees).......
  • Dillon v. Board of Educ. of Wyoming County
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1986
    ...rev'd, 425 Pa. 279, 380 A.2d 353 (1977); Burns v. Segerson, 122 R.I. 123, 404 A.2d 500 (1979); Hogsed v. Lancaster Area Schools Board of Trustees, 283 S.C. 42, 320 S.E.2d 724 (1984).6 We note that these criteria were never mentioned as prerequisites to the vacant position in the superintend......
  • Vaught v. Waites
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • October 18, 1989
    ...idea in South Carolina, citing Dew v. City of Florence, 279 S.C. 155, 303 S.E.2d 664 (1983) and Hogsed v. Lancaster Area School Board of Trustees, 283 S.C. 42, 320 S.E.2d 724 (Ct.App.1984)). The Handbook provides that Vaught may be terminated for "cause" and defines one of the causes as the......
  • Toth v. Square D Co.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 5, 1988
    ...upheld consideration of handbook provisions in the construction of an employment relationship. Hogsed v. Lancaster Area School Board of Trustees, 283 S.C. 42, 320 S.E.2d 724 (Ct.App.1984) (summary judgment inappropriate where evidence did not clearly establish employer's compliance with tra......

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