Holland v. Chase Home Fin. LLC
| Decision Date | 09 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:11cv223 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | ANDREA D. HOLLAND, Plaintiff, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, SHAPIRO & BURSON, LLP, PROF. FORECLOSURE CORP. OF VA., and JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants. |
Before the Court are Defendants Chase Home Finance LLC and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s (collectively "Chase") Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); Defendants Professional Foreclosure Corporation of Virginia ("PFC") and Shapiro & Burson, LLP's ("Shapiro & Burson") Motion to Dismiss Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); and Plaintiff Andrea D. Holland's ("Plaintiff) Motion for Leave to Amend and Motion for Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(C). These matters have been fully briefed by the Parties and are ripe for judicial determination. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Remand is DENIED; both Chase's and PFC and Shapiro & Burson's Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED; and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is DENIED. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
On August 20, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Petition to Set Aside Foreclosure Sale in the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth, seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale of her home by PFC, the substitute trustee for Chase, which occurred on May 5,2010. On February 17,2011, after repurchasing her home, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth ("Portsmouth Circuit Court"), withdrawing her petition to set aside foreclosure sale, and seeking to recover monetary damages from Chase, Shapiro & Burson, as attorneys for Chase, and PFC, as substitute trustee, (collectively, "Defendants") based upon negligence, fraud, and allegedly abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices specifically prohibited by state law and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Defendants Chase and PFC violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)1 by failing to provide Plaintiff with notice of her debt, and that Defendants Chase knowingly provided Plaintiff with false or misleading information in connection with her debt inviolation of .5 U.S.C. § 1692e.2 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 45. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to recover $65,000 in actual damages and $50,000 in punitive damages, in addition to reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with the litigation. Am. Compl. at 13.
On April 20, 2011, this case was removed from the Portsmouth Circuit Court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Jurisdiction for removal was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges causes of action arising under the laws of the United States. On April 27,2011, Defendants Chase and Defendants PFC and Shapiro & Burson filed separate Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiff's responses to Defendants' Motions were due on May 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed an untimely Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motions on June 3,2011, without leave of the Court. Defendants Chase and Defendants PFC and Shapiro & Burson filed separate Replies to Plaintiff's Opposition on June 10, 2011 and June 9, 2011, respectively.
On May 17, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(C), seeking to remand this case to the Portsmouth Circuit Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On May 20,2011, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend, seeking to amend her Amended Complaint to comply with the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). On May 31,2011, Defendants Chase and Defendants PFC and Shapiro & Burson filed separate Responses in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Remand; and on June 3, 2011, Defendants Chase and Defendants PFC and Shapiro & Burson filed separate Responses in Opposition to Plaintiff'sMotion for Leave to Amend. Plaintiff did not file replies to Defendants' Oppositions to her Motions. Accordingly, these matters are now ripe for judicial determination.
"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A federal district court has original subject matter jurisdiction over a case where the matter involves a federal question arising "under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, Md, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (). Under the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a case unequivocally "arises under" federal law where federal law creates the cause of action. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811,816 (4th Cir. 2004). However, a case may also "arise under-federal law where "the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law," id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986)), but "only [if]... the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on a substantial question of federal law;" id. ). Thus a plaintiff seeking to assert federal jurisdiction over a claim created by state law must establish: "1) that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on a question of federal law, and (2) that the question of federal law is substantial." Dixon, 369 F.3d at 816. "A plaintiff's right to relief for a given claim necessarilydepends on a question of federal law only when every legal theory supporting the claim requires the resolution of a federal issue." Id.
Once a case has been removed, "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded" back to the state court where it originated. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Because removal jurisdiction raises federalism concerns, the removal statutes must be strictly construed. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, remand to state court is required. Id. The court may require the removing party to pay costs and expenses, including attorney fees, incurred due to the removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of actions that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts may only rely upon the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). Courts will favorably construe the allegations of the complainant and assume that the facts alleged in the complaint are true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, a court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts," nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc., v. J.D.Assocs. Ltd. P 'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). A complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" in order to survive a motion to dismiss, but the complaint must incorporate "enough facts to state a belief that is plausible on its face." See Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008).This plausibility standard does not equate to a probability requirement, but it entails more than a mere possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 194950 (2009). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible she is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) ().
Leave to amend should be "freely given" to a party "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). "Motions to amend are typically granted in the absence of an improper motive, such as undue delay, bad faith, or repeated failure to cure a deficiency by amendments previously allowed." Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F.3d 444, 448 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); Connelly v. Gen. Med Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1100, 1109 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citation omitted). The disposition of a motion to amend is committed to the sound discretion of the Court. See Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 870 F.Supp. 123, 125-26 (S.D.W.Va.1994) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). "[T]o justify a denial of such leave [to amend], it must appear to the Court that the amendment is futile, offered in bad faith, prejudicial or otherwise contrary to the interests of justice." Roper v. County of Chesterfield, 807 F. Supp. 1221, 1223 (E.D. Va. 1992).
Plaintiff seeks to have this case remanded to the Portsmouth Circuit Court for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the claims contained in her Amended Complaint are...
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