Holden v. Holden
| Decision Date | 24 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 1815-00-3. |
| Citation | 35 Va. App. 315,544 S.E.2d 884 |
| Parties | Robert Charles HOLDEN v. Jena Taetz HOLDEN. |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Charles B. Phillips, Salem (Phillips, Swanson & Phillips, on brief), for appellant.
Frank K. Friedman, (John P. Grove; Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., on brief), Roanoke, for appellee.
Present: BUMGARDNER, HUMPHREYS and AGEE, JJ.
Robert Charles Holden (husband) appeals a final order of the Roanoke County Circuit Court regarding the equitable distribution of property and the award of spousal support. This order came partly as a result of our remand in Holden v. Holden, 31 Va.App. 24, 520 S.E.2d 842 (1999) (Holden I). For the reasons set forth below, the order now on appeal is affirmed in part, reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Husband and Jena T. Holden (wife) have been involved in an acrimonious divorce proceeding for several years. By a final order dated October 28, 1998 (the 1998 order), the Roanoke County Circuit Court awarded both parties a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, made an equitable distribution award of marital property and awarded spousal support to wife.
The 1998 order divided the marital property into two equal portions, based on valuations at that time, and assigned the various items comprising the marital property to husband or wife. For purposes of the current appeal, two of the assigned items of marital property are of particular note. The trial court assigned a parcel of land in Bedford County to husband valued at $30,000, and classified it as all marital property. The court also allocated certain corporate stock as follows:
The Court does further ORDER and direct that the total number of shares of Rowe Furniture Stock be divided equally.
The trial court also provided in the 1998 order that husband pay wife monthly spousal support of $185.
The 1998 order, like the order now on appeal, is partly a narrative ledger of the assigned marital properties to husband and wife, yielding equal amounts at the end.
In Holden I, husband contended that $17,000 of the value of the Bedford County property represented husband's separate property and, therefore, was not subject to the equitable distribution division as marital property. Husband also appealed the award of spousal support, but later withdrew that assignment of error.
Husband prevailed in Holden I. We agreed with his claim that $17,000 of the $30,000 value of the Bedford County property represented his separate property. Our opinion in Holden I concluded with the following statement: "[W]e reverse the equitable distribution award and remand for an order consistent with this opinion." Id. at 29-30, 520 S.E.2d at 845.
While Holden I was pending before us, husband sought a hearing in the circuit court for reduction of the previously awarded spousal support. On May 17, 1999, the trial court entered an order reducing the monthly spousal support from $185 to $100. Husband apparently withdrew his assignment of error relating to spousal support before oral argument on his appeal and prior to the May 17, 1999 revised spousal support order. He did not, however, obtain leave of this Court to proceed in the circuit court on his motion to reduce spousal support.
After our decision in Holden I, both parties filed notices to be heard on several topics in the trial court. Husband sought a hearing on the following: (1) "Termination of spousal support"; (2) "Rio clarify division of the personal property"; (3) "Rio divide [sic] the provisions for division of the Rowe Furniture Stock"; and (4) "Rio set the monetary award pursuant to the Court of Appeals direction." Wife asked the court to order: "That [husband] be held in contempt of court for his failure to pay spousal support in accordance with the Court's Order dated May 17, 1999"; and "[t]hat [husband] be ordered to take the necessary steps to divide the total number of shares of Rowe Furniture Stock in accordance with the Court's Order dated October 20, 1998."
At the April 12, 2000 hearing on these motions, the evidence was uncontradicted that the value of the Rowe Furniture Stock (Rowe stock) had declined in value by at least $9,000 since the 1998 order. The stock certificates, issued in husband's name, apparently could not be found and a fee was required to replace the certificates. Each party blamed the other for loss of the stock certificates and argued the other should pay the lost certificate fee. Husband also testified to adverse income tax consequences if sale of the Rowe stock was required as opposed to a distribution in kind.
The trial judge, sua sponte, announced at the hearing that the May 17, 1999 order reducing spousal support had been in error. Because the case was on appeal to this Court at that time, the trial judge ruled she lacked jurisdiction to reduce the support award. Accordingly, the court retroactively reinstated the $185 monthly support amount.
The trial court entered the order now on appeal, dated June 26, 2000 (the 2000 order), covering the issues presented at the April hearing. This order was a final order as contemplated by Code § 17.1-405(3).
The court resolved the remand issue of the separate property portion of the Bedford County land by ordering wife to pay husband $8,530.1 Contrary to the 1998 order, the court then awarded all the Rowe stock to husband, yet assigned the value of $34,214 to that stock which was the value used in the 1998 order, not the current market value. The court also ordered monetary adjustments for the disposition of certain tangible personal property and reimposed the $185 per month spousal support award retroactive to May, 1999.
Husband timely objected to the 2000 order and filed this appeal.
Husband contends (1) the court failed to follow our mandate in Holden I because husband should have received an award of $17,000, not $8,530, for his separate property interest in the Bedford County property; (2) the court erred in assigning all the Rowe stock to him because the stock allocation was not an issue covered by our remand order; and (3) the court erred in reversing its prior reduction in spousal support because it erroneously concluded the pending appeal in Holden I deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.
Husband argues on appeal that the redistribution of the marital property in the 2000 order fails to follow the remand directions in Holden I. We disagree. A mathematical calculation shows the trial court's resolution is correct.
In the 1998 order, husband was deemed to have an entitlement to $15,000 of the $30,000 value as "his" half of the Bedford County land when that property was classified as all marital property. In the recapitulation of all values for the assigned marital assets in the 1998 order, husband received the fee simple interest in the Bedford County land, so he "compensated" wife for her $15,000 interest in the land through other adjustments. Husband also received the Bedford County property under the 2000 order, but, based on Holden I, $17,000 of its value is his separate property, leaving $13,000 of marital equity to divide ($6,500 per spouse). Husband, therefore, is entitled to $23,500 of the value of the Bedford County land ($17,000 as his separate property interest and $6,500 for his half of the marital portion). By awarding the husband $8,530 in the 2000 order, he received a $23,530 credit ($15,000 plus $8,530) for "his" separate and marital property interests in the Bedford County land.
Husband urges us to adopt his exhibit from the record as "the correct redistribution formula,"2 which, he argues, entitled him to $17,060. This exhibit confirms the correctness of the trial court's ruling.
The exhibit reflects an assignment to husband of the equity in the Bedford County property. By assigning the equity in the property to husband, assuming equal distribution in kind of the Rowe stock, wife would receive $17,060 more of the total marital assets, $89,379 versus $72,319. Because husband received the complete fee simple interest in the Bedford County property, he already had received the $17,000 value of his separate property portion, as adjudicated by Holden I. If wife paid husband $8,530 as ordered by the trial court, each party would then receive $80,849 of marital property and, therefore equal shares. By contrast, husband's argument for a $17,060 payment from wife would give him a windfall of $8,530.
We hold that the trial court properly followed the Holden I mandate by ordering wife to pay husband $8,530 in satisfaction of his separate property interest in the Bedford County property.
Husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in allocating to him all the Rowe stock, as opposed to equal distribution in kind as originally ordered. He contends the trial court lacked authority to change the stock distribution because that issue was not covered under our Holden I remand mandate. Although husband's argument is incorrect, we do find, nonetheless, that the trial court erred when reversing the distribution of the Rowe stock because the ruling is contrary to our holding in Wagner v. Wagner, 16 Va.App. 529, 431 S.E.2d 77 (1993) (en banc). See also Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va.App. 250, 532 S.E.2d 908 (2000).3
Husband cites Virginia Electric and Power Company v. Westmoreland-LG&E Partners, 259 Va. 319, 526 S.E.2d 750 (2000), and Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991), for the proposition that the trial court lacked authority to address division of the Rowe stock. Husband's reading of Antonelli is strained, at best, and Virginia Power contradicts his argument.
The final sentence in Holden I states: "Accordingly, we reverse the equitable distribution award and remand for an order consistent with this opinion." 31 Va.App. at 29-30, 520 S.E.2d at 845. We included...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Simms v. Alexandria Dep't of Cmty. & Human Servs.
...divests the trial court of authority to modify, amend or change that order until the appellate court has acted." Holden v. Holden , 35 Va. App. 315, 326, 544 S.E.2d 884 (2001) (emphasis added). Nothing about the termination of parental rights operated to "pull the rug out" from under this C......
-
Rahnema v. Rahnema
...403, 533 S.E.2d 643, 648 (2000)); see also Bomar v. Bomar, 45 Va.App. 229, 234, 609 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2005); Holden v. Holden, 35 Va.App. 315, 324, 544 S.E.2d 884, 888 (2001); v. Steinberg, 21 Va.App. 42, 50, 461 S.E.2d 421, 424 (1995). C. BURDEN OF PROOF FOR BIGAMY ANNULMENT A Virginia cour......
-
Barrett v. Minor
...the trial court of authority to modify, amend or change that order until the appellate court has acted." Holden v. Holden, 35 Va. App. 315, 326, 544 S.E.2d 884, 889 (2001). Father misapplies Greene to the facts of this case, however, and improperly conflates statutory subject matter jurisdi......
-
Hart v. Hart
...475, 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). 14. See also Bomar v. Bomar, 45 Va. App. 229, 234, 609 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2005); Holden v. Holden, 35 Va. App. 315, 324, 544 S.E.2d 884, 888 (2001); Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42, 50, 461 S.E.2d 421, 424 (1995). 15. See supra n.7. 16. In the equitable ......