Holguin v. Billy the Kid Produce, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
• Writing for the Court: BIVINS
• Citation: Holguin v. Billy the Kid Produce, Inc., 795 P.2d 92, 110 N.M. 287, 1990 NMCA 73 (N.M. App. 1990)
• Decision Date: 21 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 11922,11922
• Parties: Felix HOLGUIN, Claimant-Appellant, v. BILLY THE KID PRODUCE, INC., a New Mexico Corporation, Respondent-Appellee.

Page 92

795 P.2d 92

110 N.M. 287

Felix HOLGUIN, Claimant-Appellant, v. BILLY THE KID PRODUCE, INC., a New Mexico Corporation Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11922.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

June 21, 1990.

Kent Cooper, Jeffreys, Cooper & Associates, Deming, for claimant-appellant.

E. Douglas Latimer, Spann, Latimer & Hollowwa, Albuquerque, for respondent-appellee.

OPINION

BIVINS, Chief Judge.

Worker, Felix Holguin, appeals from the order of dismissal of the Workers' Compensation Division dismissing his claim for benefits. The only issue raised on appeal is whether worker is a farm laborer and therefore excluded from coverage under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-6(A) (Repl.Pamp.1987) of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). We reverse the order dismissing worker's claim and remand for further proceedings.

Employer in this case is Billy the Kid Produce, Inc., a corporation engaged in the general business of farming in southwestern New Mexico. The corporation owns and leases crop-producing lands; its operations include irrigation, cultivation, harvesting, and processing crops to make them ready for shipment.

Worker was employed as a laborer in employer's onion shed. The onion shed is not located on any of the crop-producing land owned or leased by employer. The land on which the onion shed is located has no water rights and for that reason cannot produce crops. At the time of the hearing in this case, the land was assessed as commercial property by the Luna County Assessor.

The operations conducted in the onion shed can be described as follows. Onions are brought into the onion shed after harvest to be culled, sorted by size, and sacked for shipment. Initially, the onions are dumped into a large bin. The bin feeds the onions onto a conveyor that takes them to tables, where workers cull out the bad onions. From the tables, the conveyor moves the onions to a screen that sorts them by size. The sorted onions then move by conveyor to large wheels that have sacks attached. The wheels are turned by workers; as the wheels are turned, the sacks fill. When the sacks are full, workers take them off the wheels, tie them by hand, and stack them on slipsheets. A slipsheet is considered full when it has forty-five sacks. Full slipsheets are moved by forklift to the floor of the warehouse. The sacks of onions are loaded onto trucks by forklift if the truck can bear the weight; if not, workers load the sacks onto the trucks.

Worker's duties in the onion shed were primarily filling and stacking the sacks. On July 23, 1988, he injured his back while lifting a heavy bag of onions by himself.

Worker filed his claim for benefits on March 28, 1989, claiming benefits for temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, and medical benefits to cover the costs of the operation he had undergone. Employer moved to dismiss the claim, alleging that the Workers' Compensation Division lacked jurisdiction over the claim because employer is a farming operation and worker is a farm laborer. Employer and worker filed factual materials in support of and in response to the motion. The matter was set for a hearing on the motion. From the remarks during the hearing, it is apparent that the parties and the workers' compensation judge treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See SCRA 1986, 1-012(B) (Cum.Supp.1989). After hearing legal argument on the motion, the judge granted employer's motion and dismissed worker's claim.

Section 52-1-6(A) provides in pertinent part that "[t]he Workmen's Compensation Act shall not apply to employers of private domestic servants or to employers of farm and ranch laborers." What is a "farm laborer" within the meaning of the Act is a question of law. Whether a worker fits the definition is ordinarily a question of fact. If, however, the facts are undisputed, then the question becomes one purely of law. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 657 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.Ct.App.1983). In this case, the appellate issue is whether on the facts that were undisputed at the motion hearing, worker is, as a matter of law, a farm laborer.

This court has previously noted that a literal interpretation of the language of the statute leads to absurd results. Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 94 N.M. 223, 608 P.2d 535 (Ct.App.1980). Thus, the statute has been interpreted to exempt only farm and ranch laborers, rather than all the employees of an employer who employs some farm and ranch laborers. Id.; Varela v. Mounho, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194 (Ct.App.1978). Similarly, the word "and" has been interpreted to mean "or." Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc. Whether a particular worker is a farm laborer within the meaning of the Act is determined by the general character of the worker's work, rather than his activity on any particular day. Id. Where the worker's primary responsibility is performed on the farming premises and is an essential part of the cultivation of the crop, the worker is a farm laborer and not covered by the Act. Id. Moreover, the general character of the employment is controlling, even though the worker may in fact have been injured while performing a service that is not farm labor. Id. Thus, New Mexico follows the majority rule. See 1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation Sec. 53.00, at 9-189 (1986) ("The exemption of farm labor is construed according to the character of the work regularly performed by the employee, not according to the nature of the employer's business.").

While worker and another onion shed worker denied they ever worked in the fields, there is some evidence in the record that onion shed workers on occasion were sent to the fields to turn sacks of onions after it rained. Nevertheless, the determination of whether a worker is a farm laborer as that term is used in the Act is based on the worker's primary responsibilities, rather than occasionally performed tasks or responsibilities. Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc. See also Larson, supra, Sec. 53.40. It is clear from the record that the primary responsibilities of onion shed workers were in the shed, not in the field. Employer does not argue otherwise. Thus, we determine whether worker was a farm laborer based on the character of his work in the onion shed.

Under the facts represented, worker's primary responsibilities were not performed on land where crops were grown, nor were his duties an essential part of the cultivation of onions or related to some essential part of the cultivation process such as irrigation or fertilization. Thus, worker is not a farm laborer under the holding of Cueto. Employer argues that this case is controlled by Varela. In Varela, however, the worker conceded that he was a farm laborer. Worker here does not. Thus, Varela does not assist us in determining whether worker is or is not a farm laborer.

Worker argues that the general nature of his employment consists of the processing of harvested crops, and therefore he is not a farm laborer. In support of his contention, he cites cases from other states that have held that workers in packing house operations are not exempt from workers' compensation coverage as farm laborers. See Dobbins v. S.A.F. Farms, Inc., 137 So.2d 838 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1962); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez (once cantaloupes were in the packing shed, they were no longer part of the farming process); see also Robichaux v. Realty Operators, 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23 (1940); Hinson v. Creech, 286 N.C. 156, 209 S.E.2d 471 (1974); Cowiche Growers, Inc. v. Bates, 10 Wash.2d 585, 117 P.2d 624 (1941); Goodson v. L.W. Hult Produce Co., 97 Idaho 264, 543 P.2d 167 (1975).

In support of its position, employer points to Anaya v. Industrial Commission, 182 Colo. 244, 512 P.2d 625 (1973) (En Banc). In Anaya, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the worker, who had been employed by a...