Hollands v. Attala County, Civil Action No. 1:94cv206-D-D (N.D. Miss. 7/__/1995)
| Decision Date | 01 July 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:94cv206-D-D. |
| Parties | FRANK HOLLANDS PLAINTIFF v. ATTALA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI and TROY STEED, individually and as Sheriff of Attala County, Mississippi DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the court is the motion of the defendants for the entry of judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's claims. Finding the motion not well taken, the same shall be denied.
"What we've got here is a failure to communicate."2
The plaintiff, Frank Hollands, was arrested on charges of possession of crack cocaine by a Kosciusko city police officer on September 10, 1992. He was initially incarcerated in the Kosciusko City Jail, but was later transferred on October 15, 1992 to the Attala County Jail after his preliminary hearing. He was bound over at the county jail to await action by the grand jury of Attala County, Mississippi.
The plaintiff's charge was presented to the grand jury on or about February 17, 1993, during a re-call of the September 1992 term of the Attala County Grand Jury. The Grand Jury refused to return an indictment against Mr. Hollands, and a "No True Bill" was recorded in the Grand Jury record by the Assistant District Attorney Kevin Horan.
Subsequent to the Grand Jury's action, no one communicated the return of the "No True Bill" against Mr. Hollands to the Sheriff or to anyone at the jail. The Sheriff did nothing further to determine whether he had legal authority to continue holding Mr. Hollands in custody. As a consequence, Mr. Hollands remained in the Attala County Jail for the next eight (8) months. He was finally released on October 15, 1993, after a private attorney pursued the matter at the behest of Mr. Hollands.
The plaintiff filed this action seeking redress under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights secured under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as asserting several state law causes of action. Underlying his causes of action are not only the fact of his extended incarceration but also the conditions of that incarceration — lack of exercise opportunity, "group punishment" inflicted upon the prisoners, and the lack of adequate medical care. The defendants have now moved for the entry of a judgment as a matter of law in their favor on the plaintiff's claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." F.R.C.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1992). If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Fifth Circuit recognizes a cause of action arising under § 1983 for illegal detention (aka "false imprisonment"). Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1992); Simmons v McElveen, 846 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1988). "An individual has a federally protected right to be free from unlawful . . . detention resulting in a significant restraint in liberty and violation of this right may be grounds for suit under § 1983." Parker v. Fort Worth Police Dept., 980 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Sanders, 950 F.2d at 278). "[T]he infliction of punishment when not authorized by state law is a classic instance of denial of liberty without due process of law." Huddleston v. Shirley, 787 F.Supp. 109, 111 (N.D. Miss. 1992) (quoting Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 781 F.2d 24, 27 n.4 (2nd Cir. 1986)). The term "false imprisonment" with regard to this claim is somewhat of a misnomer, for it is insufficient under § 1983 to merely establish the elements of the common law tort of the same name. More than mere negligence must be shown to establish liability for illegal detention under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Simmons, 846 F.2d at 339; Martin v. Dallas County, 822 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1987). There is no dispute that Mr. Hollands suffered a substantial deprivation of liberty in this case, for it appears without question that Mr. Hollands was kept in the Attala County Jail for about eight months longer than he was legally required. The primary question to be determined in this case is whether this deprivation is redressable under § 1983.
The question for this court concerning Sheriff Steed's liability is whether there is sufficient evidence that he committed any error beyond mere negligence in failing to release the plaintiff after he was "no-billed" by the grand jury. The parties are in agreement that neither Sheriff Steed nor any of his deputies had actual knowledge of the "no bill" returned in the plaintiff's case. In essence, Sheriff Steed contends that he did not have any duty to investigate the continued propriety of holding Mr. Hollands in jail. He asserts that "he was no constitutional duty to 'investigate independently' the possibility of a 'no bill' of indictment," and points out that there is no statutory duty imposed upon a Mississippi Sheriff to check the status of grand jury records.3 Nevertheless, the court shall examine what is statutorily required of a Sheriff under Mississippi law with respect to the county jail:
§ 19-25-71 Sheriff to serve as jailer; separate rooms for sexes; jail supplies
The sheriff shall be the jailer of his county, except in any county in which there is a jointly owned jail . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 19-25-71 (1972) (emphasis added).
§ 19-25-69 Sheriff to have charge of courthouse, jail and protection of prisoners
The sheriff shall have charge of the courthouse and the jail of his county, of the premises belonging thereto, and of the prisoners in said jail Miss Code Ann. § 19-25-69 (1972) (emphasis added).
§ 19-25-35 Duty of sheriff to attend courts, jail committed persons, and to execute orders and decrees.
The sheriff shall be the executive officer of the circuit and chancery court of his county, and he shall attend all the sessions thereof with a sufficient number of deputies or bailiffs. He shall execute all orders and decrees of said courts directed to him to be executed. He shall take into his custody, and safely keep, in the jail of his county, all persons committed by order of either of said courts, or by any process issuing therefrom, or lawfully required to be held for appearance before either of them.
Miss. Code Ann. § 19-25-35 (1972) (emphasis added).
§ 19-25-79 Sheriff to receive and keep prisoner committed by justice.
The sheriff of any county shall receive and keep any prisoner by a justice of the peace according to the order of commitment.
Miss. Code Ann. § 19-25-79 (1972) (emphasis added). In the plaintiff's case, Mr. Hollands was held in the Attala County Jail for a period of time under lawful authority — i.e., pursuant to an order of the judge who presided over his preliminary hearing. His lawful detention was limited in time by the order of that court, and the term of detention it specified was the extent of Mr. Holland's lawful incarceration4. Further, this court finds § 19-25-79 of particular importance because it required Sheriff Steed to hold Mr. Hollands "according to the order of commitment." Miss Code Ann. § 19-25-79 (1972).
These relevant Mississippi statutes designate under what circumstances a sheriff may lawfully hold a person in the county jail. Indeed, the statutes require that the Sheriff hold those persons lawfully imprisoned. When considering this duty to hold prisoners in conjunction with the constitutional restraints upon infringement upon individual liberty, it is clear that a sheriff may hold in the county jail only those persons who are lawfully imprisoned. See Douthit v. Jones, 641 F.2d 345, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1981), rehearing of 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980) () In order to properly execute these statutory duties, the sheriff is necessarily required to determine if and when that prisoner is to be released in accordance with the order of commitment. Mississippi statutory law also imposes explicit obligations on a sheriff with regard to his prisoners and his knowledge of their term of detention:
§ 19-25-63 Jail-Docket kept by sheriff.
It shall be the duty of every sheriff to keep a record, to be called the "Jail docket," in which he shall note each warrant or mittimus by which any person shall be received or placed in the jail of his county, entering the nature of the writ or warrant, by whom issued, the name of the prisoner, when received, the date of the arrest and commitment, for what crime or other cause the party is imprisoned,...
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