Holland v. Valley Services, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-0178 (RMU).
| Decision Date | 07 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 06-0178 (RMU). |
| Citation | 612 F.Supp.2d 75 |
| Parties | Michael HOLLAND et al., Plaintiffs, v. VALLEY SERVICES, INC. et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Kathleen Barbara Burns, UMWA Health & Retirement Funds, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
John R. Woodrum, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ORDERING FURTHER BRIEFING ON DAMAGES
This matter is before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs are trustees of the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan ("the 1992 Plan") who seek to recover from defendant Bibeau Construction Company, Inc. ("the defendant")1 amounts paid to certain beneficiaries pursuant to the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 ("the Coal Act" or "the Act"), 26 U.S.C. § 9712, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). The plaintiffs argue that, in addition to the amounts paid to the beneficiaries, the defendant is also liable for interest, liquidated damages and attorneys' fees and costs under the Coal Act. In contrast, the defendant contends that the applicable statute of limitations and the equitable doctrine of laches bar the plaintiffs' claims. Because the statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs' claims for premiums payable before May 15, 2001, the court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to those claims. The court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to claims arising after May 15, 2001 and grants the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to those claims only. On the issue of damages, the court orders further briefing for the reasons explained below.
The Coal Act represents Congress's attempt to stabilize health plan funding for retired miners and identify employers responsible for guaranteed lifetime health benefits for those miners. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 514, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). As part of its response to the failure of coal companies to pay the health benefits promised to their miners, Congress created the 1992 Plan as part of the Coal Act. Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., 496 F.3d 670, 671 (D.C.Cir.2007). As it pertains to this case, the Act provides that the "last signatory operator," i.e., the most recent coal industry employer of a retired miner, and "related persons"2 bear the primary responsibility to pay a monthly premium into the 1992 Plan to finance health benefits for a retiree eligible under the Act. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 9701(c)(4)).
In 1962, Valley Services, Inc. was incorporated for the purpose of operating a coal mine. Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ( ) ¶ 3; Def.'s Response to Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ("Def.'s Statement") ¶ 3. Ovila Bibeau and Dorothy (Bibeau) Kilbourne, husband and wife at the time, became owners of Valley Services in 1975. Pls.' Statement ¶ 4; Def.'s Statement ¶ 4. Valley Services ceased operations in November 1979 and formally dissolved shortly thereafter. Pls.' Statement ¶ 6; Def.'s Statement ¶ 6. Defendant Bibeau Construction, owned entirely by Ovila Bibeau, was established in approximately 1962 and remains in operation. Pls.' Statement ¶ 14-15; Def.'s Statement ¶ 14-15.
On September 25, 1979, Arthur Marcum, Jr., a Valley Services employee, injured his back when he jumped from a bulldozer he was operating. Pls.' Statement ¶ 10; Def.'s Statement ¶ 10. On April 4, 1995, the 1992 Plan approved Marcum's application for retiree health benefits coverage. Pls.' Statement ¶ 11; Def.'s Statement ¶ 11. Because Marcum was eligible to receive benefits retroactive to 1988, the 1992 Plan was obligated to pay for his health care costs dating back to February 1, 1993, the date the 1992 Plan was established. Pls.' Statement ¶ 12; Def.'s Statement ¶ 12; Def.'s Mot. at 6.
On December 4, 2004,3 the 1992 Plan notified the defendant that the defendant is a "related person" to Valley Services under the Coal Act and, therefore, jointly and severally liable for the payment of monthly premiums for Marcum. Pls.' Statement ¶ 24; Def.'s Statement ¶ 23. It requested payment within 20 days. Compl. ¶ 12 Apparently receiving no response, on October 17, 2005, the 1992 Plan again contacted the defendant, demanding payment and cautioning that if it did not receive payment within 15 days, it would treat the defendant's failure to pay as a delinquency. Id. ¶ 13. The defendant, to date, has not paid the premiums, and the plaintiffs allege that it owes $120,625.16 in principal, plus interest, liquidated damages and attorneys' fees and costs. Pls.' Mot., Ex. C ("Stover Decl.") ¶ 6.
The plaintiffs initiated this action on February 1, 2006, see generally Compl., and on September 5, 2007, they moved for summary judgment, Pls.' Mot. at 12. Five days later, the defendant also moved for summary judgment. See generally Def.'s Mot. The court turns now to the parties' arguments.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id.
The nonmoving party may defeat summary judgment through factual representations made in a sworn affidavit if he "support[s] his allegations ... with facts in the record," Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993)), or provides "direct testimonial evidence," Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 338 (D.C.Cir.2006). Indeed, for the court to accept anything less "would defeat the central purpose of the summary judgment device, which is to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant the expense of a jury trial." Greene, 164 F.3d at 675.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit has directed that because it is difficult for a plaintiff to establish proof of discrimination, the court should view summary-judgment motions in such cases with special caution. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 879-80 (D.C.Cir.1997), overturned on other grounds, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc); see also Johnson v. Digital Equip. Corp., 836 F.Supp. 14, 18 (D.D.C.1993).
The defendant believes it is entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. First, it argues that the plaintiffs failed to initiate this action within the six-year statute of limitations. Def.'s Mot. at 10-17. Second, it argues that, the statute of limitations notwithstanding, the equitable doctrine of laches bars recovery for the plaintiffs. Id. at 17-20. The plaintiffs protest that the defendant has miscalculated the triggering event for the statute of limitations and that the defendant is not entitled to a defense of laches. Pls.' Opp'n at 3-4, 7-10. Both sides agree, however, that there are no material facts in dispute. See generally Pls.' Statement; Def.'s Statement.
Claims arising under the Coal Act are subject to provisions of ERISA, including the applicable statute of limitations. 26 U.S.C. § 9721. ERISA requires a plaintiff to bring an action within six years after the date on which the cause of action accrues, or within three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff should have acquired actual knowledge of the existence of a cause of action. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f).4 The defendant contends that the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued on May 15, 1995, when the first premium delinquency became due. Def.'s Mot. at 11. The six-year statute of limitations, according to the defendant, required the plaintiff to file suit by May 15, 2001. Id. The plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations provided for in ERISA is not triggered until (1) the trustees calculate the debt owed and demand payment; and (2) the employer defaults on payment. Pls.' Op...
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Holland v. Bibeau Constr. Co.
...The district court granted summary judgment to the Plan for premiums that became due after May 15, 2001. Holland v. Valley Services, Inc., 612 F.Supp.2d 75, 79 (D.D.C.2009). Ruling that Bibeau's laches defense was unavailable under the Coal Act, the district court explained that a new cause......
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Holland v. Bibeau Constr. Co.
...district court granted summary judgment to the Plan for premiums that became due after May 15, 2001. Holland v. Valley Services, Inc., 612 F.Supp.2d 75, 79 (D.D.C.2009). Ruling that Bibeau's laches defense was unavailable under the Coal Act, the district court explained that a new cause of ......