Holguin v. Pfeiffer
| Decision Date | 30 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-01715-NE-HBK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | FELIPE ROMAN HOLGUIN, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN PFEIFFER, Respondent. |
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL INCORPORATED IN HIS PETITION AND OPPOSITION ARE DENIED
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [1]
FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD
Petitioner Felipe Roman Holguin (“Petitioner” or “Holguin”), a state prisoner is proceeding on his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 constructively filed on November 29 2020.[2] (Doc. No. 1, “Petition”). In response, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition as untimely on February 9, 2021. (Doc. No. 8). Respondent submitted exhibits in support of its Motion. (Doc. No. 10). After being granted an extension of time, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent's Motion on March 15, 2021. (Doc. No. 14). Respondent, after moving and being granted an extension of time, filed a reply and additional exhibits in support on July 26, 2021. (Doc. No. 21)[3]. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends the District Court grant Respondent's motion to dismiss.
Holguin is serving a 25-year to life sentence for his plea-based first-degree murder conviction entered by the Madera County Superior Court on February 23, 2016 (case no. MCR052047). (Doc. No. 1 at 1). The Petition raises the following grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner's guilty plea was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily because Petitioner was intoxicated and suffering from mental health issues at the time of the plea; and (2) trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed to properly advise Petitioner on his guilty plea and failed to request a competency hearing prior to Petitioner entering his guilty plea. (See generally id.).
At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice that Petitioner previously sought habeas relief in this Court. See Holguin v. On Habeas Corpus, 1:19-cv-00380-LJO-SKO (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2019). That case was dismissed for Petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims. Preemptively, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to his mental illness. (Doc. No. 1 at 9, 16). Alternatively, Petitioner seeks to have the Court consider the instant petition as an amended in his prior case. (Id. at 9). Petitioner's previous petition was dismissed as unexhausted, and the case was closed on June 13, 2019, over 18 months before he initiated this action. Because that case was closed before he filed the instant petition, the Court cannot accept the instant petition as an amendment to his previous petition. However, because the prior case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of exhaustion, the instant petition is not a second or successive petition. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).
Under Rule 4, if a petition is not dismissed at screening, the judge “must order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response” to the petition. R. Governing 2254 Cases 4. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 state that “the judge may want to authorize the respondent to make a motion to dismiss based upon information furnished by respondent.” In White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that a motion to dismiss based on procedural default is proper in habeas proceedings. Since that time, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed cases where habeas petitions were dismissed on a respondent's motion to dismiss for untimeliness. Orthel v. Yates, 795 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2015) (); Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). In doing so, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly relied on information supplied outside the pleadings and its attachments, such as medical records. Orthel, 795 F.3d at 940. The undersigned finds because the statute of limitation is a procedural bar, the Court may consider the documents submitted by Petitioner and Respondent for purposes of determining whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. Id.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, sets a one-year period of limitations to the filing of a habeas petition by a person in state custody. This limitation period runs from the latest of:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Here, Holguin does not allege, nor does it appear from the pleadings or the record, that the statutory triggers in subsections (B)-(D) apply. Thus, the limitations period began to run on the date Holguin's conviction became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 120 (2009).
Holguin directly appealed his conviction. (Doc. No. 10-2). The California Supreme Court denied review of the California Court of Appeal's affirmance of Holguin's conviction on September 12, 2018. (Doc. No. 10-4). Accordingly, Holguin's conviction became final 90 days later, on December 11, 2018. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); S.Ct. Rule 13. AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations began running the next day, December 12, 2018. Therefore, Holguin had until December 12, 2019 to file his federal habeas petition, absent statutory or equitable tolling. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2001) ().
Holguin sought habeas relief three times in the state courts. Holguin filed his first state habeas petition in the Madera County Superior Court on January 17, 2019. (Doc. No. 10-5). That petition was denied on March 27, 2019. (Doc. No. 10-6). Holguin then sought habeas review in the Madera County Superior Court on January 17, 2020. (Doc. No. 10-7). That petition was denied on February 7, 2020. (Doc. No. 10-8). Finally, Holguin sought habeas relief in the California Supreme Court on March 20, 2020. (Doc. No. 10-9). That petition was denied on July 8, 2020. (Doc. No. 10-10). As noted supra, applying the mailbox rule, Holguin filed his federal petition in this action on November 29, 2020. (Doc. No. 1).
The federal statute of limitations tolls for the “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application for post-conviction or other collateral review is “pending” in state court “as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance'-i.e., ‘until the completion of' that process.'” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002) (citations omitted). “California's collateral review system differs from that of other States in that it does not require, technically speaking, appellate review of a lower court determination.” Id. at 221. Instead, petitioners are required to file an original habeas petition and a subsequent appeal in each level of court (superior, appellate, and supreme) within a “reasonable” period. Id. at 221-22; Robinson v. Lewis, 9 Cal.5th 883, 897 (2020) ( ). A petition is considered no longer “pending, ” and the petitioner is barred from AEDPA statutory tolling if an unreasonable amount of time elapsed between the filing of state court habeas petitions. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 221.
To determine whether a habeas claim was filed within a reasonable amount of time, California courts consider three factors. Robinson, 9 Cal.5th at 897. First, “a claim must be presented without substantial delay.” Id. (emphasis in original). ‘“Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.”' Id. (quoting In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770 780 (Cal. 1998). Second, if a petition was filed with substantial delay, a petition may yet be considered on the merits if the “petitioner can demonstrate good cause for the delay.” Id. (emphasis in original). Third, a petition filed without good cause for substantial delay will be considered if it falls under one of four narrow exceptions. Id. Only three of the four exceptions are relevant to noncapital cases: (1) an “‘error of constitutional magnitude led to...
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