Hollars v. Roadhouse Host, LLC
| Decision Date | 02 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cv-01142-JMS-DML,1:18-cv-01142-JMS-DML |
| Parties | JOHN GARRETT HOLLARS, Plaintiff, v. ROADHOUSE HOST, LLC, JOHN BRYANT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
John Garrett Hollars alleges that on the morning of February 7, 2016, a coworker raped him. At some point following the alleged incident, Mr. Hollars' employer - Roadhouse Host LLC, a franchise of Texas Roadhouse Development Corporation (hereinafter, "Texas Roadhouse") - terminated his employment.
Mr. Hollars brought suit against Texas Roadhouse in Madison Circuit Court, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as several state law causes of action. [Filing No. 1-1.] On April 13, 2018, Texas Roadhouse removed Mr. Hollars' suit to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, with supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Hollars' state law claims. [Filing No. 1.] Shortly after Mr. Hollars amended his Complaint, [Filing No. 18], Texas Roadhouse filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss pertaining to Mr. Hollars' state law claims. [Filing No. 20.] Mr. Hollars filed both a response and an Alternative Motion to Amend his Amended Complaint, [Filing No. 24]. Both Motions are now ripe for the Court's review. [Filing No. 20; Filing No. 24.]
I.
MOTION TO AMEND
As an initial matter, the Court will consider Mr. Hollars' Motion to Amend. [Filing No. 24.] In his brief in support of his Motion to Amend, Mr. Hollars states that the currently-operative Complaint only included one of six paragraphs from his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Charge of Discrimination in this matter. [Filing No. 25 at 2.] He states that his proposed amendments would "add allegations relating to the paragraphs presented in the EEOC Charge," that he believes "will cure any remaining defects in [his] amended pleading." [Filing No. 25 at 7-8.] He argues that Texas Roadhouse would not be prejudiced by the amendment because the case "is in its initial stages." [Filing No. 25 at 8.] In addition, Mr. Hollars points out that Texas Roadhouse is already aware of the allegations he seeks to add because it has already cited to the allegations contained in his EEOC Charge. [Filing No. 25 at 8.]
In response, Texas Roadhouse argues that Mr. Hollars' proposed amendment is "futile" as it will not cure any of the defects in the Complaint. [Filing No. 29 at 3.]
My. Hollars' reply does not address this issue, but merely states that the Court should allow him to amend his Complaint. [Filing No. 30 at 4.]
Generally, a motion for leave to amend a complaint is evaluated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2011). Rule 15 provides that "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave," which should be freely given "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit has called this standard "generous." Arrigo v. Link, 836 F.3d 787, 797 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 734 (7th Cir. 2014)). However, "a district court has broad discretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants,or where the amendment would be futile." U.S. v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 706-07 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation and citations omitted). Only where a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint after the deadline set in the case management plan has passed do courts apply a heightened pleading standard, under which "the moving party must show good cause." Arrigo, 836 F.3d at 797 (quotation and citation omitted).
In this case, the deadline to move to amend the pleadings is September 13, 2018. [Filing No. 27 at 3.] Therefore, Mr. Hollars need not show good cause in order to amend his complaint. Texas Roadhouse has only argued that amendment would be futile. After reviewing Mr. Hollars' proposed Second Amended Complaint, however, the Court finds that it alleges significantly more details than the Amended Complaint, including the date of Mr. Hollars' termination and allegations that he reported sexual harassment to Texas Roadhouse. [Filing No. 18; Filing No. 24-1.] Therefore, it is not apparent from the face of the proposed Second Amended Complaint that amendment would be futile. Accordingly, Mr. Hollars' Motion to Amend, [Filing No. 24], is GRANTED, and his proposed Second Amended Complaint is the operative Complaint in the case.
The Court now turns to Texas Roadhouse's Partial Motion to Dismiss, which the Court will treat as applying to Mr. Hollars' Second Amended Complaint. [Filing No. 20.]
II.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim that does not state a right to relief. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw allpermissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Active Disposal Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court will not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations as sufficient to state a claim for relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations must plausibly state an entitlement to relief "to a degree that rises above the speculative level." Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
The following are the factual allegations in the Complaint, which the Court must accept as true at this time:
Mr. Hollars and John Bryant were both employed by the Texas Roadhouse in Anderson, Indiana. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] Mr. Hollars began his employment with Texas Roadhouse in October 2015. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] In November 2015, Mr. Bryant began sexually harassing Mr. Hollars. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] Mr. Hollars reported the harassment to Texas Roadhouse. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] Between November 2015 and February 10, 2016, Mr. Bryant continued to sexually harass Mr. Hollars, and each time this occurred Mr. Hollars reported the harassment to Texas Roadhouse. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] Initially, Texas Roadhouse scheduled Mr. Bryant to work at locations other than Mr. Hollars' employment location and scheduled the two to work at different times. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.]
In the early morning hours of February 7, 2016, Mr. Bryant anally raped Mr. Hollars. [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.] Mr. Bryant is HIV positive. [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.] Mr. Hollars was drunk at the time of this incident. [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.] Later that day, Mr. Hollars went to Community Hospital of Anderson and notified medical staff that he believed he had been raped by Mr. Bryant and that Mr. Bryant was HIV positive.1 [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.]
On February 10, 2016, Texas Roadhouse terminated Mr. Hollars' employment. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.]
On April 14, 2016, Mr. Hollars filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that Texas Roadhouse discriminated against him by failing to respond to his complaints of being sexually harassed by Mr. Bryant based on race, color, and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [Filing No. 24-1 at 1.]
On February 12, 2018,2 Mr. Hollars brought suit against Texas Roadhouse in Madison Circuit Court, alleging that he was entitled to damages for infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, failure to maintain a safe work environment, sexual battery, and battery. [Filing No. 1-1 at 5.] On April 13, 2018, Texas Roadhouse removed Mr. Hollars' suit to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, alleging supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Hollars' non-federal claims. [Filing No. 1.] In the operative Complaint, Mr. Hollars alleges that he "is entitled to damages for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction of EmotionalDistress, Failure to Maintain a Safe Work Environment, and Negligent Retention" as well as damages "pursuant to Title VII." [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.]
On May 23, 2018, Texas Roadhouse filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss pertaining to Mr. Hollars' state law claims, which is now ripe for the Court's review. [Filing No. 20.]
Texas Roadhouse makes two arguments in support of its Motion to Dismiss, each of which the Court considers in turn.
First, Texas Roadhouse argues that Mr. Hollars' state law claims are time-barred because they were filed after the two year statute of limitations on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and negligent retention.3 [Filing No. 21 at 3.] Texas Roadhouse argues that Mr. Hollars' claims are based upon a rape that allegedly occurred on February 7, 2016, but he did not file his original complaint until February 12, 2018. Texas Roadhouse acknowledges that Mr. Hollars' employment with Texas Roadhouse was terminated on February 10, 2016, but contends that this "does nothing to support a negligent supervision or retention claim related to [Mr.] Bryant's alleged prior rape of him." [Filing No. 21 at 3-4.]
In response, Mr. Hollars argues that his claims are not time-barred because they began to accrue on February 10, 2016, [Filing No. 25 at 5], and they were filed by February 12, 2018 - the last day to file such...
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