Holland v. N.J. Dep't of Corrections
| Decision Date | 01 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFFS,00-2356 and 00-2357,ABBOA-OFFEI,No. 00-1801,Nos. 00-1801,00-1801,s. 00-1801 |
| Citation | 246 F.3d 267 |
| Parties | (3rd Cir. 2001) WALTER HOLLAND; OVESTON COX; TERRY JACOBS; BRIAN TAYLOR; WALTER WILLIAMS; MILDEO RAGHU; J. JAMES ROBERSON, LUTHER GREGG; WILHELMINA SHERROD; LILLI SMITHERMAN, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD SMITHERMAN, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE; JACK TERHUNE**; WILLIAM PLANTIER; SCOTT FAUNCE; GEORGE BLASKEWICZ; JOHN SWAL; JAMES WILLIAMS; FRANK BUDD; DAVID WIANECKI; LOUIS HELMKIN; ARTHUR FINGERMAN; WAYNE SCHULTZ; RONALD ENSANA; THOMAS MORAN; MICHAEL VIGGIANO; PAUL SCHUSTER; GREGORY DAUKSHAUS, LAWRENCE CARPENTER; PATRICK ARVONIO; AL ORTIZ; JOSEPH BUTLER; ROBERT MILLER; HERBERT BOWLBY; MICHAEL DEVINE; DOMINICK CONTE; BARRY PARKS; RAYMOND CONOVER; DAVID TILBURY; ANTHONY PORTO; ROBERT STEPHENS; JAMES LUTZ; FREDERICK VALUSEK; CAROLYN; LYDELL SHEERER; CHRISTOPHER NORELLI; GEORGE KENNYBROOK; INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS OF THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION; NEW JERSEY LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, PRIMARY LEVEL SUPERVISORY LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT; NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR OFFICER'S LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION; CAPTAINS UNIT; INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATORS UNIT, AS NECESSARY PARTIES PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. PRO. 19(A) JAMES LUTZ, v. LUTHER GREGG USA, PLAINTIFF LILLI SMITHERMAN, IN HER CAPACITY AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD SMITHERMAN; WALTER HOLLAND; OVESTON COX; BRIAN TAYLOR; TERRY JACOBS; WALTER WILLIAMSv. STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JACK TERHUNE,** IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION; NEW JERSEY LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, PRIMARY LEVEL SUPERVISORY LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT; NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR OFFICERS LAW ENFORCEMEN |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
John J. Farmer, Jr., Esquire Attorney General OF New Jersey Michael J. Haas, Esquire Assistant Attorney General James D. Harris, Esquire (argued) Todd J. Schwartz, Esquire Deputy Attorneys General Office of Attorney General of the State of New Jersey R.J. Hughes Justice Complex P.O. Box 112 Trenton, NJ 08625 Counsel for State of New Jersey, New Jersey Department of Corrections, and Jack Terhune, as Appellants/Cross-Appellees
Miriam F. Clark, Esquire (argued) Lewis M. Steel, Esquire Rachel S. Levitan, Esquire Steel, Bellman, Ritz & Clark, P.C. 225 Broadway, Suite 2501 New York, NY 10007 Counsel for Holland and Haskins Classes as Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Bill Lann Lee, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Dennis J. Dimsey, Esquire Seth M. Galanter, Esquire (argued) Marie K. McELDERRY, Esquire United States Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, DC 20035-6078 Counsel for the United States as Appellee/Cross-Appellant
On Appeal From the United States District Court For the District of New Jersey District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
Before: Becker, Chief Judge, Rendell and MAGILL,* Circuit Judges.
Several employees of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) filed suit in the District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging employment discrimination and harassment on the basis of race and gender at NJDOC facilities. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) also instituted a discrimination and harassment lawsuit against NJDOC, and this case was consolidated with the employees' action to form the present lawsuit. After extensive discovery followed by vigorous negotiations, the parties, assisted by a court-appointed mediator, drafted a proposed Consent Decree aimed at rectifying the complained-of conditions. On May 10, 1996, the District Court gave final approval to and implemented the Decree, which provided that it would be in effect for four years from the date it was implemented, and that the District Court was authorized to take "such action as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Decree."
In May 2000, motivated by certain problems with implementation, the District Court extended the Decree by ten months. The court rested its conclusion that it had the power to extend the Consent Decree on two bases. First, it opined that language in the Decree granted it this power. Second, the court reasoned that it possessed inherent power to enforce compliance with the provisions of consent decrees that it approved, and to modify such decrees in response to changed circumstances. NJDOC contests the ten-month extension of the Decree, arguing that the District Court did not have the power to extend the Decree under its terms, and that the court failed to make adequate findings to support its use of its inherent compliance enforcement or modification powers to extend the Decree.
The issue of whether the Decree itself gave the District Court the power to extend it requires us to address the proper standard of review of a district court's interpretation of a consent decree that it has approved and implemented. Several of our sister circuits have adopted "deferential de novo" as the standard of review for this situation, and the plaintiffs encourage us to do likewise. We have difficulty understanding what the oxymoronic standard of "deferential de novo" could mean, and reject this approach in favor of straightforward de novo review. Interpreting the Decree de novo, we conclude that the language of the Decree does not itself confer power on the District Court to extend it.
On the other hand, it is settled that a court does have inherent power to enforce a consent decree in response to a party's non-compliance, and to modify a decree in response to changed conditions. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968) (). Furthermore, a court has broad equitable power to fashion a remedy in its exercise of its compliance enforcement and modification powers when a consent decree is aimed at remedying discrimination, as is the Consent Decree in the case at bar. See Spallone, 493 U.S. at 276 (); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 n.6 (1992) recognizing that a court's modification power "is long-established, broad, and flexible") (internal quotes and citation omitted).
It is also clear that this broad remedial power can be used to extend the effective time period of a consent decree. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942) (consent decree extended via exercise of modification power); United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1995) (). However, a court must make specific findings that support its use of these inherent powers. See Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1952) (); Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 137 F.3d 209, 214 (3d Cir. 1998) ().
We conclude that the District Court did not make adequate factual findings to support its exercise of either the compliance enforcement or the modification power. The court neither identified sufficient incidents of non-compliance by NJDOC that would justify an extension of the entire Decree, nor did it specify the changed conditions that would justify the modification of the ending date of the Decree. We therefore will vacate the District Court's Order and remand for specific factual findings by the District Court, and for the District Court to extend only those parts of the Decree whose extension is warranted by those specific findings.1
In June 1991, Richard Smitherman, an African-American employee of NJDOC, filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that white officers, supervisors, and managers at NJDOC had subjected him and other black employees to constant racial remarks and slurs. Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq., the EEOC investigated these allegations and found reasonable cause to...
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