Hollidaysburg Manor Associates v. Blair County Bd. of Assessment and Revision of Taxes

• Decision Date: 22 October 1976
• Citation: 364 A.2d 959,26 Pa.Cmwlth. 628
• Parties: HOLLIDAYSBURG MANOR ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership v. BLAIR COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSMENT AND REVISION OF TAXES, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 959

364 A.2d 959

26 Pa.Cmwlth. 628

HOLLIDAYSBURG MANOR ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership v. BLAIR COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSMENT AND REVISION OF TAXES, Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 6, 1976.

Decided Oct. 22, 1976.

Richard A. Behrens, Marion D. Patterson, Jr., Patterson, Evey, Routch & Black, Hollidaysburg, for appellant.

M. David Halpern, Jubelirer, Carothers, Krier & Halpern, Altoona, for appellee.

Before CRUMLISH, Jr., WILKINSON, and BLATT, JJ.

OPINION

BLATT, Judge.

The Hollidaysburg Manor Associates (taxpayers) appealed a real estate tax assessment, imposed pursuant to the Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law ¹ (Code), to the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County. The lower court, by order dated January 30, 1975, ruled in favor of the taxpayers and the Blair County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes (Board) filed exceptions. The taxpayers moved to quash the exceptions on the grounds that they were not authorized by the Code as the method for appeal. The lower court, by order dated July 30, 1975, granted the motion to quash and this appeal followed. We believe that the procedure followed by the Board here was proper and we, therefore, must reverse the lower court and remand the matter to it for a determination on the merits of the exceptions.

It is clear that a county board of assessment and revision of taxes may appeal an order of the court of common pleas in a tax reassessment case, Section 705 of the Code, 72 P.S. § 5453.705, and that an appeal must be taken within thirty days from a Final order of the lower court. Sections 402 and 502 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, ² 17 P.S. §§ 211.402 and 211.502. This statutory appeal procedure does not Require that exceptions be filed to the lower court's order prior to an appeal, and we are not aware of any local court rule here which would so require; however, we believe that exceptions May be filed with the lower court and that an appeal then may be taken from the determination on those exceptions.

The case of Chester Holdings Corp. Appeal, 390 Pa. 152, 134 A.2d 668 (1957), involved a real estate tax assessment appeal in which it was held that exceptions filed to an order of a single judge and disposed of by that judge constituted a Final appealable order. In Washington Mall v. Board for the Assessment and Revision of Taxes, 4 Pa.Cmwlth. 251, 285 A.2d 885 (1971), exceptions were also filed to the order of a single judge of the lower court, but were disposed of by the court en banc, and an appeal was then allowed to this Court. ³ We believe, therefore, that the Board here was properly permitted to file exceptions with the lower court and that the court en banc should rule on the merits of those exceptions.

Moreover, we believe that the rule regarding the filing of exceptions to the decision of the lower court should be the same in statutory tax assessment appeals as it is in statutory zoning appeals. In M & E Enterprises, Inc. v. Township of Franklim Zoning Hearing Board, 17 Pa.Cmwlth. 585, 333 A.2d 523 (1975), we held that, under Section 402 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, a final decision of the lower court, from which an appeal would lie, could be either a decision of a single judge to which no exceptions had been filed or a decision on exceptions by the court en banc. The Board here filed exceptions and, therefore, the order entered on the exceptions would be the final appealable order.

The practice of filing exceptions to the order of a single judge of a court of common pleas is well established, promotes judicial efficiency, and, therefore, should be encouraged. In Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company's Assessment, 225 Pa. 272, 275, ...