Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield

• Citation: 186 F. Supp. 212
• Decision Date: 11 July 1960
• Docket Number: No. 7802.,7802.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Ruth HOLLEY, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward J. Holley, deceased, Libellant, v. THE Steamship MANFRED STANSFIELD, her engines, boilers, etc., in rem, and Reederei Blumenfeld, G.M.B.H., in personam, Respondents. REEDEREI BLUMENFELD, G.M.B.H., Petitioner, v. Joseph C. JETT, Respondent-Impleaded. Joseph C. JETT and Reederei Blumenfeld, G.M.B.H., Petitioners, v. ELIZABETH RIVER TERMINALS, INC., Respondent-Impleaded.

186 F. Supp. 212

Ruth HOLLEY, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward J. Holley, deceased, Libellant, v. THE Steamship MANFRED STANSFIELD, her engines, boilers, etc., in rem, and Reederei Blumenfeld, G.M.B.H., in personam, Respondents.

REEDEREI BLUMENFELD, G.M.B.H., Petitioner, v. Joseph C. JETT, Respondent-Impleaded.

Joseph C. JETT and Reederei Blumenfeld, G.M.B.H., Petitioners, v. ELIZABETH RIVER TERMINALS, INC., Respondent-Impleaded.

No. 7802.

United States District Court E. D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

July 11, 1960.

Fine, Fine, Legum, Weinberg & Schwan, Norfolk, Va., for libellant.

Vandeventer, Black, Meredith & Martin, Norfolk, Va., for the S.S. Manfred Stansfield and Reederei Blumenfeld.

Jett, Sykes & Coupland, Norfolk, Va., for Joseph C. Jett.

Williams, Cocke, Worrell & Kelly, Norfolk, Va., for Elizabeth River Terminals.

WALTER E. HOFFMAN, District Judge.

This case was previously before this Court at which time the libel was dismissed for reasons fully stated in an opinion reported in Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, D.C.E.D.Va., 165 F.Supp. 660. On appeal, following the later decision in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 79 S.Ct. 503, 3 L.Ed.2d 524, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the negligence of the decedent would not completely bar a recovery under Virginia law as the death occurred on navigable waters. Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 4 Cir., 269 F.2d 317, 322. Certiorari was denied, Reederei Blumenfeld, G. M. B. H. v. Holley, 361 U.S. 883, 80 S.Ct. 154, 4 L.Ed.2d 119. In referring the matter back to this Court, the following language appears:

"On remand it will become necessary for the court to make findings on unseaworthiness and failure to provide a safe place to work. While the District Court based its disposition of the case solely on the decedent's contributory negligence and found it unnecessary to decide other questions, unseaworthiness was discussed. We neither approve nor disapprove at this time any intimations in the District Court's opinion as to the law or the facts pertaining to this phase of the case, and the District Court is at liberty in its discretion to permit further testimony to be offered by either side."

In response to the Court's invitation, proctors for the several parties elected not to present further evidence with respect to liability. The matter was reargued on the basis of the prior transcript, which transcript was not available to the District Court at the time of preparation of the first opinion. Subject to brief comments hereafter noted, the Court, having examined the transcript, reaffirms all statements of fact as related in its prior opinion. (165 F. Supp. 660.) The only material change in the status of the parties is that F. S. Royster Guano Co., Inc., a respondent-impleaded on the petition of Elizabeth River Terminals, Inc., was dismissed at the time of the previous hearing, and no appeal was taken from this order of dismissal.

Without restating the facts in detail, it is sufficient to say that the vessel was not unseaworthy, and no negligence existed, by reason of the fact that the cargo of potash solidified during the voyage from Germany. The record does not reflect any appropriate method of preventing such action due to the hydroscopic nature of the cargo. When the vessel left Baltimore after partially discharging her cargo, it is true that the cargo was not trimmed, but it is unnecessary to consider this phase of the case as such failure, if any, was not even remotely connected with the fatal accident which claimed the life of the longshoreman. When we note that 20 hours had been required in unloading the No. 2-3 hatches prior to the accident, it is apparent that the condition of the cargo had been considerably changed at the time of the accident. It follows, therefore, that the failure to trim the cargo before leaving Baltimore for South Norfolk was not, and could not have been, a proximate cause of the accident.

Under all of the circumstances of this case a showing of negligence has not been established. The unseaworthy condition of the vessel as hereafter suggested was brought about by the action of the decedent, a longshoreman employed by the stevedore and highly regarded as an experienced operator of the "payloader". Notice of any unsafe condition justifying a recovery under the principles of negligence are lacking. As indicated by the former opinion, the master's refusal to permit the use of dynamite does not impress the Court as any justification for a recovery predicated upon negligence.

We turn to the issue of unseaworthiness. The vessel did become unseaworthy when the decedent, by his own actions in the use of the "payloader" and contrary to instructions from his superior, created an overhang of the solidified potash. Minutes later, in an effort to loosen the cargo by striking the solid mass with the "payloader", a block of potash approximately four feet square fell upon the decedent causing his death. The creation of the overhang, even though slight, brought about a condition of unseaworthiness and is recognized by experts in the field as a condition which should not exist and which rendered the vessel reasonably unfit for its normal function.

Thus we have the question squarely presented. May an injured party (or decedent's estate suing for the benefit of statutory beneficiaries) recover against the shipowner for injury (or death) occasioned by the unseaworthiness of the vessel when such unseaworthiness is caused and brought into effect solely by the action of the injured party (or decedent)?

In the recent case of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 943, 4 L.Ed.2d 941, the Supreme Court pointed out that there has evolved a complete divorcement of unseaworthiness liability from concepts of negligence; that the doctrine of "transitory" unseaworthiness is no longer a defense; that the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute—a species of liability without fault—an absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy; and, finally, that liability for a temporary unseaworthy condition is the same as liability which attaches when the condition is permanent. As the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter so aptly suggests:

"The only rational justification for its imposition is that the owner is now to be regarded as an insurer for unseaworthiness who must bear the cost of the insurance."

When we analyze the foregoing decision and compare Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 445, 3 L.Ed.2d 413, we come to the conclusion that the shipowner is at least a qualified insurer as to all accidents which are proximately caused by an unseaworthy condition. The qualifications are that the vessel must be "in navigation"¹; the person injured or killed must be one within the class to whom the warranty of seaworthiness is applicable²; a condition of unseaworthiness must, in fact, exist; and the injury or death must have been a proximate result of the unseaworthy condition³.

In Grillea v. United States, 2 Cir., 232 F.2d 919, 923, Judge Learned Hand said:

"It may appear strange that a longshoreman, who has the status of a seaman, should be allowed to recover

...