Hollie v. State

• Decision Date: 24 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014–DP–00006–SCT.,2014–DP–00006–SCT.
• Parties: Erik Wayne HOLLIE a/k/a Eric Hollie a/k/a Erik Hollie v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

174 So.3d 824

Erik Wayne HOLLIE a/k/a Eric Hollie a/k/a Erik Hollie

v.STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2014–DP–00006–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 24, 2015.

Office of State Public Defender by Alison R. SteinerAndre de Gruy, attorneys for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Jason L. Davis, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

Opinion

WALLER, Chief Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Erik Wayne Hollie walked into a pawn shop in Wesson, Mississippi, and killed the owner because he didn't follow “the Lord.” Hollie claimed “the Lord” led him there to kill the man. A couple of days before the murder, Hollie robbed a gas-station attendant at knife point because, according to Hollie, the two men had argued about religion.

¶ 2. Shortly after the murder, Hollie turned himself in and confessed to both the armed robbery and the capital murder. The trial judge appointed an attorney to represent Hollie, and he filed a motion for a mental evaluation. A state doctor evaluated Hollie, but before a competency hearing was held, Hollie pleaded guilty to both crimes. The trial judge accepted the guilty pleas without any adjudication on Hollie's mental status.

¶ 3. At sentencing, Hollie put on no mitigating evidence, and he specifically instructed his attorney to put on no defense. The only thing before the jury from the defense was Hollie's own statement to the jury, which was just one sentence. “I ask that you let the Lord deal with me and sentence me to death.” The jury did just that.

¶ 4. Hollie filed no appeal or any motions for post-conviction relief. The matter now is before the Court on mandatory review of his sentence of death. Finding that the trial court erred in ordering a mental evaluation but failing to hold a hearing on Hollie's competency, the Court vacates Hollie's guilty pleas, convictions, and his sentences, and remands this case for a competency determination.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 5. On September 5, 2009, Hollie got into an argument about religion at a BP gas station with an employee named Lalit Patel. The next day, Hollie went back to the gas station and got into an altercation with Patel. Hollie pulled a knife on Patel, putting the scuffle to an end. Hollie then left, grabbing a pack of cigarettes and driving off with $30 worth of gas.

¶ 6. Two days later, on September 8, 2009, Hollie went into the Wesson Pawn and Gun Shop and killed the store owner, Denmon Ward. Hollie took several handguns from the store and left. The next day, Hollie turned himself in to law enforcement. Once in custody, Hollie confessed to killing Ward. He said he did not know why he did it, but that he was led to the pawn shop by “the Lord,” and that Ward died because he did not follow “the Lord.” Hollie also confessed to the armed robbery of Patel.

¶ 7. During his statement to police, Hollie made multiple references to having mental health issues and said he was “fed up with life” and that the police could kill him. When asked why he had come to the police department that day, Hollie replied that the “Lord” had led him there “to turn myself in or die.” He also stated that he planned to “go to his death” that morning but the officers talked him out of it. Later in the interview Hollie asked the officers to “take me out back and do me right and shoot me in the f* * *ing head. That's all I want.”

¶ 8. The grand jury indicted Hollie for the armed robbery of Patel and for the capital murder of Ward. The indictment for capital murder provided that Hollie:

did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without the authority of law and with or without deliberate design, kill and murder one Denmon Ward, a human being, at a time when he, the said Erick Wayne Hollie, was then and there engaged in the commission of the crime of Armed Robbery, contrary to and in violation of Section 97–3–19(2)(e) of the Mississippi Code....

In pertinent part, the indictment for armed robbery charged Hollie:

with the unlawful and felonious intent to take, steal and carry away from the presence of Lalit Patel, a human being, personal property, of value of Lalit Patel dba BP Fuel Station, he, the said Erik Wayne Hollie, by putting the said Lalit Patel in fear of immediate injury to his person by the display and exhibition of a certain deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the presence of the said Lalit Patel, against his will, certain personal property of value of the said Lalit Patel dba BP Fuel Station, to-wit: gasoline, contrary to and in violation of Section 97–3–79 of the Mississippi Code....

¶ 9. At Hollie's arraignment, the trial judge asked Hollie if he wanted an attorney. Hollie replied, “it don't matter.” The judge followed up, “It don't matter ...? Well, are you going ... to do anything to hire a lawyer or anything of that nature?” Hollie said “no,” though later at the proceeding he said he wanted an attorney appointed to represent him.

¶ 10. After counsel was appointed, Hollie's attorney requested a mental examination to determine whether he was competent to stand trial and whether he was insane under Mississippi law at the time of the crimes. The trial judge ordered an examination. Dr. Criss Lott conducted the examination and prepared a report.

¶ 11. But before the court held a hearing on the matter, Hollie pleaded guilty to both crimes. The court never held a hearing on Hollie's competence or sanity, but instead accepted Hollie's guilty pleas without any adjudication on Hollie's mental status. Dr. Lott never testified, and his report, while filed with the trial court, was never admitted into evidence.

¶ 12. At sentencing, before the jury was selected, Hollie's attorney requested to read and submit into the record an affidavit prepared by Hollie and to question Hollie under oath. The affidavit prohibited Hollie's attorney from putting on any defense or taking any action on behalf of Hollie. This included questioning the venire, striking any potential jurors, calling any witnesses, offering any mitigating evidence, or making any type of closing arguments. The affidavit also stated that the waiver of these constitutional rights was knowing and done after consultation with counsel. Hollie also acknowledged under oath that he took these actions voluntarily and against the advice of counsel.

¶ 13. The State then proceeded to select the jury without any actions from Hollie or his counsel. Once the jury was empaneled, the State put on its case, arguing for the death penalty. After the State rested and gave closing remarks, Hollie addressed the jury. He asked that they sentence him to death and “let the Lord deal with me.”

¶ 14. The State offered two aggravating factors:

Consider only the following elements of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed:

(1) Whether the defendant has been previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. [§ 99—19—101(5)(b), hereafter the “prior violent felony conviction” aggravator]

(2) Whether the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery. [§ 99—19—101(5)(d) hereafter the “committed while engaged in robbery” aggravator]

The first aggravating factor referred to the armed robbery of Patel. The second referred to the robbery of Ward under the felony murder statute. No proof of mitigating factors was offered.

¶ 15. The jury returned a verdict imposing the death penalty, finding the Patel robbery as the only aggravating factor. The verdict read:

[W]e, the jury, unanimously find that the aggravating circumstances of (list or itemize all of the aggravating circumstances presented in section B of this instruction) which you unanimously agree existed in this case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mr. Hollie pled guilty to armed robbery on November the 6th, 2009. Incident occurred on September 6th, 2009.

The trial court sentenced Hollie to death for the murder of Ward and fifty years for the armed robbery. The judgment of conviction and the sentence were entered on March 16, 2010.

¶ 16. After his conviction and sentence, Hollie did not file a post-trial motion or any appeal or any motions for post-conviction relief.¹ No action was taken on his behalf until March 22, 2012, when the Office of the State Public Defender filed a motion to substitute counsel and to file out-of-time post-trial motions, including seeking leave to file an out-of-time appeal.² The trial court initially granted Hollie's motions, but after Hollie sought a new mental evaluation, the State filed a motion arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction. More than a year later, on November 18, 2013, the trial judge ruled in favor of the State, reversing his prior order and dismissing all of the proceedings. Then on January 2, 2014, the State filed a motion to set a date for execution with this Court. We denied that motion, and Hollie's case is now before the Court under Mississippi Code Section 99–19–105, which mandates a review of all death sentences. Hollie raises eight issues, but, because the first matter is dispositive, we do not address the subsequent issues:³

The conviction relied upon by the jury in imposing a death sentence, and/or the death sentence itself, must be set aside because the trial court failed to make any judicial determination at any point in the proceedings that Hollie was competent to proceed.

DISCUSSION

¶ 17. This Court is reviewing Hollie's sentence pursuant to the statutory requirement that each sentence of death must be evaluated to determine:

(a) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor;

(b) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in Section 99—19—101;

(c) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant; and

(d) Should one or more

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