Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State

• Jurisdiction: North Carolina,United States
• Citation: Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 385 N.C. 380, 892 S.E.2d 594(Mem) (N.C. 2023)
• Decision Date: 18 October 2023
• Parties: HOKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., plaintiffs and Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, plaintiff-intervenor and Rafael Penn, et al., plaintiff-intervenors v. STATE of North Carolina and the State Board of Education, defendants and Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, realigned defendant and Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Timothy K. Moore, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, intervenor-defendants
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Docket Number: 425A21-3

385 N.C. 380

892 S.E.2d 594 (Mem)

HOKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., plaintiffs and Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, plaintiff-intervenor and Rafael Penn, et al., plaintiff-intervenors v. STATE of North Carolina and the State Board of Education, defendants and Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, realigned defendant and Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Timothy K. Moore, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, intervenor-defendants

No. 425A21-3

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 18, 2023

Robert Neal Hunter, Jr., Attorney at Law, For Combs, Linda, State Controller.

Michael L. Robinson, Winston-Salem, Forsyth County, Attorney at Law.

Amar Majmundar, Senior Deputy Attorney General, For State of N.C.

Matthew Tulchin, Special Deputy Attorney General, For State of N.C.

Tiffany Y. Lucas, Deputy General Counsel, For State of N.C.

Thomas J. Ziko, Attorney at Law, For State Board of Education.

Neal A. Ramee, Attorney at Law, For Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.

David Noland, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, For Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.

H. Lawrence Armstrong, Attorney at Law, Enfield, For Hoke County Board of Education, et al.

Melanie Black Dubis, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, For Hoke County Board of Education, et al.

Scott B. Bayzle, Attorney at Law, For Hoke County Board of Education, et al.

Elizabeth M. Haddix, Attorney at Law, Pittsboro, For Penn, Rafael, et al.

Matthew F. Tilley, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, For Berger, Philip E., et al.

Russ Ferguson, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, For Berger, Philip E., et al.

Christopher A. Brook, Attorney at Law, For Penn, Rafael, et al.

Scott E. Bayzle, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, For Hoke County Board of Education, et al.

Catherine G. Clodfelter, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, For Hoke County Board of Education, et al.

Ryan Y. Park, Solicitor General, For State of N.C.

Michael A. Ingersoll, Attorney at Law, For Berger, Philip E., et al.

Sarah G. Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, For State of N.C.

South A. Moore, Assistant General Counsel, For State of N.C.

Maya Brodziak, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, For Penn, Rafael, et al.

David Hinojosa, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, For Penn, Rafael, et al.

Chavis Jones, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, For Penn, Rafael, et al.

Michael Robotti, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, For Penn, Rafael, et al.

ORDER

On the petition for discretionary review prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals filed by intervenor-defendants on 20 September 2023, the Court hereby allows the petition solely on the question of whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its order of 17 April 2023. See Lemmerman v. A.T. Williams Oil Co. , 318 N.C. 577, 580, 350 S.E.2d 83 (1986) ("The question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even in the Supreme Court.").

By order of the Court in Conference, this the 18th day of October 2023.

Justice BERGER concurring.

The premise of the dissent is that this Court already "resolved the question of subject-matter jurisdiction in [ Hoke County III ]." ¹ The dissent is wrong.

Take, for example, the question of standing. My dissenting colleague previously served as the lawyer for some of the parties in this case, known as the Penn Intervenors. ² Those parties, in filings while my dissenting colleague was their counsel, requested to intervene in this matter. The lawsuit, at that point, focused on educational deficiencies in rural counties in the eastern part of our State. The Penn Intervenors sought intervention to "enforce their constitutional rights to a sound basic education" against the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System. Core to their rationale for intervention was that every public school district faces its own unique educational challenges and groups of students or school districts in one area of our state are ill-suited to address the educational deficiencies in others.

This raises questions that our Court has not yet addressed: If public school students or local school boards who are not parties to this case believe the remedial order does not sufficiently address the educational failure in their districts, are they bound by the remedial order? If so, how were their rights adjudicated without their presence in the suit—an elementary principle of jurisdictional law. See Martin v. Wilks , 490 U.S. 755, 759, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) ("[T]he general rule" is "that a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party."). Moreover, if they are not bound by the remedial order and may bring their own claims (as the Penn Intervenors did in this case with my dissenting colleague as their counsel), how did the trial court have jurisdiction to enter a judgment purportedly adjudicating their rights? See id.

There are many other unresolved issues of subject matter jurisdiction as well. How did so many crucial issues get ignored when many of these issues were addressed at length in the Hoke County III dissent? See Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State , 382 N.C. 386, 477–536, 879 S.E.2d 193 (2022). The Court never explained.

However, as my dissenting colleague acknowledges, this Court rushed to complete its earlier opinion in this incredibly complex, novel case (one that has spanned decades) so that it could be released in November of last year. The failure to resolve these jurisdictional questions is not the first oversight from this Court's rush to judgment in Hoke County III . As other filings have acknowledged, there is another pending appeal at this Court, involving the same parties and related issues.

My dissenting colleague laments that subject matter is now being addressed because it will cause various harms to judicial integrity and "snuff out legal finality." Once again, we endure ad nauseum these fanciful protestations. But it is black letter law that courts cannot ignore potential defects in subject matter jurisdiction. "Where there is no jurisdiction of the subject matter the whole proceeding is void ab initio and may be treated as a nullity anywhere, at any time, and for any purpose." High v. Pearce , 220 N.C. 266, 271, 17 S.E.2d 108 (1941). Even if we again failed to address jurisdictional concerns, these issues could be raised later in a collateral attack on the trial court's order, causing tremendous chaos if steps are already being taken to execute the novel relief in the remedial order. See Pulley v. Pulley , 255 N.C. 423, 429, 121 S.E.2d 876 (1961).

In sum, the Legislative-Intervenors argued various jurisdictional theories in their briefs and arguments to this Court that were left unresolved. This court is duty-bound to address any potential subject matter jurisdiction issues, even those that are not raised by the parties. In re Sauls , 270 N.C. 180, 187, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967). However, in its rush to publish an opinion in the prior matter, the majority declined to address fundamental subject matter jurisdiction questions. To be sure, these issues were raised, but the majority chose to ignore the bedrock legal principle that courts must examine jurisdiction to act. Even legal neophytes understand that subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived and can be raised at any time. See Lemmerman v. A.T. Williams Oil Co. , 318 N.C. 577, 580, 350 S.E.2d 83 (1986).

Because these crucial issues of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and must be addressed by this Court, it is a sound exercise of this Court's constitutional role to take this case and permit the parties to brief the various issues including standing, joinder of necessary parties, adverseness, intervention, and jurisdiction of the trial court to provide the requested relief, all of which are necessary jurisdictional prerequisites to execution of the trial court's remedial order.

Justice DIETZ and Justice ALLEN join in this concurring opinion.

Justice EARLS dissenting.

Legislative-Intervenors’ bypass petition should be denied because it is substantively hollow and procedurally improper. This Court resolved the question of subject-matter jurisdiction in Leandro IV . See Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 382 N.C. 386, 879 S.E.2d 193 (2022) (" Leandro IV "). In that case—just 11-months old—the Legislative-Intervenors raised the same arguments they do in their bypass petition: That the trial court lacked jurisdiction to remedy constitutional deficiencies in public education. See id. at 469-70, 879 S.E.2d 193. We examined that claim and "unequivocally rejected" it. See id. at 469-71, 879 S.E.2d 193.

Legislative-Intervenors could have asked us to reconsider our ruling at that time. In fact, North Carolina's Rules of Appellate Procedure gave them a specific mechanism to do so. See N.C. R. App. P. 31(a). They did not. And now, they seek a belated "do over"—a result foreclosed by our procedural rules and long-standing practice. See, e.g., Davis v. S. Ry. Co., 176 N.C. 186, 96 S.E. 945 (1918) (denying request to reconsider an earlier decision because the "only method" to do so was a "petition to rehear" and defendant had not timely filed one); accord Newton v. State Highway Com., 194 N.C. 303, 139 S.E. 613 (1927). In short, the majority grants an untimely petition to reopen a settled question. Because I think that action is unsound in principle and destabilizing in practice, I dissent.

Our decision in Leandro IV shows that the issue of jurisdiction is not new to this case. The Legislative-Intervenors previously have raised the same jurisdictional arguments they now seek to raise in their bypass petition. See Leandro IV , 382 N.C. at 391, 469-70, 879 S.E.2d 193. There, as here, they disputed the trial court's authority to order a statewide remedy because, in their view, that court never found a statewide constitutional violation. Id. We found those assertions "untimely, distortive, and meritless." Id....