Holder v. Statement Auto Sales
| Decision Date | 18 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | 19 CV 1159 (MKB)(RML) |
| Parties | ANTHONY HOLDER, Plaintiff, v. STATEMENT AUTO SALES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
By order dated August 29, 2019, the Honorable Margo K. Brodie, United States District Judge, referred the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment to me for report and recommendation. I heard oral argument on October 29, 2019. (See Transcript of Oral Argument, dated Oct. 29, 2019 ("Tr."), Dkt. No. 19.) For the reasons explained below, I respectfully recommend that defendant's motion be granted as to the claims brought under the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 49 U.S.C. § 37201, et seq.; that plaintiff's motion be denied as to those same claims; that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims; and that this case be dismissed.
Plaintiff Anthony Holder ("plaintiff") brought this action on February 27, 2019 pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (the "Federal Odometer Act" or the "Act"), 49 U.S.C. § 37201, et seq. He additionally brings a claim pursuant to New York General Business Law § 349, as well as claims for fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation under New York common law. (See id.)
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. On or about November 17, 2018, defendant Rent a Ruck Inc. d/b/a Statement Auto Sales ("defendant"), which operates a used car lot in Queens, New York, purchased a 2002 Honda CR-V with vehicle identification number JHLRD77472C036978 (the "Honda") from a garage in Vermont. (Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement, dated July 31, 2019 ("Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement"), Dkt. No. 12-9, ¶¶ 2-3; Declaration of Gina Lopez, sworn to July 31, 2019 ("Lopez Decl."), Dkt. No. 12-1, ¶¶ 3-4.)1 The bill of sale indicated that its odometer reading was 206,001 miles. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 4; Lopez Decl. ¶ 6; Bill of Sale, annexed to Lopez Decl. as Ex. B.) Upon inspection of the Honda, defendant's mechanics discovered that its gasoline and temperature gauges were not functioning properly. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 6; Lopez Decl. ¶ 8.) The gasoline and temperature gauges in the Honda are part of an "instrument gauge cluster unit," which also includes the tachometer, speedometer, and odometer; therefore, they could not be repaired or replaced individually. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 7-8; Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Instead, the entire unit had to be replaced. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 8; Lopez Decl. ¶ 10.)
Defendant purchased a used instrument gauge cluster unit that was compatible with the Honda, and replaced the faulty unit with the one it had purchased. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 9-10; Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.) After replacing the instrument gauge cluster unit, defendant did not reset the odometer to zero; nor did it affix a written notice to the left door frame of the Honda specifying the mileage before the replacement. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 11; Lopez Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendant claims it was unaware it was required to do so. (See id.) The odometer on the replacement instrument gauge cluster unit displayed 122,615 miles. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 12; Lopez Decl. ¶ 13.)
On January 24, 2019, plaintiff purchased the Honda from defendant. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 15; Lopez Decl. ¶ 16; Purchase Agreement, annexed Lopez Decl. as Ex. D.) At the time of sale, plaintiff and defendant's manager, Gina Lopez, each signed a New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Certificate of Sale (the "Certificate of Sale"), which listed the odometer reading as 122,615. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 16-17; Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 17-18; Certificate of Sale, annexed to Lopez Decl. as Ex. E.) The Certificate of Sale additionally included a certification by defendant, placed directly below the odometer reading, which read " (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 18; Lopez Decl. ¶ 19; Certificate of Sale, Ex. E to Lopez Decl.) (emphasis in original). After purchase, plaintiff began to experience difficulties with the operation of the Honda. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 19; Lopez Decl. ¶ 20.) He subsequently found a Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles Inspection Test Report Form dated February 16, 2018 inside of the Honda indicating that, at the time of the inspection, its odometer reading was 202,894 miles. (Plaintiff's Rule 56.1 Statement, dated Aug. 21, 2019 ("Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statement"), Dkt. No. 15-7, ¶ 4; Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Rule 56.1 Statement, dated Sept. 13, 2019, Dkt. No. 16-2, ¶ 4; see also Vermont State Inspection Form, annexed to Compl. as Ex. B.)
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is material where it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law" and a dispute is genuine where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party carries the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Jaffer v. Hirji, 887 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2018). However, where the burden of proof at trial would fall on the non-moving party, the moving party may shift its initial burden by "point[ing] to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Simsbury-Avon Pres. Club, Inc. v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the non-moving party must put forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Gottlieb v. Cty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996). While the court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of [the non-moving party], conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment." Flores v. United States, 885 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2018) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Where the parties make cross-motions for summary judgment, the standard is the same. Madelaine Chocolate Novelties v. Great N. Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 3d 3, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). "The district court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." Id. (quoting Marotta v. Road Carrier Local 707 Welfare Fund, 100 F. Supp. 2d 145, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)). Even where both parties assert the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the court need not enter judgment for either party. Lauria v. Heffernan, 607 F. Supp. 2d 403, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Morales v. Quintel Entm't, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Plaintiff brings claims under three provisions of the Federal Odometer Act: (i) the anti-tampering provision, 49 U.S.C. § 32703; (ii) the service, repair, and replacement provision, 49 U.S.C. § 32704; and (iii) the disclosure provision, 49 U.S.C. § 32705.2 (See Compl.; Am. Compl.) The anti-tampering provision provides that a person may not "disconnect, reset, alter, or have disconnected, reset, or altered, an odometer of a motor vehicle intending to change the mileage registered by the odometer." 49 U.S.C. § 32703(2). The service, repair, and replacement provision provides that, where a person services, repairs, or replaces an odometer in a way that causes the mileage to change: "(1) the person shall adjust the odometer to read zero; and (2) the owner of the vehicle or agent of the owner shall attach a written notice to the left door frame of the vehicle specifying the mileage before the service, repair, or replacement and the date of the service, repair, or replacement." Id. § 32704(a). Finally, the disclosure provision requires a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle to provide the transferee with written notice of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer or, if the transferor knows that the odometer reading is different from the vehicle's actual mileage, disclosure that the actual mileage is unknown. Id. § 32705(a)(1). It further provides that a transferor may not make a false statement in the course of making such disclosures. Id. § 32705(a)(2).
In order to recover damages under the Federal Odometer Act, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a violation of the Act; and (2) intent to defraud. Id. § 32710(a); see also Badu v. Allen, No. 14 CV 1230, 2015 WL 10458899, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 944142 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2016); Enobakhare v. Carpoint, LLC, No. 08 CV 4798, 2011 WL 703920, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 704902 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011); Harris v. Jamaica Auto Repair, Inc., No. 03 CV 417, 2007 WL 4380280, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2007). Intent to defraud can be based on actual intent, gross negligence, or recklessness. Enobakhare, 2011 WL 703920, at *7. "[I]n order to withstand a motion for summary judgment on such claims, plaintiff must present evidence from which a fact-finder could rationally conclude that [defendant] acted with the requisite intent." Harris v. Jamaica Auto Repair, Inc., No. 03 CV 417, 2009 WL 891920, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009).
Plaintiff argues that he need not show intent to defraud with respect to his claim under 49 U.S.C. § 32704(a). (See Memorandum of Law in Support of...
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