Hollenbeck v. Estelle

Decision Date05 April 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-1141,81-1141
Citation672 F.2d 451
PartiesKenneth Lee HOLLENBECK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Albert S. Low, Jr., Houston, Tex., for petitioner-appellant.

Joe Foy, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before COLEMAN, POLITZ and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

Convicted of murder with malice in Texas state court, 1 Kenneth Lee Hollenbeck seeks federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contending that he was denied the right to testify and his trial was marred by ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. We affirm.

Context Facts

On the night of February 28, 1973, Hollenbeck inauspiciously engaged in an extended drinking bout in a Dallas bar with a former employee, Joe Hernandez. The two men left the bar in Hollenbeck's new car, with Hollenbeck driving. Hollenbeck had refused Hernandez permission to drive because of Hernandez's condition; he had been drinking for several hours before Hollenbeck joined him at the bar. 2

In response to Hernandez's inquiry, Hollenbeck revealed that there was a fifth of scotch in the glove compartment. Hernandez consumed approximately half of the bottle without pausing. He then took Hollenbeck's .357 magnum single-action revolver from the glove compartment and began waving it around. Hernandez cocked the pistol, pointed it at Hollenbeck and demanded that he be allowed to drive.

Hollenbeck stopped the vehicle, exited and walked around its rear. Hernandez slid over to the driver's side and placed the pistol on the console between the seats. After opening the passenger door, Hollenbeck picked up the pistol, pointed it at Hernandez and said, "Is this what you want or is this it?" Hernandez reached for Hollenbeck's hand. Hollenbeck fired, emptying the six-shot revolver. Five of the bullets struck and killed Hernandez. The sixth was found in the interior of the auto.

At the beginning of the murder trial, out of the presence of the jury, the judge told Hollenbeck that he had a right to testify on his own behalf or he could decline to do so. Hollenbeck chose not to testify, a decision concurred in by his retained counsel. Hollenbeck claims that during the course of the trial, he told his attorney he had changed his mind and wanted to testify. His counsel was opposed. Hollenbeck made no further effort to testify; he relied on his attorney's advice. Hollenbeck did not inform the trial judge that he desired to testify.

Hollenbeck maintains on appeal that he was improperly denied his right to testify, and that his counsel was ineffective, principally for failing to introduce evidence of self-defense.

The Right to Testify

The right to testify has been recognized. "Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.45, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540 n.45, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Godbold, J., dissenting).

The state trial judge informed Hollenbeck of his right to testify, in a model of appropriate judicial concern for the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. The explication by Judge Thomas B. Thorpe is worthy of reproduction in full:

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hollenbeck would you and your attorney come forward here, please, for just a minute?

Realizing that you have two very competent attorneys, there's not much reason for me to take this up with you, but out of an abundance of caution, I want to advise you that the law provides that you have a right to testify and no one can keep you from testifying if you want to. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, likewise, if you choose to testify, the State of Texas will be allowed to cross-examine you just the same as any other witness and, of course, you understand that, do you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Also, if you have previous convictions in the nature of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude that is not remote, then the State will be entitled to ask you about those convictions and, in effect, disclose those convictions to the jury. I'm sure you understand that.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And, likewise, you also have a right to remain silent. In other words, you do not have to testify if you don't want to, and if you choose to remain silent, the State of Texas can't make you testify. They can't call you as a witness or in any way force you to bear witness against yourself, nor can they do anything to call upon you to account for your failure to testify. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: In the event that you choose to testify and you have previous convictions that are made known to the jury, I will instruct the jury that they are not to consider those convictions for any purpose except as they may bear on your credibility and in the setting of punishment, if they got to that phase of the case.

Now, if you choose not to testify, I will instruct the jury that they can't use that against you in any way and that they can't speculate as to why you did not testify or what you might have said had you chosen to testify.

Now, do you have any questions concerning that phase of the case, your right to testify or remain silent?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Fine. Take your seat.

There can be no serious suggestion, in light of this exchange, that Hollenbeck was unaware of his right to testify or to remain silent. Nor can it be gainsaid, based on the facts reflected in the state court record and in the record of the federal habeas proceeding, that Hollenbeck knowingly and intelligently waived the right to testify....

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  • People v. Curtis
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • April 23, 1984
    ...that he has a right not to testify and that if he does not testify then the jury can be instructed about that right. See Hollenbeck v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019, 103 S.Ct. 383, 74 L.Ed.2d 514 (1982). The purposes of advisement by the court on the record a......
  • U.S. v. Teague
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • February 26, 1992
    ...517, 532 (1976).12 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1713.13 Rifkin, supra note 11, at 265.14 See Hollenbeck v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 451, 452-53 (5th Cir.) (noting that state trial judge's colloquy with defendant regarding waiver of right to testify was "a model of appropriate ju......
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    • August 30, 1996
    ...States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d at 1226 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 907, 106 S.Ct. 238, 88 L.Ed.2d 239 (1985); Hollenbeck v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019, 103 S.Ct. 383, 74 L.Ed.2d 514 (1982). Neither can Emery show that he was prejudiced by the absen......
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    ...v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 764 (9th Cir.1989) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991); Hollenbeck v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.1982) (noting that state trial judge's colloquy with defendant was "a model of appropriate judicial concern for the constitutional ......
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