Holland v. State

• Decision Date: 11 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 93-DP-00494-SCT,93-DP-00494-SCT
• Citation: 705 So.2d 307
• Parties: Gerald James HOLLAND v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

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705 So.2d 307

Gerald James HOLLAND v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 93-DP-00494-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 11, 1997.

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James L. Davis, III, Mack A. Bethea, Gulfport, John H. Holdridge, New Orleans, LA, for appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Marvin L. White, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

En Banc.

SMITH, Justice, for the Court:

¶1 Gerald James Holland was convicted in 1987 in the Circuit Court of Harrison County of the capital murder of Krystal D. King, committed during the underlying crime of rape. Holland was sentenced to death. On appeal, this court affirmed the conviction of capital murder, but vacated the death penalty, and remanded the case for resentencing. Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848 (Miss.1991). On April 3, 1993, a resentencing jury for the second time imposed the death penalty. This appeal consolidates Holland's direct appeal of his resentencing and our mandatory review of the death sentence. Holland assigned the thirty-one alleged errors on appeal. After thorough review, we find no error and accordingly affirm Holland's sentence of death.

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THE FACTS

¶2 The evidence presented at the original trial was sufficiently summarized in our prior opinion. Holland I, 587 So.2d at 851. Therefore only limited additional facts are required here. Briefly, the 15-year-old victim was raped, beaten, and stabbed. The cause of death was asphyxiation as a ligature was placed around her neck and clothing was stuffed down her throat. Holland forced a friend, who had not been present during the murder, to accompany him to a remote area for burial of the mutilated body. This court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to convince a rational fact finder of Holland's guilt of capital murder and the underlying crime of rape beyond a reasonable doubt, and affirmed Holland's guilt.

¶3 The first jury, however, prematurely considered the death sentence before the mitigating and aggravating evidence was presented and before the instructions of the law were given by the trial court. This Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury had been violated, vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 872. Holland was granted a new sentencing hearing and again received the death penalty, which he is now appealing. He asserts that the trial court impermissibly restricted his mitigation evidence at rehearing. Therefore, the issue presented here concerns the scope of evidence admissible in mitigation after remand for resentencing before a new sentencing jury.

¶4 Holland filed a bevy of motions which were denied by the trial judge with certain exceptions. The trial judge reserved evidentiary rulings on each piece of evidence until presented at the trial. As to aggravating factors, the trial judge submitted by instruction the following aggravators: (1) that the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the act of commission of the crime of rape, (2) that the capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and (3) that the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Additionally, the judge submitted to the jury the determination of whether Holland actually killed Krystal D. King, or attempted to kill her, or intended that the killing take place, or contemplated that lethal force would be employed in accordance with the capital sentencing procedure set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7)(a-d) (1994 rev.); see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3376-77, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). The resentencing jury imposed the death sentence, finding the existence of all three of the aggravating factors, as well as finding that Holland actually killed Krystal King, intended to kill and contemplated that lethal force would be employed. From his sentence of death, Holland appeals.

DISCUSSION OF LAW

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING HOLLAND'S MOTION VIII, WHICH SOUGHT A DECLARATION THAT MISSISSIPPI'S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, INTER ALIA, BECAUSE IT AUTHORIZES IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR SIMPLE FELONY MURDER BUT NOT PREMEDITATED MURDER?

¶5 Holland argues that Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101, Mississippi's capital murder statute, is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The ground assigned in this challenge is that the statute permits the death penalty for certain felony murders without a finding of intent to kill, but does not include premeditated murder. This error has been asserted before this Court in Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1344 (Miss.1977), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988, 100 S.Ct. 2975, 64 L.Ed.2d 847 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 30, 65 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1980) and Bell v. Watkins, 381 So.2d 118, 124 (Miss.1980), but was denied without analysis. Therefore, this Court addresses the issue of constitutionality.

¶6 Gray's Eighth Amendment claim addressed the imposition of the death penalty. Under Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-88, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2931-32, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875, 97

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S.Ct. 197, 50 L.Ed.2d 158 (1976), a death sentence must not be excessive in relation to the crime for which it is imposed, and death sentences must be imposed with reasonable consistency. Holland contends that Mississippi's capital murder scheme imposing death on an unpremeditated murder, but not a premeditated murder committed in an atrocious manner, implicates the Eighth Amendment concerning fair trial guarantees.

¶7 Holland's argument overlooks the fact that the our statute restricts, limits and narrows the death penalty to certain classes of cases. One class consists of those cases in which two crimes have been committed, i.e., murder and another specified type felony. Another class concerns a murder for compensation, or "hire." See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(a) and (d). Another class of crimes address specified classes of people considered particularly vulnerable, i.e., children, law enforcement personnel and public elected officials, etc. See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(a), (e), (g).

¶8 Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7)(a-d) further restricts the imposition of death within the class to those persons the sentencing jury finds (1) actually killed; (2) attempted to kill; (3) intended to kill; or (4) contemplated lethal force be used.

¶9 The constitutional challenge asserted here does not offend the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and this conclusion has been long ago held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.1982), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 910, 103 S.Ct. 1886, 76 L.Ed.2d 815, reh'g denied, 462 U.S. 1124, 103 S.Ct. 3099, 77 L.Ed.2d 1357 (1983).

¶10 Gray also addressed the due process or equal protection challenge of the Fourteenth Amendment and upheld Mississippi's legislative classifications of criminal activity thereunder stating:

The basis of Gray's claim under both equal protection and due process is that there is no rational basis for imposing the death penalty on people who commit murder during the course of a felony but not imposing it on people who commit especially atrocious simple murder. However, Mississippi could have rationally decided that felony murders pose a problem different from atrocious simple murders and could have sought to cure the felony murder problem first. Alternatively, the legislature could have decided that the death penalty would be more effective in deterring felony murders since an experienced felon is more likely to assess the consequences of his acts. Conversely, it could have rationally determined that the death penalty might not effectively deter atrocious simple murders since such people are likely as a group to act on passion or impulse and thus be unmindful of the consequences of their crime. In short, the legislature could have rationally decided that the one class of murders either presented a different problem from the other or that the death penalty would be more effective deterrent [sic] to felony murders than atrocious simple murders.

Gray, 677 F.2d at 1104.

¶11 Considering all these factors, this Court holds that Holland's constitutional challenge to Mississippi's capital murder statutory scheme is without merit.

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT HOLLAND COULD NOT DENY, CHALLENGE, CONTEST, REBUT, EXPLAIN, OR DEFEND:

A. AGAINST THE CONTENTIONS THAT HOLLAND HAD RAPED THE VICTIM;

B. AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION IN SUPPORT OF THE RAPE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE;

C. AGAINST THE CONTENTION THAT HOLLAND HAD ACTUALLY KILLED, ATTEMPTED TO KILL, INTENDED TO KILL, AND CONTEMPLATED LETHAL FORCE WOULD BE EMPLOYED AGAINST THE VICTIM (ENMUND FACTORS)?

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT:

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A. HOLLAND COULD NOT ARGUE AND SEEK TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR RESIDUAL DOUBT REGARDING HIS GUILT FOR THE OFFENSE;

B. A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE RAPE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE SHOULD BE GRANTED;

C. THE PROSECUTION COULD INTRODUCE ANY AND ALL EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT THE GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE OF THE PREVIOUS TRIAL, INCLUDING EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE AND THAT HOLLAND MURDERED AND/OR RAPED THE VICTIM, BUT THAT HOLLAND COULD NOT INTRODUCE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT THE GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE OF THE PREVIOUS TRIAL TENDING TO SHOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE AND THAT HOLLAND DID NOT MURDER AND/OR RAPE THE VICTIM?

IV. IN DENYING HOLLAND'S MOTION TO PLACE THE COURT AND STATE ON NOTICE OF THE DEFENSE CALLING AS A WITNESS, DENNIS CANFIELD, AND PLANNING TO READ HIS PRETRIAL TRANSCRIPT LOCATED AT TR. 2232-64 OF THE FIRST TRIAL, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER OF 1987?

V. IN RULING THAT DOCTOR LEROY RIDDICK, A HIGHLY QUALIFIED FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST, COULD NOT, EITHER AT THE...