Holcomb v. Bray
| Decision Date | 03 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 21S-PL-518 |
| Citation | 187 N.E.3d 1268 |
| Parties | Eric J. HOLCOMB, Governor of the State of Indiana, Appellant v. Rodric BRAY, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the Indiana State Senate and Chairman of the Indiana Legislative Council; Todd Huston, in his official capacity as the Speaker of the Indiana House of Representatives and Vice-Chairman of the Indiana Legislative Council; The Indiana Legislative Council; and The Indiana General Assembly, Appellees |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: John C. Trimble, A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Aaron D. Grant, Michael D. Heavilon, Lewis Wagner, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General, Patricia Erdmann, Chief Counsel, Jefferson Garn, Section Chief, Julia C. Payne, Melinda R. Holmes, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE INDIANA CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS: Josh S. Tatum, Andrea K. Townsend, Yuning Tian, Plews Shadley Racher & Braun LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana
This case presents a dispute between the executive and the legislative branches of our state government over the scope of their respective constitutional authority. The General Assembly enacted a law that allows it to call itself into emergency session, which the Governor challenges as unconstitutionally co-opting a purely executive function.
The question before us is not whether it is sensible for the General Assembly to be able to set an emergency session. We decide only whether the Legislature's chosen mechanism is permissible under the relevant constitutional text, which requires the length and frequency of legislative sessions to be "fixed by law." That is, each session must be specifically set by a bill enacted by the full General Assembly when it is in session. Yet, the challenged law purports to delegate this authority to a small group of legislators and allows them to wield that power outside of session. Under our Constitution, the General Assembly simply cannot do what the challenged law permits absent a constitutional amendment.
Finding that the Governor has satisfied the high burden required to establish that the law is unconstitutional and rejecting the Legislative Parties’ arguments that the suit is procedurally barred, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
During the 2021 legislative session, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indiana House of Representatives introduced the bill that would become House Enrolled Act 1123 ("HEA-1123"). HEA-1123 authorizes the General Assembly to commence an "emergency session" if a small subset of legislators—eight members from each of the two chambers, known as the Legislative Council—adopts a resolution that finds the following:
Pub. L. No. 64, § 4, 2021 Ind. Acts. 731, 733 (codified at Ind. Code § 2-2.1-1.2-7 ). The Legislature passed HEA-1123 on April 5.
Four days later, Governor Eric J. Holcomb vetoed the bill, writing that he "firmly believe[s] a central part of this bill is unconstitutional." He went on to explain that, in his view, the law impermissibly gives the General Assembly "the ability to call itself into a special session, thereby usurping a power given exclusively to the governor under Article 4, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution." Soon after, the General Assembly overrode the Governor's veto. And because an emergency was declared for HEA-1123, the law went into effect immediately.
On April 27, Governor Holcomb filed suit against the Indiana State Senate President Pro Tempore and Chairman of the Legislative Council; the Speaker of the Indiana State House of Representatives and Vice-Chairman of the Legislative Council; the Legislative Council; and the Indiana General Assembly (collectively the "Legislative Parties"). Governor Holcomb sought a declaration that certain provisions of HEA-1123 were unconstitutional and an injunction to permanently enjoin enforcement of those provisions.
Three days later, the Indiana Attorney General, appearing on behalf of both the Governor and the Legislative Parties, filed a motion to strike "the appearances and all filings by unauthorized attorneys purporting to represent the Governor of Indiana in this case." The Attorney General claimed that his office is solely responsible for the state's legal representation and that he had not authorized anyone outside of his office to represent the Governor. In response, the Governor asserted he did not need the Attorney General's consent to hire outside counsel "when seeking to defend his ... constitutional rights and responsibilities." After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to strike, finding no legal authority preventing the Governor from hiring his own counsel under these circumstances. The Attorney General then moved to certify the trial court's order for interlocutory appeal, but the court denied the motion.
Soon after, the Governor and Legislative Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Governor argued the undisputed facts establish that HEA-1123 is unconstitutional and void as a matter of law since it "purports to grant the General Assembly, through its Legislative Council, a constitutional power exclusively granted to the governor." The Legislative Parties agreed that the facts were undisputed but claimed that they were entitled to summary judgment because HEA-1123 is a lawful exercise of the General Assembly's constitutional authority to set its own meeting times. They also set out several procedural arguments as to why the Governor could not pursue the lawsuit, including that the Governor lacks standing, the case is not yet ripe, the Governor lacks the authority to hire outside counsel to bring this suit since he did not first get consent from the Attorney General, and the relief sought by the Governor is barred by the legislative-immunity and political-question doctrines. After a hearing, the trial court rejected the procedural arguments but found that HEA-1123 is constitutional.
The Governor appealed, requesting direct transfer to this Court under Appellate Rule 56(A). We accepted the Governor's request.
We review de novo the propriety of summary judgment and pure questions of law, including constitutional claims and the procedural defenses raised here. Hughley v. State , 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) ; City of Hammond v. Herman & Kittle Props., Inc. , 119 N.E.3d 70, 78 (Ind. 2019).
The Indiana Constitution vests the executive power of our state in the Governor and the legislative power of our state in the General Assembly. Ind. Const. art. 4, § 1 ; id. art. 5, § 1. To ensure these powers remain separate, Article 3, Section 1 mandates that neither branch "shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided." Id. art. 3, § 1. So, though this distribution-of-powers mandate generally prevents one branch of government from usurping the power constitutionally vested in another, some otherwise impermissible interference is authorized. See, e.g. , State v. Monfort , 723 N.E.2d 407, 412 (Ind. 2000) (); State v. Denny , 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252, 254 (1889) ().
The General Assembly's primary role is to exercise the legislative power of the state, which includes making and enacting laws. Inherent in this function is the ability to deliberate and debate—processes that occur in legislative sessions. Our Constitution provides details on such sessions in Article 4, Section 9 :
The sessions of the General Assembly shall be held at the capitol of the State, commencing on the Tuesday next after the second Monday in January of each year in which the General Assembly meets unless a different day or place shall have been appointed by law. But if, in the opinion of the Governor, the public welfare shall require it, he may, at any time by proclamation, call a special session. The length and frequency of the sessions of the General Assembly shall be fixed by law.
Ind. Const. art. 4, § 9. Notably, although legislative sessions are inherently a legislative-branch function, the second sentence of Article 4, Section 9 — the special-session clause—gives the Governor the authority to "call a special session." But the last sentence—the length-and-frequency clause which was added by amendment in 1970—gives the General Assembly authority over the length and frequency of its sessions, so long as it exercises that authority "by law."
Here, HEA-1123 permits the sixteen-member Legislative Council to set an emergency session after adopting a resolution at a time when the General Assembly is not in session. The Governor, finding no distinction between an emergency session and a special session and believing the authority to call a special session is vested solely in the executive branch, seeks a declaratory judgment that HEA-1123 is unconstitutional on several grounds. The Legislative Parties dispute those claims and also present several procedural reasons why the Governor should not be permitted to bring them in the first place.
We hold that HEA-1123 violates Article 4, Section 9 ’s fixed-by-law requirement by authorizing an emergency session to be set through a simple...
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