Hoke v. Lyle

• Decision Date: 08 August 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-45
• Parties: STEPHEN RAY HOKE, Plaintiff, v. MR. LYLE; NATHAN DEAL; HOMER BRYSON; STANLEY WILLIAMS; and TIFFANY HENRY, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

STEPHEN RAY HOKE, Plaintiff, v. MR. LYLE; NATHAN DEAL; HOMER BRYSON;

STANLEY WILLIAMS; and TIFFANY HENRY, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-45

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

August 8, 2016

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia ("GSP"), submitted a Complaint, (doc. 1), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, et seq., contesting certain conditions of his confinement. For the reasons which follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Governor Nathan Deal and Homer Bryson. Additionally, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, DISMISS his claims for compensative and punitive damages under Section 1983, and DISMISS his monetary damages claims under RLUIPA. The Court should also DENY Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. However, Plaintiff's allegations arguably state colorable claims for injunctive relief and nominal damages against Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry in their individual capacities. Accordingly, these claims will proceed, and the Court DIRECTS the United States Marshal to serve Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and this Order.

BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff claims that Defendants instituted policies specifically "stop[ping] all Christian Religious Mail from coming into the prison . . ." (Doc. 1, p. 8.) Plaintiff states that during the month of September 2014, Landmark Ministries tried on multiple occasions to send Plaintiff a study bible and bible study lessons. (Id. at p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he never received these packages and never received notification that Defendants rejected those items. When Plaintiff asked why he was not receiving his packages, a counselor told him that GSP had not approved his "Package Request" form. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he submitted several package request forms and never received a response. After filing a grievance to that effect, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Williams denied him administrative relief and described the mailing situation as normal prison procedure. (Id. at p. 5.) Plaintiff contends, instead, that this policy was specifically enacted to "isolate and inflict mental punishment on inmates," that the policy substantially burdens his ability to practice his religion because meetings and prayer services are also banned, and that Defendants are specifically targeting Christians because other religious followers have "full freedom to meet and practice any way they wish . . . includ[ing] unfretted [sic] mail delivery of any incoming . . . material." (Id. at pp. 7-10.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an inability to pay the filing fee, and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court mustdismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

When reviewing a Complaint such as the one Plaintiff has filed, the Court is guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusualpower to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").

DISCUSSION

I. Failure to Disclose Litigation History

Plaintiff filed a Supplement to his Complaint on July 13, 2016, to correct an "honest mistake" regarding his litigation history. (Doc. 7.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff answered "no" when asked if he had previously "brought any lawsuits in federal court which deal with facts other than those involved in this action." (Doc. 1, p. 3.) In the follow-up questions asking Plaintiff for details regarding each lawsuit, he specifically wrote "N/A." However, in his Supplement, filed almost three months after his Complaint, Plaintiff discloses to the Court that in 2010 he brought one other suit in the Northern District of Georgia. (Doc. 7.)

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld the dismissal of cases where a pro se prisoner plaintiff has failed to disclose his previous lawsuits as required onthe face of the Section 1983 complaint form. See, e.g., Redmon, 414 F. App'x 221, 226 (11th Cir. 2011) (pro se prisoner's nondisclosure of prior litigation in Section 1983 complaint amounted to abuse of judicial process resulting in sanction of dismissal); Shelton v. Rohrs, 406 F. App'x 340, 341 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Young v. Sec'y Fla. for Dep't of Corr., 380 F. App'x 939, 941 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Hood v. Tompkins, 197 F. App'x 818, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (same). Even where the prisoner has later provided an explanation for his lack of candor, the Court has generally rejected the proffered reason as unpersuasive. See, e.g., Redmon, 414 F. App'x at 226 ("The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff's explanation for his failure to disclose the Colorado lawsuit—that he misunderstood the form—did not excuse the misrepresentation and that dismissal was a proper sanction."); Shelton, 406 F. App'x at 341 ("Even if [the plaintiff] did not have access to his materials, he would have known that he filed multiple previous lawsuits."); Young, 380 F. App'x at 941 (finding that not having documents concerning prior litigation and not being able to pay for copies of same did not absolve prisoner plaintiff "of the requirement of disclosing, at a minimum, all of the information that was known to him"); Hood, 197 F. App'x at 819 ("The objections were considered, but the district court was correct to conclude that to allow [the plaintiff] to then acknowledge what he should have disclosed earlier would serve to overlook his abuse of the judicial process.").

Another district court in this Circuit explained the importance of this information as follows:

[t]he inquiry concerning a prisoner's prior lawsuits is not a matter of idle curiosity, nor is it an effort to raise meaningless obstacles to a prisoner's access to the courts. Rather, the existence of prior litigation initiated by a prisoner is required in order for the Court to apply 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (the "three strikes rule" applicable to prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis). Additionally, it has been the Court's experience that a significant number of prisoner filings raise claims or issues that have already been decided adversely to the prisoner in prior litigation. . . . Identification of prior litigation frequently enables the Court todispose of successive cases without further expenditure of finite judicial resources.

Brown v. Saintavil, No. 2:14-CV-599-FTM-29, 2014 WL 5780180, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2014) (emphasis omitted).

The Court has no tolerance for lack of...