Holladay v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 07 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:15-cv-00011-SLG |
| Parties | JAMIE ELAINE HOLLADAY, Plaintiff, v. FAIRBANKS NORTH STAR BOROUGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Before the Court at Docket 31 is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion is fully briefed.1 Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to the Court's decision.
Plaintiff Jamie Elaine Holladay brought this action alleging employment discrimination on the grounds of age and disability, interference with her right to seek medical leave, defamation, and contractual grievances. Ms. Holladay began working forDefendant—the Fairbanks North Star Borough School District (the District)—in 2010, as an aide in the Autism Outreach (AO) program.3 As an employee of the District, Ms. Holladay was a member of the Education Support Staff Association (ESSA), which had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the District.4
From September 2011 through April 2013, Ms. Holladay alleges that she was given less desirable work assignments, was more closely supervised than her coworkers, and was treated differently from coworkers during office training sessions.5 She adds that she was criticized for inappropriate work attire, was given "glares, blank stares, and downgrading looks" from supervisors, was spoken to in a "demeaning tone," and "was treated as if nothing she said or did was correct."6 During this period, Ms. Holladay received two "negative evaluations," one in March 2012 and the other in April 2012.7 Susan Nugent (a contractor hired by the District to assist in running the AO program) allegedly made negative comments about Ms. Holladay during meetings to discuss these evaluations.8
In 2012 the District restructured by terminating the AO program and starting up a new program in its place, the Autism Behavior and Educational Liaison (ABEL) program.9 In July 2012, as a result of this restructuring, Ms. Holladay and all of the other workers in the AO program were laid off.10 In August 2012, Ms. Holladay applied for but was not hired to a similar position in the restructured ABEL program.11 Ms. Holladay contends that the hiring decisions for ABEL were based on age, and that she was not hired because she was over 50 years old. Ms. Holladay then complained of her treatment to school officials, who found "no wrongdoing."12 In December 2012, while her administrative complaint was still being evaluated by the District, Ms. Holladay was rehired to fill a different position at a different school.13 Ms. Holladay received a third negative evaluation in "[l]ate April 2013."14
During the summer of 2013, Ms. Holladay was notified that she would be transferred to a different school in the District.15 At the beginning of August 2013, theDistrict offered a week-long training program; Ms. Holladay did not receive notice of this training and did not attend.16 On August 22, 2013, shortly after having commenced work for that school year, Ms. Holladay met with her new school's principal to discuss her employee improvement plan. In this meeting Ms. Holladay became, in her own words, "exasperated and addled" as she explained her past history with Ms. Nugent related to the negative evaluations. At Ms. Holladay's request, she was excused from work for the remainder of that day.17
The next day Ms. Holladay was called to a meeting with Traci Gatewood, another school administrator, who apparently was concerned about Ms. Holladay's mental health and how it might impact her interaction with students.18 Ms. Holladay did not return to work at the District after the August 23 meeting.19 She asked to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act20 (FMLA) and sought accommodations for her disability pursuant to the ADA; these requests were not immediately granted.21 Although Ms. Holladay did not return to work after August 23, the record does not reveal whether shewas in a paid or unpaid status. In October 2013, Ms. Holladay's doctor indicated that she could return to work under certain conditions.22
On November 4, 2013, Ms. Holladay met with District personnel. During the course of that meeting, she was terminated from her position. According to Ms. Holladay's unrebutted evidence, she "was told [she] was terminated because of the accommodations."23 In a letter to Ms. Holladay from Ms. Gatewood documenting that November 4 meeting, Ms. Gatewood explained that "all parties agreed that no reasonable accommodation could be made to continue [Ms. Holladay's] employment" in her assigned position.24 At that meeting, Ms. Holladay was offered an opportunity to accept a job in either a janitorial or part-time clerical position.25 Ms. Holladay rejected that offer on November 8, 2013 and resigned from the District because she "considered the work environment so hostile" that she could not "accept[]" any offer.26
On August 29, 2014—294 days after she rejected the alternative job offers and 298 days after she had been terminated—Ms. Holladay faxed a letter to the EEOC describing these events.27 On or about November 28, 2014, Ms. Holladay added chargesof unlawful retaliation.28 The EEOC dismissed Ms. Holladay's complaints and issued a right to sue letter on February 3, 2015.29 Ms. Holladay filed this suit on May 7, 2015, seeking injunctive relief and damages.30
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff's claims arise under federal law. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact lies with the moving party.31 If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party must present specific factual evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of fact.32 The non-moving party may notrely on mere allegations or denials.33 Rather, that party must demonstrate that enough evidence supports the alleged factual dispute to require a finder of fact to make a determination at trial between the parties' differing versions of the truth.34
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws "all justifiable inferences" in the non-moving party's favor.35 To reach the level of a genuine dispute, the evidence must be such "that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the non-moving party."36 If the evidence provided by the non-moving party is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate.37
Ms. Holladay's claims fall into four categories. First, she presents employment-related discrimination claims—her claims of retaliation, age discrimination, and disability discrimination fall into this category. Second, she alleges a claim of defamation under Alaska law. Third, she claims she was improperly denied benefits under the FMLA. And fourth, she asserts contract claims based on her employment agreement with the District. The Court will address each category in turn.
Because Ms. Holladay is self-represented, the Court construes her Complaint liberally. The Court discerns four distinct employment discrimination-related claims in the Complaint. First, Ms. Holladay claims that she was retaliated against—in the form of increased and demeaning supervision and negative personnel evaluations from 2011 until "late April 2013"—for her participation in a workplace investigation.38 Second, Ms. Holladay alleges that in the summer of 2012 she was not hired into the ABEL program because of her age.39 Third, she claims she was subjected to a hostile work environment on account of her disability during some period between September 2011 and late April 2013.40 And fourth, she claims that she was terminated or forced to resign in November 2013 because of her disability.41
The District raises two arguments that it contends entitle it to judgment as a matter of law on each of these claims. First, the District contends the claims are untimely.42 Second, the District contends that each claim fails on the merits.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially institutedproceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred."43 The federal regulation implementing that statutory section provides that "a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of."44 Once a charge has been filed, it "may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein."45 And "[s]uch amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received."46 These provisions governing timeliness of Title VII claims also extend to claims under the ADA and the ADEA.47
Ms. Holladay asserts that she first filed her complaint with the EEOC on August 29, 2014, and the District accepts that as the relevant date for the purposes of its summary judgment...
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