Hoit v. Capital Dist. Transp. Auth.
| Decision Date | 22 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | 1:15-CV-134 (CFH) |
| Parties | KEVIN HOIT, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL DISTRICT TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, P.C.
Albany, New York 12205
Attorneys for plaintiff
O'Connor, O'Connor Law Firm
20 Corporate Woods Blvd.
ELMER R. KEACH, III., ESQ.
MARIA K. DYSON, ESQ.
DENNIS A. FIRST, ESQ.
DANIELLE M. MEYERS, ESQ.
LISA F. JOSLIN, ESQ.
RICHARD C. REILLY, ESQ.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER
Presently pending before the Court1 is (1) defendants Tony Clanton and Frank Mancini's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 79), (2) defendant Capital DistrictTransportation Authority's ("CDTA") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 81), and (3) plaintiff's Cross Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. Nos. 88, 89). Plaintiff opposed defendants' motions. Dkt. Nos. 89, 90, 91. Defendant CDTA filed a reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to plaintiff's motion to file a Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 95. Defendant Clanton and Mancini filed a reply "in further support of motion for summary judgment and in opposition to plaintiff's motion for leave to amend." Dkt. No. 97.
Following this Court's July 19, 2016 Decision and Order, the only remaining claims in this action are as follows: (1) plaintiff's first cause of action against defendants Baez and Mancini ("Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law - Violation of Equal Protection Clause/Sexual Harassment"), (2) plaintiff's third cause of action against defendants CDTA and Mancini ("Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law - Implementation of Municipal Policies and Practices that Directly Violate Constitutional Rights/Failure to Implement Municipal Policies to Avoid Constitutional Deprivations and/or Failure to Train and Supervise Employees under Color of State Law"), and (3) plaintiff's fourth cause of action against defendants CDTA, Baez, and Clanton ("Violation of New York State Human Rights Law - New York Executive Law § 296"). Dkt. Nos. 22, 51.
The undersigned will first address the dispositive motions (Dkt. Nos. 79, 81) and will then address plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 88). For the reasons that follow, CDTA's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, defendants Mancini and Clanton's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, andplaintiff's Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint is denied.
Defendant CDTA argues that plaintiff fails to demonstrate that CDTA should be held liable for the conduct of its employees under Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because plaintiff presented no evidence that he suffered constitutional harm as a result of a policy, practice or custom, or deficient training. See Dkt. No. 81-19. Further, CDTA contends that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for hostile work environment in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL")2 § 296 because the alleged sexual harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment. Id. In response, plaintiff argues that CDTA is liable for the actions of the individual defendants because it "condoned and created a workplace environment that was permeated with sexually inappropriate conduct" and because senior officials engaged in, or were aware of and failed to remedy, sexually-inappropriate conduct. Dkt. No. 91 at 27.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, it was supported by affidavits or other suitable evidence, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The moving party has the burden to show the absence of disputed material facts by providing the court with portions of pleadings, depositions, and affidavits which support the motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Facts are material if they may affect the outcome of the case as determined by substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "A 'genuine' dispute over a material fact only arises if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Dister v. Cont'l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). All ambiguities are resolved and all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 F.3d 330, 334 (2d Cir. 1997). However, "inferences must be supported by affirmative facts and must be based on relevant, admissible evidence." Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Merritt-Meridian Constr. Corp., 975 F.Supp. 511, 515 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . . an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat anotherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]" Rexford Holdings, Inc. v. Biderman, 21 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted ).
The party opposing the motion must set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, and must do more than show that there is some doubt or speculation as to the true nature of the facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). For a court to grant a motion for summary judgment, it must be apparent that no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party. See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir. 1994); Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988).
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, CDTA filed a Statement of Material Facts. Dkt. No. 81-20. The facts relating to CDTA's Motion for Summary Judgment are related herein in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Skubel, 113 F.3d at 334.
Plaintiff contends that on November 7, 2013, plaintiff, then a mechanic for CDTA, worked the second shift in CDTA's Albany garage. Dkt. No. 90 at 5. November 7, 2013 was plaintiff's last day of employment with CDTA; he voluntarily resigned on October 25, 2013, effective November 7, 2013, in order to work for a different companyin a job that provided a pay increase. Id. at 6. Plaintiff did not resign due to the incident nor to any incident of sexual harassment at CDTA. Id. at 6. Defendants Juan Baez and Frank Mancini were maintenance foremen, with Baez as a foreman for the mechanics and Mancini as foreman for the service technicians. Dkt. No. 81-20 at 1. Foremen "assigned work and oversaw personnel on the shop floor" and "could report misconduct on the part of mechanics, but could not and did not recommend discipline or take disciplinary action." Id. at 2. Foremen were not involved in hiring or interviewing. Id.
Mancini was not supervising plaintiff on November 7, 2013. Dkt. No. 81-20 at 2; Dkt. No. 20 at 3. Plaintiff considered Baez to be a "friend at work." Id. at 4. Plaintiff and Clanton were friendly at work. See id. at 5. Plaintiff would "joke around" with Mancini at work. Id. Plaintiff was working on a bus in a bus bay during the incident in question. Id. at 6, 35. After the incident, plaintiff smoked a cigarette with Clanton and another coworker. Dkt. No. 90 at 13. Plaintiff took his meal break that evening with Baez and Mancini. Id. at 15. Plaintiff worked the remainder of his shift. Id.
CDTA had in place an Employee Conduct Policy, Employee Rules of Conduct Policy, and a Preventing Harassment in the Workplace policy. Dkt. No. 81-20 at 2. Pursuant to CDTA's policies, "upon receiving a complaint of alleged harassment, the Director of Human Resources (or their designee) undertakes an investigation to determine if the Policy on Preventing Harassment in the Workplace has been violated, and employees violating the policy are subject to discipline which can include suspension and termination[.]" Id. Plaintiff received an employee handbook when hebegan working for CDTA, and underwent yearly training about discrimination and harassment in the workplace. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff never reported the November 7, 2013 incident to anyone at CDTA or to the police. Dkt. No. 90 at 16-17. Plaintiff never had a problem with Baez before the incident, nor had Baez previously done anything to plaintiff that plaintiff felt to be inappropriate. Id. at 26. Plaintiff never personally experienced any act that be perceived to be harassment at CDTA prior to the incident. Id. Similarly, plaintiff never before experienced any incidents with Mancini. Id. at 32. Plaintiff was friendly with Clanton both in and outside of work. Id.
In addition to taking plaintiff to the ground and then sitting on top of plaintiff, Clanton also " Dkt. No. 90 at 7. Plaintiff was not laughing during the incident, but yelling at defendants and was "physically struggling to get away from them." Id. Richard Chevalier, a CDTA technician, observed that plaintiff was upset for the remainder of the evening. Id. at 8. Clanton saw Baez...
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