Holden v. Miller-Smith, Case No. 1:12–cv–789.

• Decision Date: 20 June 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:12–cv–789.
• Parties: Alan and Nicole HOLDEN, Plaintiffs, v. Penelope MILLER–SMITH et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

28 F.Supp.3d 729

Alan and Nicole HOLDEN, Plaintiffs,
v.
Penelope MILLER–SMITH et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:12–cv–789.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed June 20, 2014

Motion granted.

David Michael Honigman, David Frederich Hansma, Mantese Honigman Rossman and Williamson PC, Troy, MI, for Plaintiffs.

William Vogelzang, Jr., Mark T. Ostrowski, Kluczynski, Girtz & Vogelzang, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION
JANET T. NEFF, District Judge.

Pending before the Court in this continuing litigation under the Individuals

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with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA ¹), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 27). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to pursue their administrative remedies before the IDEA's two-year statute of limitations expired and that their present claims are therefore barred. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to Defendants' motion (Dkt. 30), seeking to establish equitable tolling as an exception to the IDEA's statute of limitations. Defendants filed a Reply (Dkt. 31), and Plaintiffs filed a Sur–Reply (Dkt. 33). For the reasons that follow, the Court holds that even assuming the IDEA's limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons, equitable tolling is not properly applied to toll the limitations period on the facts at bar. Consequently, Plaintiffs' claims are barred, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.

I. BACKGROUND A. The IDEA

The IDEA is a Spending Clause statute that seeks to ensure that “all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education” (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The Act “leaves to the States the primary responsibility for developing and executing educational programs for handicapped children, but imposes significant requirements to be followed in the discharge of that responsibility.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005) (quoting Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)).

Participating states, such as Michigan, must certify to the Secretary of Education that they have policies and procedures that will effectively meet the Act's conditions, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). Schaffer, supra. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1701 et seq. (Michigan's Mandatory Special Education Act [MMSEA] ). State educational agencies, in turn, must ensure that local schools and teachers are meeting the state's educational standards, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(11), 1412(a)(15)(A). Schaffer, supra. Local educational agencies (school boards or other administrative bodies) can receive IDEA funds only if they certify to a state educational agency that they are acting in accordance with the state's policies and procedures, § 1413(a)(1). Id. at 52–53, 126 S.Ct. 528.

As the Supreme Court observed, “[t]he core of the statute ... is the cooperative process that it establishes between parents and schools,” and the “central vehicle for this collaboration is the [Individualized Education Program (IEP) ] process.” Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53, 126 S.Ct. 528. “State educational authorities must identify and evaluate disabled children, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)-(c), develop an IEP for each one, § 1414(d)(2), and review every IEP at least once a year, § 1414(d)(4).” Id. The Act requires that an IEP include, among other items,

(I) a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, ...;

....

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(II) a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals, ...;

....

(III) a description of how the child's progress toward meeting the annual goals described in subclause (II) will be measured and when periodic reports on the progress the child is making toward meeting the annual goals (such as through the use of quarterly or other periodic reports, concurrent with the issuance of report cards) will be provided;

(IV) a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the child, and a statement of the program modifications or supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child ...;

(IV) an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate with nondisabled children in the regular class and in the activities described in subclause (IV) ...;

(V) (aa) a statement of any individual appropriate accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic achievement and functional performance of the child on State and districtwide assessments ...;

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A).

Parents and guardians play a significant role in the IEP process. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53, 126 S.Ct. 528. They must be informed about and consent to evaluations of their child under the Act, § 1414(c)(3). Id. Parents are included as members of “IEP teams,” § 1414(d)(1)(B). Id. They have the right to examine any records relating to their child, and to obtain an “independent educational evaluation of the child,” § 1415(b)(1). Id. They must be given prior written notice of any changes in an IEP, § 1415(b)(3), and be notified in writing of the procedural safeguards available to them under the Act, § 1415(d)(1). Id. If parents believe that an IEP is not appropriate, then they may seek an administrative “impartial due process hearing,” § 1415(f). Id. School districts may also seek such hearings. Id. In sum, the IDEA contemplates that the “special knowledge and experience of the agencies will be utilized in devising the plan, that it will be fine-tuned through the cooperation of the child's teachers and parents, and that the advice of a qualified and impartial hearing officer will be available concerning the adequacy of the plan.” Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343 (6th Cir.1989).

Before 2004, the IDEA did not contain a provision imposing a limitation on the time to request a due process hearing, and, as a result, courts borrowed the general state-law statute of limitations relating to suits for injury to a person or property brought against states and their agencies. See King ex rel. King v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 228 F.3d 622, 624 (6th Cir.2000) (instructing the selection of an appropriate state statute of limitations “on a case-by-case basis ‘considering the posture of the case and the legal theories presented’ ”) (quoting Janzen v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 486 (6th Cir.1986)).

In reauthorizing the IDEA in 2004, see Pub.L. No. 108–446, 118 Stat. 2647 (Dec. 3, 2004), effective July 1, 2005, Congress added a two-year limitations provision to the Act, a provision that provides that “[a] parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint,

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or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). Congress promulgated two exceptions to the timeline, as follows:

The timeline described in subparagraph (C) shall not apply to a parent if the parent was prevented from requesting the hearing due to—

(i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational agency that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint; or

(ii) the local educational agency's withholding of information from the parent that was required under this subchapter to be provided to the parent.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D). Congress also specified that an IDEA claim accrues on the date that a plaintiff or his parent “knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B).

After the due process hearing, any aggrieved party may bring a civil action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). Moreover, the IDEA does not preclude a disabled child from pursuing other available remedies under federal law in state or federal court, provided that the child first exhaust all administrative remedies available under state law where the relief sought is available under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415( l ) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.” ) (emphasis added).

B. Relevant Facts

In the fall of 2008, Plaintiffs' son began attending preschool in a special education classroom at Ross Park Elementary School, a public school within the Mona Shores School District (Mona Shores) (Dkt. 1–7, Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10). Plaintiffs' son has a disability that qualifies him for special education and related services under the IDEA, and Plaintiffs and Mona Shores agreed to an IEP, which Plaintiff Alan Holden signed on October 27, 2008 ( id. ¶¶ 8, 19, 21, 25).

On December 18, 2008, Plaintiff Nicole Holden attended a Christmas party in her son's classroom (Dkt. 1–7, Compl. ¶¶ 32–33). According to Holden, her son sat in a booster seat attached to a small chair during the party ( id. ¶ 34). Plaintiffs allege that use of the booster seat was “unreasonable” ( id. ¶ 91). Plaintiffs withheld their son from the classroom and requested a meeting ( id. ¶ 42).

On or about February 6, 2009, after attempting...