Holland v. Horn

Citation150 F.Supp.2d 706
Decision Date25 April 2001
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 99CV2551.,CIV.A. 99CV2551.
PartiesWilliam HOLLAND, Petitioner, v. Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Philip L. Johnson, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution, Greene County; and Joseph P. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview, Respondents
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Ellen Berkowitz, David Wycoff, Matthew Lawry, Philadelphia, PA, for petitioner.

Thomas W. Dolgenos, David Curtis Glebe, Assist. Dist. Attorneys, Philadelphia, PA, for respondents.

OPINION AND ORDER

VAN ANTWERPEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before us pursuant to a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by petitioner William Holland ("Petitioner") on January 14, 2000. Petitioner presents twelve claims in pursuit of relief from his state murder conviction and death sentence under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was arrested on August 14, 1984 and charged with burglary, robbery, attempted rape, attempted involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and first degree murder arising from an incident in the home of Jewel Stevens ("Victim") on August 11, 1984. Alli B. Majeed, Esq. ("trial counsel") was appointed by the court to assist Petitioner in presenting his defense. Petitioner was found guilty by a jury on all charges in the Court of Common Pleas, First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, Trial Division, on June 12, 1985. The same jury fixed the penalty at death later that day in a bifurcated proceeding. Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on May 20, 1988. See Commonwealth v. Holland ("Holland I"), 518 Pa. 405, 543 A.2d 1068 (1988). He was represented on direct appeal by Norris E. Gelman, Esq. ("appellate counsel").

On October 6, 1994, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for collateral post-conviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9541 et seq. On October 7, 1985, the PCRA court entered an order staying Petitioner's execution for ninety days, pending the filing of a counseled PCRA petition. Barnaby C. Wittles, Esq. ("PCRA counsel") was appointed to represent Petitioner in his post-conviction proceedings. Three evidentiary hearings were held in conjunction with Petitioner's claims for state post-conviction relief. The first was held on July 13, 1995, the second on December 14, 1995, and the third on May 22, 1996. Petitioner's post-conviction claims were denied in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Trial Division, on September 16, 1996. Petitioner then filed a timely appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on April 1, 1999.1 See Commonwealth v. Holland ("Holland II"), 556 Pa. 175, 727 A.2d 563 (1999).

This case comes before us under § 2254 of the AEDPA, which permits federal courts to grant, under certain circumstances, a writ of habeas corpus to prisoners convicted in state court. Petitioner filed his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on January 14, 2000. His Petition was followed by a Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 28 of that year. The Commonwealth submitted its Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 15, 2000, to which Petitioner responded on March 12, 2001 with Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of His Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. All papers were timely filed and have been considered herein. We have placed the burden of proof on Petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any or all of the twelve claims included in his Petition, and find that he has satisfied this burden with respect to one of his claims. We therefore vacate Petitioner's death sentence and remand his case to the Pennsylvania courts with an order that there be a resentencing.

II. BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of August 11, 1984, Petitioner entered the basement apartment of Jewel Stevens at 7829 Langdon Street in Northeast Philadelphia by cutting a screen and climbing through the window. (See N.T. 6/5/85, at 1.70-1.71.) Ms. Stevens, who was seventy-one years old, was asleep. After cutting the phone line, Petitioner proceeded to stab Ms. Stevens in her side and abdomen with an onion peeler. (See N.T. 6/6/85, at 2.67.) She suffered a deep laceration on her right arm in an attempt to defend herself. (See N.T. 6/10/85, at 4.35.) Petitioner then forcefully removed Ms. Stevens' pajama bottoms, used them to tie her wrists together, and sexually assaulted her. (See N.T. 6/6/85, at 2.67-2.68.) He stuck Ms. Stevens' toes with straight pins, leaving one in her right foot. (See N.T. 6/6/85, at 2.4.) He took a few dollars from a table in the apartment and smoked a cigarette. (See N.T. 6/6/85, at 2.57, 2.68.)

At approximately 5 a.m., Betty Roman, Ms. Stevens' upstairs neighbor, was awakened by noises in Ms. Stevens' apartment, including the Victim's cries for help. Ms. Roman called the police. (See N.T. 6/5/85, at 1.44-1.49.) When he became aware of the police's arrival, Petitioner hid the bloody onion peeler above a neighbor's door and fled the building. (See N.T. 6/5/85, at 1.60-1.62.) Officer Randall Straw arrived on the scene first and tended to Ms. Stevens in her apartment. Officer Bridgette McGinnis arrived after Officer Straw, and proceeded to the back of the Ms. Stevens' apartment building, where she observed Petitioner for about twenty seconds before he fled. (See N.T. 6/5/85, at 1.101-1.110.) The next evening, Officer Mitsos, a member of the Sex Crimes Unit of the Philadelphia Police Department, received a call from Ms. Susan Dorfman. Ms. Dorfman identified a man named "Bill" who lived in the building behind Ms. Stevens', as the potential perpetrator. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer Mitsos went to the building behind Ms. Stevens' in an attempt to ascertain if anyone named Bill lived there. He met Petitioner, who successfully fled Officer Mitsos' pursuit. The building superintendent notified Officer Mitsos that Petitioner lived with there his mother, Ms. Pauline Rogers, and advised the officer that Petitioner may have gone to his grandmother's house. Officer Mitsos was, however, unable to locate Petitioner at his grandmother's house. (See N.T. 6/5/85, at 1.140-1.150.)

Two days later, on August 14, 1984, Officer Dennis Graeber, Petitioner's half-brother, informed Detective Joseph Descher that Petitioner was currently at his grandmother's house. Detective Descher proceeded to that location, where he found Petitioner and his grandmother. Detective Descher asked Petitioner to accompany him to the police station for questioning, making clear to Petitioner that he was under no legal obligation to do so. Petitioner agreed. (See N.T. 6/6/85, at 2.25-2.33.) When they arrived at the station, Officer Descher and his partner, Officer Schol, began to question Petitioner about the incident at Ms. Stevens' apartment. When Petitioner made it clear that he was in Ms. Stevens' apartment on the night of the attack, the officers read Petitioner his Miranda rights and recorded his full confession. (See N.T. 6/6/85, at 2.40-2.69.) On August 24, 1984, Jewel Stevens died from wounds sustained during the incident on August 11. (See N.T. 6/6/85, at 2.9.) Petitioner was charged with, among other things, the first degree murder of Jewel Stevens. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death. He has been denied relief from his conviction and sentence both on direct appeal and in state collateral proceedings under the PCRA. He now petitions this court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to § 2254 of the AEDPA.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion

Before filing a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a petitioner must exhaust all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The exhaustion requirement is a rule of comity, not jurisdiction, Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989), and is designed to allow state courts the opportunity to correct a state's alleged violation of federal constitutional law before federal courts consider the matter. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). "An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

Exhaustion requires that petitioner fairly present his claims to every level of state court, including offering each claim for discretionary review by a State's highest court, and afford each reviewing court a fair opportunity to act on those claims.2 O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971).3 The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he has exhausted available state remedies. See Landano v. Rafferty, 897 F.2d 661, 668 (3d Cir.1990); Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir.1982). The petitioner is not, however, required to revisit claims raised on direct appeal in state collateral proceedings, see O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844, 119 S.Ct. 1728 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953)), or seek alternatives to state habeas such as "a suit for injunction, a writ of prohibition, or mandamus or a declaratory judgment in the state courts." Id. (citing Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249-50, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971) (per curiam)). If the petitioner is unable to prove that all claims in his petition satisfy the statutory exhaustion requirements, his entire petition must be dismissed without prejudice and returned to the state courts for...

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    • United States
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    ...seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state court conviction became final.'" Holland v. Horn, 150 F.Supp.2d 706, 761 n. 45 (E.D.Pa.2001)(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 1495). "The phrase `clearly established Federal law' refers to the holdin......
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    ...raise a meritless claim, relief under Strickland is not available. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Holland v. Horn, 150 F.Supp.2d 706, 770 (E.D.Pa.2001); Holloway v. Horn, 161 F.Supp.2d 452, 583-84 (E.D.Pa.2001). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has developed an ineffective a......
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