Holland v. Richards

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Holland v. Richards, 123 N.E.2d 731, 4 Ill.2d 570 (Ill. 1955)
• Decision Date: 21 January 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33219,33219
• Parties: Laura Virginia HOLLAND, Appellant, v. Lucille RICHARDS et al., Appellees,

Page 731

123 N.E.2d 731

4 Ill.2d 570

Laura Virginia HOLLAND, Appellant, v. Lucille RICHARDS et al., Appellees,

No. 33219.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 21, 1955

Henry I. Green, Oris Barth, Lawrence R. Hatch, and James H. Wheat, Urbana, for appellant.

Harris & Harris, Lincoln, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Laura Virginia Holland, filed her complaint in equity in the circuit court of Logan County on December 7, 1953, seeking to establish her title to approximately 190 acres of farm lands located in that county. The relief prayed was that appellees be compelled to surrender into court a certain deed dated June 28, 1926, by which the premises in question were allegedly conveyed to appellant's mother and the children of her body; that title to the land be quieted and confirmed in appellant; that a certain deed dated March 18, 1933, by which the same lands were conveyed to appellees, Lucille Richards, Florence Richards Graham and Gertrude Richards Honaker, be surrendered into court, held to be void and set aside as a cloud on appellant's title, and that appellees account for rents and profits allegedly received. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, the principal ground being that the complaint showed on its face that appellant's claim was barred by laches. This motion was allowed and the plaintiff was allowed to amend her complaint. The complaint as amended also asks that appellees be enjoined from trespassing and from interfering with appellant's right of possession. The motion to dismiss the complaint as amended failed to assert several of the grounds urged in the earlier motion. The trial court again sustained the motion and appellant, having elected to stand on her amended complaint, a decree was entered dismissing her suit for want of equity. This appeal followed.

Counsel for appellees concede that only the question of laches is involved in this appeal; that if the action of the trial court in dismissing the complaint is to be sustained it must be on that basis and that basis alone. It is specificially stated that appellees do not urge any of the other matters originally raised in their motion to dismiss. Therefore the issues are narrowed to two questions: (1) Is the doctrine of laches applicable to the facts of this case as stated in the complaint? (2) Can the defense be raised by motion or is appellant correct in her contention that it can be raised only by answer?

The second question may be answered without reference to the facts pleaded, so we first give attention to that matter. The answer is that where a complaint in equity shows laches on its face and fails to set forth any excuse for any earlier prosecution of the suit, the matter may be raised by motion specifically pointing out such defect. This was certainly the law before the passage of the present Civil Practice Act. In Kerfoot v. Billings, 160 Ill. 563, at page 573, 43 N.E. 804, at page 808, the question was specifically raised and we stated: 'Our conclusion is that where a bill shows laches upon its face, and fails to set forth any excuse for an earlier prosecution of the suit, the defense of laches on the part of the complainant may be set up under demurrer either general or special.' In the same case we observed that it had been held in a number of cases that if the bar of the Statute of Limitations appeared on the face of the bill, and no circumstances were alleged to take the case out of the statute, the bill would be obnoxious to demurrer and that there was no reason why the same rule should not apply where laches amounting to a bar in equity appeared on the face of the bill. Since the passage of the Civil Practice Act, general demurrers have been abolished and motions in the nature of special demurrers have been substituted. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 110, par. 169.) Motions under the act must specifically point out the defects complained of, but there is nothing in the act which changes the earlier rule. Section 43(4) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 110, par. 167,) provides that the facts constituting any affirmative defense such as laches (among others) must be plainly set forth in the answer or reply, but this provision is not to be construed as stating that the defense of laches may be raised only by answer or reply. The section properly construed merely means that when the pleader elects to plead an affirmative defense, such as laches, in his answer or reply, the facts constituting that defense must be plainly set forth. There is nothing in the Civil Practice Act which excuses the necessity of stating a cause of action, and where a complaint fails to state a cause of action by reason of apparent laches where no sufficient excuse for delay is stated, there appears to be no reason why the defect cannot be raised by motion so long as the motion specifically points out the defect complained of. In Deasey v. City of Chicago, 412 Ill. 151, 105 N.E.2d 727, appellants who were police officers filed a bill in equity and at law to recover portions of their salaries allegedly due them. A motion to dismiss alleging (inter alia) laches and the Statute of Limitations was sustained and a motion for leave to amend was denied. In affirming the judgment of the trial court we stated, 412 Ill. at pages 155-156, 105 N.E.2d at page 729: 'A marked lack of diligence in pursuing their claims appears on the face of appellants' complaint, which was filed in June, 1950, on claims which allegedly arose from the period January, 1931, to December, 1939. Appellants were aware, as a result of the nine annual appropriation bills passed during this period, that their salaries had been lowered and that they were being consistently paid at a reduced rate, yet they did not act. In Knaus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 365 Ill. 588, 7 N.E.2d 298, it was held that the Statute of Limitations may be availed of in chancery by a motion to dismiss where the bar appears on the face of the complaint, unless an equitable excuse is alleged in the complaint to avoid the bar. No sufficient equitable excuse was here alleged. Plaintiffs had full year-by-year knowledge of the salary reductions, and should have sought earlier adjudication of their rights in relation thereto. They are guilty of laches since they waited eleven years at the least reckoning to bring this action, and the bar of the Statute of Limitations appears on the face of their complaint, thus making it properly within the court's consideration on motion to dismiss.' It is our conclusion, therefore, that appellees might properly raise the defense by motion assuming (1) that an unreasonable delay appeared on the face of the complaint, (2) that no sufficient excuse for delay appeared or was pleaded, and (3) that the motion specifically pointed out the defects complained of.

This brings us to a consideration of the question whether the bill shows on its face that appellant was guilty of laches which requires a detailed examination of the amended complaint. It is alleged that Helen Richards Holland, deceased, mother of the appellant, Laura Virginia Holland, was the daughter of John E. Richards and Laura B. Richards, pioneer residents of Logan County, and that the appellees, Lucille Richards, Florence Richards Graham and Gertrude Richards Honaker, are also daughters of the same John E. Richards and Laura B. Richards. On or about June 28, 1926, John E. Richards and Laura B. Richards, his wife, deeded four separate parcels of particularly described land in Logan County to each of their four daughters for life with remainder in fee simple to the children of their bodies, reserving to John E. Richards and Laura B. Richards and the survivor life estates therein. The amended complaint also alleges that an additional 190 acres in question in this case was deeded to Helen Richards Holland, mother of the appellant at the same time by a fifth deed. It is alleged that all of the daughters were advised of the entire transaction and of the existence of all of the deeds. It is further alleged that by virtue of the deed to the 190 acres and the delivery thereof to Helen Richards Holland, title and ownership was vested either in the grantee for and during the term of her natural life with remainder in fee simple at her death to the children of her body, or in the grantor in fee simple subject only to the reserved life estates. It is alleged that Harold F. Trapp was an attorney who prepared all the deeds for John E. Richards.

The complaint further alleges that the deed to the 190 acres of land was in the possession of Helen Richards Holland for many years after its delivery to her in 1926, as the appellees well knew; that John E. Richards, one of the grantors, in his lifetime requested to see the deed; that it was delivered to him for that purpose, but that he took the deed away with him and that he either destroyed it or delivered it to the appellees who have either destroyed it or who have it in their possession; that appellees have refused to return it, so that it cannot be produced by appellant in court; that said deed is being withheld by the appellee or some persons through whom they claim or has been destroyed by some of them. It is alleged that John E. Richards and Laura B. Richards remained in exclusive possession of the 190 acres of real estate for their respective lives; that John E. Richards died in 1939 and that Laura B. Richards died on February 12, 1947.

The complaint then alleges that by deed dated March 18, 1933, John E. Richards, and Laura B. Richards purported to convey the same 190 acres of real estate to the appellees, Lucille Richards, Florence Richards Graham and Gertrude Richards Honaker,...