Holbrook v. Chamberlin

• Decision Date: 23 October 1874
• Citation: 116 Mass. 155
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Wilder S. Holbrook v. Henry H. Chamberlin & others

116 Mass. 155

Wilder S. Holbrook v. Henry H. Chamberlin & others

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

October 23, 1874

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Worcester. Contract against Henry H. Chamberlin, John M. Barker and Warren D. Hobbs, to recover the rent of certain premises situated in the town of Sutton, leased by the plaintiff to the defendants by two leases under seal, and for damages resulting from the alleged breach of certain covenants therein. By the first lease, which was dated January 17, 1865, the plaintiff leased to the defendants "a certain factory building and water privilege with all the appurtenances thereto belonging for the term of five years from April 1, 1865. The lessees covenanted, among other things, "to quit and deliver up the premises and all future erections and additions to or upon the same, to the lessor or his assigns peaceably and quietly, at the end of the term, in as good order and condition (reasonable use and wearing thereof, and damages by fire or other casualties excepted) as the same now are or may be put into by the lessor, or those having his estate in the premises." The lessor agreed to sell to the defendants, "at any time within two years from date, all the property known as the Sutton Woollen Manufacturing Establishment" for a specified sum.

By the second lease, which was dated April 1, 1865, the plaintiff leased to the defendants for five years "all the land and buildings as they are upon the premises known as the Sutton Woollen Mills Estate" in Sutton, "meaning and intending to demise and let all that portion of the estate" not let to the defendants by the first lease. The lessees covenanted to deliver up the premises at the end of the term in as good order and condition "as the same now are, or may be put into by the lessor," "and not make or suffer any waste thereof."

At the trial in the Superior Court, before Bacon, J., the report of an auditor was the only evidence offered by the plaintiff. None of the findings of the auditor were controverted except the following.

The defendants offered evidence tending to show that the defendant Barker's name was signed to the first lease by Warren D. Hobbs, one of the other defendants, not in the presence of the said Barker, and without authority in writing from said Barker, and that Barker never personally signed the same; and they requested the judge to instruct the jury that the plaintiff could not recover under that lease unless Hobbs had authority from Barker under seal to execute the same, or unless Barker was present at the time it was so executed. This ruling the judge refused to give, but ruled that even if Hobbs had no authority to sign Barker's name, yet Barker, having entered under the lease, having afterwards taken the second lease of the other premises, and having executed that himself, was estopped from showing that Hobbs was not authorized to sign his name.

The auditor found that after the first lease was executed, but prior to April 1, 1865, the defendants set the glass which was broken in the mill and factory houses and effected other repairs therein, in consideration of being permitted by the plaintiff to occupy part of the mill and one of the factory houses free of rent from the date of said lease to April 1, 1865; and that these repairs were regarded by the parties as if made by the lessor, and that the covenants in the leases referred to the condition of the leased property as it stood on April 1, 1865; and that when the defendants took possession of the premises demised in the first lease, the windows were in good condition in the buildings named therein and the panes of glass properly set therein, but that at the expiration of said lease several of the windows and a large quantity of the glass were broken by some party other than the plaintiff, and the damages sustained by the plaintiff in the premises the auditor found to be seventy-five dollars.

The auditor further found that the premises were used by the defendants from April 1, 1865, until 1866, when they were changed to a cotton mill and afterwards used as such, the machinery used therein was operated by water power in the usual manner; that in 1866 the defendants placed in the mill additional machinery consisting of counter-shafting, pulleys, hangers and belts; the counter-shaft was belted from the main shaft, and with the pulleys and hangers appertaining thereto, was fastened to the timbers or floors of the building by bolts and screws, and was connected to the machines by belts. All this machinery was purchased for and adapted to the use of the mill as a cotton mill, and all of it could be detached and removed from the building with out substantial injury thereto or to the machines. On December 1, 1868, the defendants ceased to occupy the premises, and E. Fisher & Sons occupied the same as lessees of the defendants. The plaintiff assented to this assignment by writing under seal. In 1869, E. Fisher & Sons removed from the premises the said counter-shafting, pulleys and hangers to the value of $ 220, and the aforesaid belts to the value of $ 50, and converted them to their own use.

The defendants contended upon the above facts, that the plaintiff could not recover for the glass, counter-shafting, pulleys, hangers and belts, but the judge ruled that he could.

It further appeared, from the auditor's report, that the defendants, during their occupation of the mill, introduced appliances for heating it by steam, consisting of a portable boiler for generating steam, set horizontally on a flat stone, with cemented brick and stone set on each side of it, supplied with water by a force pump screwed to the floor, and operated by the wheel of the factory; the steam being conveyed over the building by three rows of steam piping extending horizontally along two sides and one end of three rooms and through the ell, and having the usual joints and elbows; these pipes passed through the floors of the factory from one story to another, and were supported by hooks screwed to the building, and when the posts in the building came in their way, holes were bored therein, through which the pipes ran. While Fisher & Sons were in occupation, a new boiler was put in which was set upright on the ground near where the old boiler had stood, and the connection of the pipes was changed to the new boiler. Both boilers were connected with the chimney by flues. In September, 1869, Fisher & Sons removed said steam pipes, amounting to 1500 feet, with the joints and elbows and other fittings belonging thereto, and converted them to their own use to the value of $ 405. The defendants contended, upon the above facts, that the plaintiff could not recover this item.

It further appeared that at the commencement of the leases a machine called Daniels's wood-cutting machine stood on the premises described in the first lease, outside the mill and eighteen inches therefrom. This machine was movable, weighed about 300 pounds, and was used for cutting up brush and wood. It was operated by a belt running from the main shaft of the factory to a counter-shaft, and thence to the machine. There was no agreement between the parties as to the use of this machine, unless the same passed by the first lease; but when the defendants took possession of the premises under this lease, they continued to use the machine, as it had before been used, and as above stated, until it was broken and disabled by the defendants, and became of but little value, and was not afterwards repaired by them. The table on which the machine stood remained on the premises at the expiration of the lease. The damage to the machine was $ 55. The defendants contended, upon the above facts, that the plaintiff could not recover for this item.

The defendants asked the court to rule that upon the above facts the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in this action, which ruling the judge refused to give, and instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the several amounts found by the auditor as in his report stated.

The jury thereupon returned a verdict for the plaintiff for...