Holbrook v. Bos. Scientific Corp., CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-10671-WGY

• Decision Date: 16 September 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-10671-WGY
• Citation: 487 F.Supp.3d 100
• Parties: Margaret HOLBROOK and Robert Holbrook, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

487 F.Supp.3d 100

Margaret HOLBROOK and Robert Holbrook, Jr., Plaintiffs,

v.BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-10671-WGY

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed September 16, 2020

Aaron M. Levine, Aaron M. Levine & Associates, Washington, DC, Paula S. Bliss, Bernheim Kelley Battista & Bliss, Plymouth, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Kate E. Middleton, Pro Hac Vice, Faegre, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Lisa Oliver White, Murphy & Riley, PC, Boston, MA, Theodore E. O'Reilly, Pro Hac Vice, Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Margaret and Robert Holbrook (the "Holbrooks") filed this lawsuit against Boston Scientific Corporation ("Boston Scientific"), alleging that Ms. Holbrook was injured by defects in a pelvic mesh product, the Solyx, which Boston Scientific produced. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 61-62, ECF No. 1. A medical doctor in Louisiana implanted a Solyx mesh in Ms. Holbrook in May of 2016. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 58-59. This same doctor surgically removed the Solyx mesh in November of 2018, and found that the mesh had eroded. Compl. ¶ 61, ECF No. 1. The Holbrooks claim that Boston Scientific acted negligently in developing and marketing the Solyx, and breached warranties as to its safety, resulting in injuries to Ms. Holbrook and a loss of consortium. Compl. ¶¶ 70-104.

Boston Scientific moved to dismiss the complaint, Boston Scientific's Mot. Dismiss Compl., ECF No. 5, arguing that the Holbrooks’ claims were untimely under Louisiana's statute of prescription and precluded by the Louisiana Product Liability Act (the "Liability Act"), Def. Boston Scientific's Mem. Law. Supp. Mot. Dismiss ("Def.’s Mem. Mot. Dismiss") 1, 11-13, 13-22, ECF No. 6. This Court granted Boston Scientific's motion, dismissing the Holbrooks’ complaint without prejudice to the Holbrook's filing for leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days. ECF No. 20. The Holbrooks have now moved for leave to file an amended complaint, Pls.’ Mot. Leave File Am. Compl. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and filed a proposed amended complaint. Mot. Leave, Ex. 1, Am. Compl. 1-24, ECF No. 22-1. Boston Scientific has filed a memorandum in opposition. Def. Boston Scientific Corporation's Opp'n Pls.’ Mot. Leave File Am. Compl. ("Def.’s Opp'n"), ECF No. 24.

II. ANALYSIS

Boston Scientific argues that the Holbrooks’ proposed amended complaint remains time-barred and fails to state a claim under the Liability Act. Def.’s Opp'n 1-2, 4-19. Therefore, Boston Scientific contends, the Holbrooks’ motion for leave to amend should be denied as futile. Id.

This Court concludes that the plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint is sufficient as to all their claims, with the exception of the demand for attorney's fees and punitive damages. Accordingly, the proposed amended complaint merits granting the Holbrooks leave to file.

A party may amend its pleading by leave of the court, which should be "freely give[n] ... when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court "enjoys significant latitude in deciding whether to grant leave to amend." U.S. ex rel. Gagne v. City of Worcester, 565 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 2009). Generally, it ought grant such leave unless an amendment was made in bad faith, was unduly delayed, or would prove futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).

An amended complaint is futile if "the relevant statute of limitations has elapsed," Brooks v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 2020 WL 837375 at *1 (D. Mass. Feb. 20, 2020) (Sorokin, J.), or, "the pined-for amendment does not plead enough to make out a plausible claim for relief," HSBC Realty Credit Corp. (USA) v. O'Neill, 745 F.3d 564, 578 (1st Cir. 2014). To assess futility, a court applies the same legal standard as that of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996) ; that is, whether the plaintiff has plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff need not prove that he or she will prevail at trial but must establish more than simply a possibility of entitlement to relief. See García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2013).

A. Timeliness of the Complaint

Boston Scientific contends that the Holbrooks’ complaint is governed by the prescription statute of Louisiana -- the state where Ms. Holbrook was implanted with the Solyx mesh, and, where the Holbrooks reside. See Def.’s Opp'n 1-2, 5-13; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492.¹ Under that one-year prescription statute, the Holbrooks’ claims would be untimely and their motion to amend would be futile.

Instead, this Court concludes that Massachusetts's three-year statute of limitations applies to this action. See Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 260, § 2A.² Because the Holbrooks filed their complaint within that longer three-year period, the Holbrooks’ claims are not time-barred.

1. Choice of law Analysis

This Court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state, namely Massachusetts. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). "Massachusetts courts apply a functional approach to choice-of-law issues that involve conflicting statutes of limitations." Elliston v. Wing Enterprises, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 351, 354 (D. Mass. 2015) (Saylor, J.), citing New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gourdeau Constr. Co., 419 Mass. 658, 660-63, 647 N.E.2d 42 (1995) ( Gourdeau ). Under this approach, "the forum will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the claim unless:(a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the forum; and (b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state having a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence." Gourdeau, supra at 660 n.1, 647 N.E.2d 42, quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 142 (1971) (Supp. 1989).

The focus of this choice of law analysis is on the timeliness of the action, rather than the underlying claim. See Kahn v. Royal Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 572, 574–75, 709 N.E.2d 822, (1999) ("we focus on the statute of limitations issue, and not on the underlying tort"). When weighing the interests of the forum and others staets, Massachusetts courts focus on the overarching choice of law principles set forth in Section 6 of the Restatement. Gourdeau, supra at 660 n.2, 647 N.E.2d 42. Considering these factors, a Massachusetts court may apply the statute of limitations of another state if that state has "the dominant interest in having its own limitations statute enforced." Nierman v. Hyatt Corp., 441 Mass. 693, 696–98, 808 N.E.2d 290 (2004)³ .

In their amended complaint, the Holbrooks plausibly plead that Massachusetts has a substantial interest in the timeliness of their product liability claims. Not only do they assert that Boston Scientific is headquartered within Massachusetts, they also claim that all of the allegedly wrongful actions that underly the Holbrooks’ claims occurred in Massachusetts. See In re Fresenius Granuflo/NaturaLyte Dialysate Prod. Liab. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 3d 294, 307 (D. Mass. 2015) (Woodlock, J.) ("Massachusetts courts have ... considered the location of events that constitute the alleged wrongdoing as essential for the substantial interest analysis") ( Fresenius ). The Holbrooks allege that "all the decisions regarding designing, developing, warnings, warranties, packaging and labeling were made in Massachuetts," "[t]he negligence and wrongdoing of Defendant came from acts in Massachusetts, the product developed in as was done in Massachusetts, and the defective device was put into the stream of commerce in Massachusetts." Am. Compl. ¶2. Faced with similar claims, courts have concluded that Massachusetts’ statute of limitations should govern. See, e.g. Fresenius, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 306-308 (Massachusetts statute of limitations applied where defendant made decisions "regarding the design, marketing, sale, distribution, labeling, instructions and warnings—or decisions not to provide particular instructions and warning" in Massachusetts).

Applying Massachusetts’ statute of limitations to this case would further its "significant interest" in seeing a resident defendant, like Boston Scientific, "be held accountable for its conduct, which took place in Massachusetts, and which allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury." Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 417 Mass. 643, 649, 632 N.E.2d 832 (1994). Massachusetts "public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them ... and that the [user] of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products." See id. at 648, 632 N.E.2d 832.

Although Louisiana also has an interest in having its stricter statute of limitations applied to this case, that interest is not so obviously dominant that it warrants setting aside Massachusetts’ statute of limitations. See Def.’s Opp'n 5-11. Boston Scientific contends that Louisiana is the state with the closest connection to the Holbrook's claims because it is the state in which they reside and where Ms. Holbrook was implanted with the Solyx mesh. See Def.’s Opp'n 9-12. In product liability claims like this, however, the location of the injury "is only one aspect of the claim." Elliston, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 354. The Court also recognizes that Louisiana's unique statute of prescription and the Louisiana Product Liability Act reflect an interest in limiting liability for certain tort actions. See, e.g. Eaglin v. Eunice Police Dep't, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2018 WL 3154744, at *6 (La. 2018). (Louisiana has "long recognized significant differences exist between common law statutes...