Holden v. Hardy

• Decision Date: 29 October 1896
• Docket Number: 725
• Citation: Holden v. Hardy, 14 Utah 71, 46 P. 756 (Utah 1896)
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF UTAH v. ALBERT F. HOLDEN

46 P. 756

14 Utah 71

STATE OF UTAH v. ALBERT F. HOLDEN

No. 725

Supreme Court of Utah

October 29, 1896

Application for writ of habeas corpus by Albert F. Holden convicted in a justice's court of a violation of the eight-hour law respecting the employment of laborers in mines, against Harvey Hardy, sheriff.

Writ discharged, and petitioner remanded.

Marshall & Royle, Dickson, Ellis & Ellis, and Bennett, Harkness, Howat & Bradley, for petitioner.

The act is in violation of section 7, article 1, of the constitution of this state."Sec. 7. Art. 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

It is also in violation of section 1, article 14, of the constitution of the United States."Sec. 1. Art. 14.No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."

What is due process of law?

"In the celebrated case of Dartmouth College v Woodward,4 Wheaton 519, Mr. Daniel Webster gave the following definition of the due process of law: 'By the law of the land, is more clearly intended, the general law; a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the land.'"

The privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a property right.Frorer v. People,141 Ill. 171;Ramsey v People,142 Ill. 380;Cooley Const.Lim. 484.

The proposed law is class legislation in this:

It deprives mining and smelting employers of the right to make contracts, which persons and corporations in all other lines of business have the right to make.It deprives employers and employes in these lines of business of the equal protection of the law.It is in violation both of the spirit and letter alike of the constitution of the United States, and the state of Utah.State v. Loomis,115 Mo. 307;People v. Otes,90 N.Y. 48;State v. Goodwell,33 W.Va. 179;State v. Coal & Coke Co.,33 W.Va. 188;W.Va. Fire Creek Co., 6 L. R. A. 359;Commonwealth v. Perry,34 Cent. L. J. 78;Millett v. People,117 Ill. 294;Frorer v. People,142 Ill. 387;Ragio v. State,86 Tenn. 272;Braceville Coal Co. v. People,147 Ill. 66;Perry v. Commonwealth,155 Mass. 117;Eden v. People,161 Ill. 296;In re 8-hour Law,39 P. R.(Colo.) 328;In re House Bill107, 39 P. R.(Colo.) 431;Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6th A.(Pa. St.) 354;Low v. Printing Co.,59 N.W. 362(Neb.);Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380.

In the case of Ritchie v. The People,155 Ill. 98, a statute of Illinois was passed upon, providing: "No female shall be employed in any factory more than eight hours in any one day or forty-eight hours in any one week."

The act was held unconstitutional and in violation of fundamental principles, both as class legislation and as depriving women of the equal protection of the law.

In 98 N.Y. 98, In re Jacobs, the court had under consideration a law of New York prohibiting the manufacture of cigars and preparation of tobacco in any form in tenement houses, etc.

The law was held unconstitutional--the court says: "To justify this law it would not be sufficient that the use of tobacco may be injurious to some persons, or that its manufacture may be injurious to those who are engaged in its preparation and manufacture; but it would have to be injurious to the public health * * * What possible relation can cigar making in any building have to the health of the general public?"

The last quoted lines become very pertinent to the issue at bar: What possible relation can the limitation of hours of labor in mines and smelters have to the safety, health and welfare of the general public?

It is not a question whether the employment is injurious to the workman, but whether it is prejudicial to the health, comfort or safety of the general public.

On the other hand, if the exercise of such a power is constitutional, and not forbidden by the declaration of rights, it is manifest that a law could be enacted, which would provide that the period of employment should be twenty hours per day, and that no contract should be made or carried out contrary to its provisions, without incurring the penalties denounced; and so such a power, if exercised, would prove an engine of destruction of the property rights and liberties of the workingmen.

The supreme court of Colorado has decided the precise question here presented, and held that, "it is not competent for the legislature to single out the mining, manufacturing, and smelting industries of the state, and impose upon them restrictions with reference to the hours of their employes, from which other employers of labor are exempt.An act such as proposed would be manifestly in violation of the constitutional inhibition against class legislation.The bill submitted also violates the right of parties to make their own contracts--a right guaranteed by the bill of rights, and protected by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States."39 N.E. 329.

So it was held in Colorado in March, 1895, upon the same language in the declaration of rights, and also upon section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, the opinion citing many cases in the different states.In re House Bill No. 203, 39 S.E. 431-2.So in Low v. Rees PrintingCo., 24 Lawyer's Rep. Ann.

Speaking of the latest case from Missouri on these subjects with approval, State v. Jnlow,31 S.W. 781, the circuit court further says: "The court then further holds that to deny a citizen the right to make free and valid contracts for his labor is to deprive him of 'liberty without due process of law,' and that any statute which undertakes to make such an act, otherwise innocent and lawful, a criminal offense, constitutes 'legislative judgment' without trial or sentence, and that any such legislation is unconstitutional and void.The court further finds the statute there unconstitutional, because it is class legislation--because it is a statute which undertakes to regulate the rights and conduct of one class of citizens, without reference to all other classes."

Laws of the character of the one in question have been held unconstitutional and void in California, Illinois, Colorado, Nebraska, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Missouri and Ohio, and the principles upon which the decisions are grounded are to be found throughout the text books of the law, and the writings of our most learned and patriotic statesmen, and are supported by the great weight of authority, if not all the authorities, and upheld in the light of constitutional principles which cannot safely be ignored.

C. S. Varian, O. W. Powers, and A. C. Bishop, Attorney General, for the state.

Cited: People v. Ewer,70 Hun 239;On Appeal, 141 N.Y.App. 129;Peo. v. Warden,144 N.Y.App. 529;Beers v. Mass.,97 U.S. 32;People v. Bellett,99 Mich. 151;Com. v. Hamilton Co., 120 Mass. 383.

The constitution is specific on this subject.It declares that eight hours shall constitute a day's work on public works, and further, commands that, "the legislature shall pass laws to provide for the health and safety of employes in factories, smelters and mines."Article 16, section 6.

This is mandatory.Article 1, section 26.

The determination of the question of regulation is, by this provision, committed to the legislature.The law enacted has relation to the purpose contemplated, and this ends the controversy.

Since 1888 a somewhat restricted right of eminent domain has attached by legislative grant to the business of mining.C. L. sec. 3841, et seq.;Laws 189, pp. 37-8-9.

By act, approved and taking effect April 5, 1896, six days after the act under consideration was approved, the business of producing and reducing ores was declared to be of "vital necessity to the people of the state of Utah;" to be a pursuit "in which all are interested and from which all derive a benefit."

In express terms, mining and milling (smelting) ore were declared to be for the public use, and the right of eminent domain was granted.Laws, 1896, p. 316.

The validity of similar legislation is established by decisions in a neighboring state.Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell,11 Nev. 394;Overman Mg. Co. v. Corcoran, 15 Nev. 148.

The mine and mill owners have sought and obtained a legislative declaration that their business was for the public use, with the accompanying right of eminent domain.They are within reasonable legislative control in the exercise of occupations claimed to be, and by legislative act declared to be, affected with a public use.The mine and mill owners can not successfully challenge the very authority by which they are permitted to exercise special privileges.Munn v. Illinois,94 U.S. 113;Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517.

The grant of special privileges and particularly of the right to exercise the state's right of eminent domain, subjects the business to legislative control.Georgia Banking Co. v. Smith,128 U.S. 179.

Ritchie v. People, cited from 155 Ill. 101, is much relied upon in support of petitioner's contention.The Illinois statute prohibited the employment of any female in any factory or workshop more than eight hours in any one day or forty-eight hours in any one week.In adjudging this statute to be unconstitutional, the court expressly concede--as was done in the prior Illinois cases above referred to--that under certain...