Holland v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 5–11–0560.,5–11–0560.
• Citation: 372 Ill.Dec. 504,2013 IL App (5th) 110560,992 N.E.2d 43
• Parties: Larry W. HOLLAND, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. SCHWAN'S HOME SERVICE, INC., Defendant–Appellant (The Schwan Food Company, Schwan's Shared Services, LLC, and Gary Young, Defendants).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2013 IL App (5th) 110560

992 N.E.2d 43

372 Ill.Dec. 504

Larry W. HOLLAND, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.SCHWAN'S HOME SERVICE, INC., Defendant–Appellant (The Schwan Food Company, Schwan's Shared Services, LLC, and Gary Young, Defendants).

No. 5–11–0560.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

May 30, 2013.

Rehearing Denied July 1, 2013.

Michael F. Dahlen, Feirich/Mager/Green/Ryan, Carbondale, Robert E. Arroyo, Jackson Lewis LLP, Chicago, IL, Alan L. Rupe, Richard A. Olmstead, Kutak Rock LLP, Wichita, KS, for Appellant.

Thomas F. Crosby, Winters, Brewster, Crosby & Schafer, LLC, Marion, IL, for Appellee.

OPINION

Justice STEWART delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[372 Ill.Dec. 511]¶ 1 This case involves a lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, Larry W. Holland, alleging that his former employer, Schwan's Home Service, Inc. (Schwan's), terminated his employment in retaliation for his exercising his rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 to 30 (West 2008)). After a seven-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in Holland's favor on his retaliatory discharge claim, awarding him a total of $4,260,400 in compensatory and punitive damages. The punitive damages portion of the award was $3.6 million.

¶ 2 Throughout the trial court proceedings, Schwan's denied Holland's assertion that it terminated his employment. Instead, it maintained that when Holland recovered from his work accident and was ready to return to work, it offered him an available position at the facility where he previously worked, but he refused to report for work. At several stages of the lower court proceedings, Schwan's requested the circuit court to decide the issue of whether it had terminated Holland in its favor as a matter of law, rather than submitting the issue for the jury to decide. Prior to the trial, Schwan's made this request in a motion for summary judgment that the circuit court denied. After the conclusion of Holland's case in chief, it made the request again in a motion for a directed verdict. Again, the circuit court denied the motion. In denying Schwan's motion for a directed verdict, the circuit court found that Holland had presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he was terminated. It noted that Schwan's was “free to argue to the jury” that Holland was not terminated, but it was “up to the finder of fact to make that determination.” Finally, after the jury considered the evidence and entered a verdict in Holland's favor, Schwan's raised this issue again in a posttrial motion requesting the circuit court to enter a judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict (judgment n.o.v.). The circuit court again denied Schwan's request.

¶ 3 Schwan's now appeals the judgment entered on the jury's verdict and argues that the circuit court should have entered a judgment n.o.v. in its favor because the evidence conclusively established that it did not terminate Holland's employment. Schwan's also advances alternative arguments under a judicial estoppel theory and a standing theory and takes issue with the circuit court's jury instructions, certain evidentiary rulings, and the amount of the jury's award for compensatory and punitive damages. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The legislature enacted the Workers' Compensation Act as a compromise between employers and employees with respect to compensation for work-related injuries. Under the statutory scheme, employees gave up their common law right to sue their employers in tort, but gained the right to recover for injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment without regard to fault. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 180, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1978). Employers gave up their common law defenses to claims involving work-related accidental injuries or death, but their liability became fixed under the statutory scheme. Id. The ability of this statutory scheme to provide efficient and expeditious remedies for injured workers would be seriously undermined if employers could simply terminate or threaten to terminate employees for seeking their rights and remedies under the statute. Id. at 181, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d at 357. “[W]hen faced with such a dilemma many employees, whose common law rights have been supplanted by the [Workers' Compensation] Act, would choose to retain their jobs, and thus, in effect, would be left without a remedy either common law or statutory.” Id. at 182, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d at 357.

¶ 6 In 1975, the legislature amended the Workers' Compensation Act to include section 4(h), which expressly prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because the employee exercises his rights or remedies granted to him under the Act. Pub. Act 79–79, § 1 (eff. July 1, 1975). In the present case, in order for Holland to succeed in his claim against Schwan's for retaliatory discharge, he had to prove to the jury that he was an employee before his injury, that he exercised a right granted by the Workers' Compensation Act, that he was discharged by Schwan's, and that his discharge was causally related to his filing a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act. Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 184 Ill.2d 328, 335–36, 235 Ill.Dec. 54, 704 N.E.2d 403, 406 (1998). As noted above, Schwan's takes issue with the jury's finding that Holland proved that it discharged him from his employment.

¶ 7 Schwan's challenge to the “discharge” element of Holland's claim is presented to us on appeal by way of Schwan's argument that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict and/or its motion for a judgment n.o.v. “Although motions for directed verdicts and motions for judgments n.o.v. are made at different times, they raise the same questions and are governed by the same rules of law.” Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 37, 368 Ill.Dec. 1, 983 N.E.2d 414. Our review of the circuit court's denial of Schwan's request for a judgment n.o.v. requires us to consider all of the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Holland to determine whether there was a total failure or lack of evidence to prove the discharge element of his claim. Id. This standard is a high one. Id. Accordingly, in discussing the background relevant to Schwan's contention on appeal, we look at the trial evidence in the light most favorable to Holland and with all reasonable inferences construed in his favor on the issue of whether Schwan's terminated his employment. If reasonable minds differ concerning inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, entry of a judgment n.o.v. is not appropriate. Id.

¶ 8 Schwan's is in the business of marketing and distributing a variety of frozen food products to consumers for home consumption. Holland began working for Schwan's on July 12, 2004, as a “district project manager.” However, he held that position for only two months before Schwan's discontinued this position. Schwan's then offered Holland a position as a “sales supervisor.” As part of his duties as a sales supervisor, Schwan's trained Holland in its employment procedures. Holland explained to the jury that, for job transfers within the company, Schwan's employment procedures included a website that employees could log onto using their employee number. Once logged on, an employee was able to review any internal offers extended to employees for job reassignments. The information available on the website included a written internal offer, the compensation package, vacation benefits, and other information related to the new position being offered. According to Holland, a written “internal offer” was the customary way Schwan's internally moved its employees from one position to another. When Schwan's eliminated Holland's district project manager position in 2004, it notified him of his transfer offer to the sales supervisor position by issuing him a written internal offer.

¶ 9 Holland worked for Schwan's as a sales manager until July 2006, when Schwan's discontinued that position. Schwan's then offered Holland the position of “facility supervisor” at its depot in West Frankfort, Illinois. This was the position that Holland occupied when he was involved in his work-related accident that occurred in August 2008. Again, when Schwan's transferred Holland to this new position, it issued him another written internal offer. The written “Internal Offer Letter” was admitted into evidence at the trial, and it included a summary of the offer's terms and conditions and a line for Holland to sign as his acceptance of the offer. Holland indicated that he was familiar with “all the different parts” of Schwan's internal offer letters because they were the customary way that Schwan's moved someone from one position to another and because his reassignment in July 2006 was the second time he had received a written internal offer letter from Schwan's. He also testified that he continued to receive a salary from Schwan's during his transition from sales supervisor to facility supervisor.

¶ 10 Holland's duties as the facility supervisor at the West Frankfort depot included managing the facility, maintaining inventory, managing the movement of goods in and out of the facility, and managing and helping the employees (material handlers) who physically handled and moved the goods in and out of the facility. He was responsible for keeping track of inventory, both stored in the depot's storage freezer and loaded onto the depot's delivery trucks. In managing inventory, he was responsible for controlling the amount of goods that inexplicably disappeared from the depot's inventory (shrinkage) and the amount of goods that could not be sold to consumers because of defects (damage). He was also responsible for the maintenance of the depot property and delivery trucks. At the end of his workday, he was responsible for mowing the depot's yard if necessary,...