Hollant v. City of N. Miami
| Decision Date | 17 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-24197-Civ-Scola |
| Parties | Emile Hollant, Plaintiff, v. City of North Miami, Florida, and others, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
This matter is before the Court upon the motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants City of North Miami (the "City"), Larry M. Spring, Jr., Larry Juriga, Scott W. Galvin, and Diana Roman. (Mot., ECF No. 32.) After careful consideration of the motion, opposing and supporting submissions, and the applicable case law, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion (ECF No. 32.)
This case arises in the aftermath of a police-involved shooting in July, 2016. As alleged in the amended complaint (ECF No. 30), the Plaintiff, who was a commander in the North Miami Police Department, was one of the responders to a 9-1-1 call about two individuals later identified as Arnaldo Rios-Soto and Charles Kinsey—one of whom appeared to have a gun to his head. After positioning himself approximately 170 feet away from the two men, Hollant moved from his position to get a set of binoculars from his patrol car to better see and attempt to identify the object in Rios-Soto's hand. Before Hollant returned, North Miami Police officer Aledda fired, hitting Kinsey. Hollant told Gary Eugene, the police chief at the time, who arrived at the scene after the shooting, that he had not witnessed the shooting.
Three days later, Defendant Juriga, the assistant police chief at the time (and now current chief), claimed that Hollant had lied to Eugene and had made a statement that caused Aledda to open fire. Based on this information, Eugene decided to put Hollant on administrative leave, which Defendant Larry Spring, the City manager, stated should be without pay. However, after reviewing the radio transmissions from the shooting incident, Eugene requested that Defendant Spring and the City attorney review the police radio communications before suspending Hollant. According to Hollant, Defendant Spring refused to listen, and ordered Eugene to relieve Hollant of duty. Hollant alleges that even though Eugene did not agree with the suspension, he nevertheless suspended Hollant without pay as directed, and without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard.
Later the same day at a national press conference, Defendant Spring falsely accused Hollant of fabricating information and lying about his absence when the shooting took place. In addition, Defendant Scott Galvin, a City councilman, falsely accused Hollant at the same press conference of "betraying the badge" and "jeopardizing the lives" of his officers. News of Hollant's suspension was also circulated in the local media.
As a result of the media reports, the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's Office ("SAO") and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") commenced investigations regarding the shooting incident and Hollant's involvement. The SAO ultimately determined not to pursue a formal criminal investigation, and despite alleged pressure from the City, the SAO refused to amend its close-out memo to change language regarding its conclusion that Hollant did not lie. In addition, Hollant remained on administrative leave, but with pay, pending completion of a North Miami Police Department internal investigation, headed by the Defendant Sergeant Diana Roman.
In December, 2016, FDLE issued its report on the shooting by Officer Aledda, which the Plaintiff alleges reaffirmed the SAO's initial conclusion that he did nothing wrong. However, the Disposition Panel report ultimately found that Hollant obstructed the law enforcement investigation by making false statements. In spite of internal disagreements with the report's finding, Defendant Juriga sent Hollant notice of his intent to terminate Hollant and of Hollant's right to a pre-determination hearing.
Hollant requested and attended a pre-determination hearing, at which he alleges that he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or to clear his name. In addition, the City's personnel board refused to review his termination decision. As a result, Hollant maintains that the process was unfair and violated his right to due process.
In the amended complaint, Hollant asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Counts 1-4); a claim for violation of the Florida Whistleblower Act (Count 5); a claim for national origin discrimination (Count 6); a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 7); and a claim for slander (Count 8). The Defendants each seek dismissal of the claims asserted against them.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all of the complaint's allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-has-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must articulate "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not survive dismissal. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Yet, where the allegations "possess enough heft" to suggest a plausible entitlement to relief, the case may proceed. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. "[T]he standard 'simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' of the required element." Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citation omitted).
In their motion, the Defendants argue that the amended complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. Specifically, the Defendants maintain that Counts 1 through 4 should be dismissed because the Plaintiff received adequate due process in the form of a pre-determination hearing, and that the claims in Counts 1 and 2 against the City should be dismissed because the Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a municipal custom or practice. In addition, the Defendants argue that the claims in Counts 1, 3, and 4 asserted against the individual Defendants Spring, Juriga, and Galvin should be dismissed because they are redundant of the claims against the City, and if asserted against the Defendants in their individual capacities, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the Defendants argue that Counts 5 through 7 fail to state a claim, and the allegedly slanderous statements underlying Count 8 are absolutely privileged. The Court considers each argument in turn.
A civil rights action under § 1983 requires the deprivation of a federally protected right by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2013); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).
In the analysis of procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must have a property interest of which he is deprived by state action, and he must have received insufficient process regarding that deprivation. Ross v. Clayton Cty., 173 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1999) Indeed, "[i]n procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 'life, liberty, or property' is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (emphasis in original). "Generally, a public employee has a property interest in continued employment if state or local ordinance in any way limits the power of the appointing body to dismiss an employee." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff was afforded sufficient due process because he was provided a pre-determination hearing, which also gave him the opportunity to clear his name. In response, Hollant argues that he did not receive a hearing prior to being suspended, and that the pre-determination hearing he had prior to his termination was not meaningful. In order to determine whether a violation has occurred, the Court must inquire into the process provided. "This inquiry would examine the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126. Thus, the inquiry is necessarily a factually intensive one, and not suited to disposition upon a motion to dismiss.
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes the existence of a liberty interest in one's good name and reputation, and has held that a procedural due process claim for deprivation of that interest may arise where the state fails to provide an employee with an opportunity for a name clearing hearing when...
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