Hollenbeck v. Ristine

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: DEEMER, C. J.
• Citation: 75 N.W. 355,105 Iowa 488
• Parties: JAMES HOLLENBECK, Appellant, v. J. M. RISTINE
• Decision Date: 17 May 1898

75 N.W. 355

105 Iowa 488

JAMES HOLLENBECK, Appellant,
v.
J. M. RISTINE

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 17, 1898

Appeal from Linn District Court.--HON. G. W. BURNHAM, Judge.

ACTION at law to recover damages for an alleged libel written of and concerning the plaintiff, resulting in his discharge from employment by the Cedar Rapids & Marion City Railway as a conductor upon its lines, and for loss of time and injury to reputation and means of support. Defendant admitted the writing of the alleged libel, and averred that it was both justifiable and privileged. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Henry Rickel, John T. Christie and Jamison & Smith for appellant.

C. D. Harrison and Hubbard, Dawley & Wheeler for appellee.

OPINION

[105 Iowa 489] DEEMER, C. J.

The alleged libelous publication of which plaintiff complains is the same one recently considered by this court in the case of Hollenbeck v. Hall, 103 Iowa 214, 72 N.W. 518, and need not be set out in extenso. We held in that case that the publication was not libelous per se. The only difference between that case and this is that, in this, plaintiff alleged and produced evidence tending to show that the defendant wrote the letter to Hall, who was president and manager of the Cedar Rapids & Marion City Railway, with intent to injure plaintiff, and to induce Hall to discharge him from the service of that company; that he had theretofore been in the employ of the company as a conductor for many years; and that, by the writing of said letter, plaintiff has been injured in his means of support, deprived of his employment, and lost valuable [105 Iowa 490] time by reason of his discharge. This, as we understand it, is a plea for special damages; and the question at the threshold of the case is whether or not plaintiff can recover special damages resulting from the publication of a letter which is not libelous per se. It has been broadly stated that "all words are actionable if special damage follows." Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. (Eng.) 39; Barnes v. Trundy, 31 Me. 321; Comyn, Digest, tit. "Action for defamation," D, 30. Again, it has been said that "special damage will not help you if the words are not defamatory." Blackburn, J., in Young v. Macrae, 7 Law T. (N. S.) 354, 3 Best & S. 264. To the same effect is Sheahan v. Ahearne, 9 Ir. R. C. L. 412. We apprehend that between these two statements is to be found the correct rule. Town-shend, in his work on Libel and Slander (4th ed., section 197), says: "It may be correct to say that, to make the words wrongful, they must in their nature be defamatory; provided, the rule thus expressed be understood as being subordinate to and implied in the more comprehensive rule that, to render actionable that language which is not actionable per se, the language must occasion special damage, in the proper sense of that term;" that is to say, as we understand it, the damage must be [75 N.W. 356] the natural and proximate, although not the necessary, consequences of the wrongful act complained of. Townshed further says: "The real question must always be, was the damage complained of the natural and proximate consequences of the publication?" Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (2d ed., p. 242), says: "Besides the publications mentioned [referring to those libelous per se], any...