Holliday v. Gusman
| Decision Date | 18 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-11236 |
| Parties | MICHAEL W. HOLLIDAY v. MARLIN N. GUSMAN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability (rec. doc. 52) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Rec. doc. 55). Both motions are opposed (rec. docs. 60 & 61), and both parties have filed replies. (Rec. docs. 70 & 73). For the following reasons the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (rec. doc. 55) and denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability. (Rec. doc. 55).
Plaintiff Michael W. Holliday filed this lawsuit against Defendant Marlin N. Gusman, Sheriff of Orleans Parish (“OPSD”), alleging disparate-treatment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq. Holliday alleges that he was suspended and then terminated from his employment at the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office (“OPSO”) because he suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome (“PTSD”) after serving in the United States Marine Corps.
Holliday served eight years in the Marine Corps and was honorably discharged in 2003. (Rec. doc. 61-3 at p. 2). He served one combat tour in Iraq and Kuwait in 2003. (Rec. doc. 55-4 at p. 32). Holliday was diagnosed with PTSD in the summer of 2017. (Id. at p. 6).
On December 16, 2017, while employed by OPSO as a Lieutenant, Holliday's neighbor Nihaya Mansour - who had heard noises in her backyard at approximately 10:46 p.m. - observed Holliday there clad only in his black underwear and black socks. (Rec. doc. 55-5 at p. 41). Mansour's daughter, Rosaila Mansour, reported that Holliday was growling like a dog. (Id.). Nihaya yelled at Holliday to leave her backyard, and, when he did not, Rosaila informed him that she was calling the police. (Id.). Yet Holliday just stood there, holding a plastic bag and a black-handled stainless-steel pocketknife. (Id.). Holliday never threatened the Mansours, but Rosaila dialed 911. (Id.). Nihaya then noticed that the side housing panel to the window air conditioner was damaged. (Id.).
When deputies from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (“JPSO”) arrived, they observed Holliday in his underwear and socks, and Holliday dropped the pocketknife. (Id.). The police detained him, and Nihaya reported to them that she wanted to press criminal charges. (Id.). The police arrested Holliday and later booked him on charges of criminal trespassing and simple criminal damage. (Id. at p. 44). Holliday believes that this incident occurred due to his PTSD, but he admitted at his deposition that no medical provider had ever indicated that PTSD caused the episode. (Rec. doc. 55-4 at p. 56).
On December 27, 2017, the OPSO notified Holliday that it was suspending him “in connection with an allegation that [he] acted in a manner unbecoming” of an OPSO employee in violation of OPSO Rule 201 - Adherence to Law, and Rule 301 - Professionalism. (Rec. doc. 55-6 at pp. 1, 7).[1] After Holliday requested a stay of the proceedings, the OPSO granted a stay of all administrative proceedings related to his suspension while he sought treatment for PTSD. (Id. at p. 2). The OPSO notified him that the “stay of current administrative proceedings has no bearing upon any future administrative proceedings of the ultimate determination of [his] status with the OPSO and that he was required to contact the OPSO once he finished his treatment program.” (Id. at p. 61).
Holliday's disciplinary proceeding resumed on April 23, 2018 after he notified Lieutenant John Morreale, the Administrative Commander of the OPSO's Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”), that the criminal charges against him had been refused. (Id. at p. 2). On April 27, 2018, IAD Agent Kevin Talley and Morreale interviewed Holliday. (Id. at p. 3). Holliday informed Talley and Morreale that he had no memory of the incident that led to his arrest, but he again opined that the incident was caused by his PTSD. (Id.). Holliday reported that he had not had an episode of PTSD in approximately seven years. (Id.).
Holliday produced a letter to the IAD from the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) dated October 4, 2017, described as a “summary of benefits” and indicating that Holliday has “one or more service-connected disabilities.” (Id.). Neither this letter nor the other records from the VA suggested that PTSD caused Holliday's December 26, 2017 arrest. (Id.). Indeed, Holliday produced no medical records or other documentation that indicated that PTSD caused his arrest. (Id. at p. 4). Holliday testified at his deposition that neither Morreale nor Talley made him feel as if they did not want him working at the OPSO because of his PTSD. (Rec. doc. 55-4 at p. 57).
Based on their investigative findings, the IAD sustained the administrative charges against Holliday. (Rec. doc. 55-6 at p. 4). Pursuant to OPSO's Employee Disciplinary Policy, any employee accused of a criminal act receives a hearing before OPSO's Disciplinary Review Board (“DRB”). (Id.). On May 25, 2018, the DRB held a disciplinary hearing to determine whether Holliday violated Articles 201 and 301 of the OPSO Rules and Regulations and any potential penalty. (Id. at p. 5). During the hearing, Holliday testified as to his PTSD and his opinion that PTSD caused his arrest but presented no evidence - other than his own opinion - that his PTSD caused his arrest. (Rec. doc. 55-5 at pp. 29-37). Holliday testified at his deposition that “there were no statements or insinuations [at the DRB hearing] that [he] should not work there [OPSO] at all.” (Rec. doc. 55-4 at p. 57). The DRB ultimately voted to sustain the charges against Holliday and recommended termination based on the members' conclusion that Holliday's conduct violated the law and OPSO's standard regarding professionalism. (Rec. doc. 55-8 at p. 2). Tellingly, all members of the DRB who presided over Holliday's hearing had served during other DRB hearings when they had recommended termination for other employees for adherence to law and professionalism violations when the employees did not have known PTSD or earlier military service. (See, e.g., id.).
Compliance Director Darnley R. Hodge, Sr. - who at the time had the final authority to discipline and terminate OPSO employees - approved Holliday's termination and declared that he did not consider Holliday's PTSD or military service when doing so. (Rec. doc. 55-3 at pp. 1-2). The OPSO terminated Holliday on May 30, 2018. (Rec. doc. 42 at ¶ 10). Holliday appealed his termination. (Id. at pp. 5-6). Hodge denied that appeal. (Id. at p. 7). Holliday testified that he did not believe that Hodge terminated or denied his appeal due to his PTSD or his military service because Hodge himself was a “combat veteran.” (Rec. doc. 55-4 at pp. 249-252). In all, since January 1, 2017, OPSO has terminated 13 employees other than Holliday based on their own arrests. (Rec. doc. 55-6 at pp. 5-6).
On June 16, 2019, Holliday filed this lawsuit against Gusman, alleging disability discrimination under the ADA. (Rec. doc. 1). Holliday later amended his complaint to add the claims under USERRA. (Rec. doc. 40, 42).
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law' are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'” Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Lease, 755 F.Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)). “[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion” by either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the “existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, ” or by “showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must,...
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