Holland v. Kennedy

Decision Date23 August 1989
Docket NumberNo. 58680,58680
Citation548 So.2d 982
Parties56 Ed. Law Rep. 386 Dr. J. Shelvey HOLLAND, Jr. v. Dr. Verne R. KENNEDY, Dorothy D. Barham, Thomas G. Hood, Norman H. McCrummen, III, and Belhaven College.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

John L. Maxey, II, Samuel L. Begley, Cupit & Maxey, Jackson, for appellant.

Joseph L. McCoy, McCoy, Wilkins, Noblin & Stephens, Thomas H. Suttle, Jr., Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, Jackson, for appellee.

Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and ROBERTSON and PITTMAN, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court:

I.

Today's appeal presents a point of adequacy in a plaintiff's pleading and, more poignantly, the present possibility that justice delayed may be justice denied. Plaintiff's suit for breach of employment contract, for libel and slander incident to discharge was filed December 30, 1981, and generously sets forth facts which if found to be true fortell recovery. Yet, after one false start, appeal, reversal and remand, the Circuit Court, in what is surely the last hurrah for the late but we trust not lamented demurrer, 1 dismissed the declaration on its face.

We reverse and remand.

II. 2

By letter dated August 10, 1979, Belhaven College offered J. Shelvey Holland ("Holland") the administrative position of Vice President for Student Affairs at the college. At that time, Holland was also offered a teaching position on the faculty of the college. The terms of Holland's employment were outlined in the letter, to commence on June 1, 1979. For each of the next two years the college reappointed Holland to his administrative and teaching positions. The college's fiscal year commenced each June 1.

The "Faculty-Staff Handbook" provided that notice of any termination of employment would be transmitted to the affected faculty member no later than March 1. More particularly, the handbook stated:

Members of the faculty not on permanent tenure are given notice in writing by the President not later than March 1 in any academic year in which their appointment is not to be renewed.

On March 23, 1981, Holland was informed by a letter from Dr. Verne Kennedy, President of Belhaven College, that his appointment at the college had been renewed for the fiscal year beginning on June 1, 1981. The announcement of Holland's re-appointment, however, caused disquiet among both other faculty members as well as the administrative staff who worked under Holland's supervision.

The President of the college ultimately capitulated to the wishes of the disgruntled employees, and by letter dated April 1, 1981, Kennedy discharged Holland from his employment, effective May 31, 1981. Holland's salary was to continue through the month of August, however. The letter stated that Holland's interactions with other employees had caused serious problems at the college and that working relationships among the faculty and staff had suffered as a result.

In addition to the letter of re-appointment, Holland claims also that at a meeting held in Kennedy's office on March 9, 1981, Kennedy extended to him an oral offer of employment for the fiscal year beginning June 1, 1981. Holland says he accepted the offer at that time.

These factual circumstances form the basis for Holland's wrongful discharge (or breach of contract) claim. The libel claim stems primarily from events occurring after Holland's termination. Apparently, the president of the college sought ratification of his actions from the Belhaven Board of Trustees. While explaining his reasons for the termination to that body, Holland alleges, Kennedy submitted a memorandum which contained accusations which he knew to be false and which injured Holland's reputation.

The civil conspiracy and interference with contract claims are rooted in the alleged participation of the other Belhaven faculty and staff in the events leading up to Holland's termination. Holland claims in his amended declaration that these other defendants, working in concert, actively induced his employer to breach his employment contract by circulating false rumors among the staff and by vocally calling for his dismissal.

On December 30, 1981, Holland filed suit against the college, its president (Kennedy), and those faculty and staff members who allegedly induced Kennedy to breach his employment contract. Holland claimed that he was entitled to his salary for the entire one-year term of the contract as well as actual damages resulting from his relocation to Jackson from Atlanta. In addition, Holland sought actual and punitive damages from all defendants for tortious breach of contract, libel, and interference with contract.

This is not the first appearance of this case in this Court, however. Holland filed his original declaration on December 30, 1981, naming only Belhaven College and its president, Verne R. Kennedy as parties defendant. After the Circuit Court had sustained a demurrer by order dated March 31, 1982, Holland filed an amended declaration, naming the additional parties. The defendants responded with a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure having recently been adopted. The Circuit Court granted that motion, and Holland appealed to this Court, maintaining that the new rules had no application to the action as it had been initiated prior to their adoption, January 1, 1982. By opinion dated August 22, 1984, this Court held that the Rules of Civil Procedure were not applicable to this action, as the action was instituted in 1981, and "the amended declaration was a continuation of the original filed prior to January 1, 1982, the effective Rules date." Holland v. Kennedy, 454 So.2d 1305, 1306 (Miss.1984).

On remand, the defendants again demurred. Three years later, by order dated September 7, 1987, the Circuit Court sustained the demurrer. Holland again appeals, assigning as error the lower court's grant of the defendant's demurrer.

III.

A.

A general demurrer such as that presented to the Circuit Court was, in pre-rules practice, a method of testing the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations. 3

The demurrer ... is a pleading by which the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the bill in substance, or in form, and presents to the court the question of law as to whether upon such a bill the defendant should be required to plead further; and by which, for the purpose of said challenge and of the argument of said test in law, all of the facts of the bill well pleaded are, for the time being, admitted.

Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice Sec. 286 (2d ed. 1950); see Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Weems, 382 So.2d 479, 480 (Miss.1980).

A case of significance is Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So.2d 471 (Miss.1976), an action for invasion of privacy, where the Court stated the standard by which the sufficiency of a declaration should be judged.

Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-7-35 (1972) provides that declarations shall contain a statement of facts in "ordinary and concise language ... and if it contains sufficient matter of substance for the court to proceed upon the merits of the cause, it shall be sufficient." The section concludes that an objection to maintain an action shall not be based upon "the form thereof...." In our jurisprudence it is the rule that where a demurrer to a declaration raises merely a doubtful question, or where the case is such that justice may be promoted by a trial on the merits, even though the demurrer might be technically sustainable, it must be overruled. Jacobs v. Bodie, 208 Miss. 779, 45 So.2d 587 (1950); Goff v. Randall, 206 Miss. 178, 39 So.2d 881 (1949). We also adhere to the rule that facts which are reasonably or necessarily implied from facts stated must on demurrer be considered as true, and when such facts together with express averments, furnish sufficient material of substance for courts to proceed on the merits the demurrer should not be sustained. Ross v. L. & N.R.R., 178 Miss. 69, 172 So. 752 (1937).

Deaton, 326 So.2d at 473.

Further, the rules regarding a general demurrer (the type interposed by today's defendants) establish that in cases where the declaration states multiple grounds for relief, the demurrer must either be granted as to all counts or be denied in its entirety. "A general demurrer must be sustained or overruled in its entirety. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co. v. Potts, 68 Miss. 637, 10 So. 59 (1891). A general demurrer to a declaration containing more than one count cannot be sustained if any count is sufficient." Boler v. Mosby, 352 So.2d 1320, 1323 (Miss.1977); see also Hicks v. Greenville Lumber Co., Inc., 387 So.2d 94, 97 (Miss.1980).

B.

Whether Holland's breach of contract claim may survive a demurrer turns on whether, taking as true the facts Holland has alleged in his declaration, his contract with the college was "at-will" or for the definite term of one year.

The March 23 letter so viewed provides:

In its February 26 meeting, the Belhaven College Board of Trustees approved a 1981-1982 budget which becomes effective June 1, 1981. Some increase in wages was budgeted for each member of the college's salaried faculty and staff.

Beginning June 1, 1981, your annual salary will be $28,000.00....

Holland points to the termination provisions of the "Faculty-Staff Handbook" as well as the long-standing practice of the college to re-appoint each faculty member with specific reference to the academic and fiscal year beginning June 1 as evidence of the definite term of employment.

The provisions of the handbook pertinent to this issue read as follows:

The terms of employment are explicitly stated in the letter of appointment. A copy of "Christian Aims and Standards" (see below for copy) accompany each letter and are designated as a part of the contract.

Members of the faculty not on permanent tenure are given notice in writing by the President not later than March 1 in any academic year in which their appointment is not to be renewed.

Members of the...

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