Holderby v. Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 12

Decision Date29 December 1955
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2449, 29 Lab.Cas. P 69,693 Robert A HOLDERBY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 12, an unincorporated association, R. B. Bronson, P. A. Judd and Wm. C. Carroll, Defendants and Appellants. L. A. 23488

Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and Raymond G. Stanbury, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Aaron Sapiro, Los Angeles, for respondent.

SHENK, Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant Local Union No. 12 of the International Union of Operating Engineers from a judgment for the plaintiff Robert A. Holderby in an action in which the plaintiff sought and obtained reinstatement as a member in good standing in the union and damages resulting from his alleged unlawful exclusion therefrom.

The plaintiff became a member of the union in October, 1952. From November, 1952, until March, 1953, he was delinquent in his dues and for that reason was suspended from membership by the executive board of the union on February 5, 1953. Thereafter he applied for reinstatement and assigned illness as the reason for his delinquency. On March 17, 1953, the executive board addressed a letter to him stating the conditions of his reinstatement as follows: '* * * it was the recommendation of the Advisory Board, concurred in by the Executive Board, that you be granted the privilege of Reinstating your membership by the payment of back Per Capita tax, Reinstatement Fee of $5.00, dues for the current month, and three months dues in advance.' The executive board waived certain of the above items and gave a credit for $10 paid prior to March 17. It stated in its letter that there remained a balance of $19 due and that in addition it required the plaintiff to furnish a doctor's certificate substantiating his illness. It appears that the requirements for reinstatement were consistent with the union's constitution. On April 29 a report certifying that the plaintiff had been a patient at a veterans' hospital was mailed to the financial secretary of the union. On May 27 the plaintiff made final payment of the amount required for reinstatement plus dues to that date. Soon thereafter he was issued a referral slip for a work assignment on which the notation 'dues paid rein 12' appeared. It may be assumed that the notation was in recognition of the payment of dues and the plaintiff's reinstatement in Local 12.

On June 6, 1953, the executive board of the union met and purported to reject the plaintiff's application for reinstatement. The minutes of its meeting state that 'A motion was made, seconded and carried that all previous action of the Executive Board in the case of Robert A. Holderby be rescinded. A motion was made and seconded that the application for reinstatement of Robert A. Holderby be rejected and that all moneys paid into the Local Union by him be refunded. On the motion it was thoroughly established that Holderby was not a qualified engineer and that his actions during the past six months had marked him as an individual undesirable for membership in this Union.' The plaintiff received a letter from the union advising him of his rejection and enclosing a check for $138.60 as 'the total amount paid in by you on Initiation Fee, Dues, Permits, etc.'

On July 1, 1953, the plaintiff commenced the present action. Article XVII, section 1(a) of the union's constitution provides in part as follows: 'Any General Officer who shall have filed in a Local Union charges against a member thereof, and any officer or member of a Local Union, may appeal to the General Executive Board from the adoption of any action by said Local Union, or from any decision rendered by the General President. Any Local Union, or member thereof which belongs to a local, State or Provincial Organization or Joint Executive Board may appeal to the General Executive Board from any act or decision of said local, State or Provincial Organization or Joint Executive Board * * *.' Section 3 of that article states: 'No suit or other action at law or equity shall be brought in any court by any member, officer or subdivision of the International Union of Operating Engineers until and unless all rights, remedies and provisions for hearing, trial and appeal within the Organization shall have been properly followed and exhausted by the member, officer or subdivision complaining * * *.' Prior to commencing this action the plaintiff did not avail himself of the remedies provided in the constitution for a review by the general executive board of the action taken against him.

The plaintiff claims that on May 27, after he had fully complied with the requirements on which his reinstatement was conditioned, he automatically became fully reinstated to membership in the union; that thereafter the purported denial of his application for reinstatement was in reality an exclusion from membership without compliance with procedures established in the union's constitution, and that he was improperly deprived of valuable rights conferred upon him as a member of the union. See Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 P. 763, 49 L.R.A. 400. There is no question but that provisions in the union's constitution for the expulsion of members were not followed. That document requires that formal charges be filed and a hearing be had.

The trial court agreed with the plaintiff, specifically finding that 'in accordance with the said letter of March 17, 1953, the reinstatement of the plaintiff had been completed by May 28, 1953'; that he was a member in good standing on June 6, 1953, the date the alleged exclusionary action took place; that 'he was entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership at the said time,' and that, 'by reason of said action of the part of the Executive Board plaintiff was thereby in effect, expelled from the defendant Local Union No. 12 * * *.'

The foregoing findings of the court are supported by substantial evidence, and on appeal may not be successfully controverted by the defendant. However, it is contended that the plaintiff failed to exhaust the remedies available within the union and that he is not now entitled to judicial relief.

It is the general and well established jurisdictional rule that a plaintiff who seeks judicial relief against on organization of which he is a member must first invoke and exhaust the remedies provided by that organization application to his grievance. Lawson v. Hewell, supra, 118 Cal. 613, 50 P. 763; Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I. O. O. F., 110 Cal. 297, 42 P. 887. This rule is analogous to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to resorting to the courts (see 2 Cal.Jur.2d 304), and to the rule requiring the parties to a contract for arbitration of disputes to exhaust those remedies before seeking judicial relief. See Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 558, at page 563, 277 P.2d 464, and cases collected. Such rules are based on a practical approach to the solution of internal problems, complaints and grievances that arise between parties functioning pursuant to special and comples agreements or other arrangements. They make possible the settlement of such matters by simple, expeditious and inexpensive procedures, and by persons who, generally, are familiar therewith. Such internal remedies are designed not only to promote the settlement of grievances but also to promote more harmonious relationship, and the courts look with favor upon them.

The plaintiff claims that an exception to the general rule made it unnecessary that he pursue the internal remedies for review before commencing this action. In Weber v. Marine Cooks' & Stewards' Ass'n, 93 Cal.App.2d 327, at page 338, 208 P.2d 1009, at page 1016, it is stated that 'where an organization has violated its own laws and arbitrarily violated a member's property rights the rule of exhaustion of remedies by appeals to a higher body within the organization need not be adhered to before direct resort to a judicial tribunal.' See Harris v. National Union etc. Cooks & Stewards, 98 Cal.App.2d 733, at page 736, 221 P.2d 136. If such an exception is construed as broadly as the quoted language would permit, it would make it unnecessary for any party with a justified grievance involving personal and property rights against an organization of which he is a member, including the plaintiff in the present case, to have the matter corrected internally by the machinery provided before resorting to the courts. The exception in such a case would swallow the rule, a result clearly not intended by the cases relied on as authority for the broad interpretation sought by the plaintiff to justify this action. It is only when the organization violates its rules for appellate review or upon a showing that it would be futile to invoke them that the further pursuit of internal relief is excused. The violation of its own rules which inflicts the initial wrong furnishes no right for direct resort to the courts.

The statement of the exception in the Weber case, discussed only incidentally with other points considered determinative, is said to have resulted from a holding in Simpson v. Salvation Army, 49 Cal.App.2d 371, 121 P.2d 847. In that case the court set forth the exception in almost identical language, with citations, and then stated in 49 Cal.App.2d at page 375, 121 P.2d at page 849: 'Obviously, that exception is not here involved.' In one of the two cases there relied on, Neto v. Conselho Amor etc., 18 Cal.App. 234, 122 P. 973, the court stated the exception, citing the other case...

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