Hollinger v. Wells
Decision Date | 01 August 2008 |
Docket Number | 2070053. |
Parties | Thomas HOLLINGER, Jr., and Constance Hollinger v. Wendell WELLS, d/b/a Wells Construction. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
J. Milton Coxwell, Jr., of Coxwell & Coxwell, Monroeville, for appellants.
J. McGowin Williamson of Williamson & Williamson, Greenville, for appellee.
In 2005, Wendell Wells, doing business as Wells Construction ("Wells"), contracted to repair a house in Lowndes County owned by Thomas Hollinger, Jr., and Constance Hollinger ("the Hollingers"). On January 3, 2006, Wells sued the Hollingers alleging breach of contract and seeking a lien against the Hollingers' real property located in Lowndes County. Although the complaint alleges that Wells is "entitled to enforce a lien against the real property of [the Hollingers] such as filed in Exhibit `A'...," there is no Exhibit "A" attached to the complaint or contained in the record.
On May 4, 2006, the Hollingers answered the complaint, alleging as an affirmative defense that the contract was unenforceable; they also counterclaimed, alleging that Wells had failed to complete the work in a good and workmanlike manner and that, as a proximate cause, the Hollingers had incurred damages and had expended additional sums to have the repairs to the house completed.
On May 9, 2007, the trial court, without a jury, heard ore tenus testimony, apparently only from Wells. The court entered a judgment on May 16, 2007, determining that "[Wells] shall recover a judgment against the [Hollingers] in the sum of $15,623.80 ... plus statutory interest of 6% from July 1, 2005 to the date of this Order plus the cost of this action."
On June 13, 2007, the Hollingers filed a postjudgment motion for a new trial alleging that the judgment was contrary to the law and the great weight of the evidence. That motion also alleged that they had obtained newly discovered evidence that would materially affect the outcome of the case. There was no affidavit or any documentary evidence attached to that motion.
On June 28, 2007, the Hollingers amended their postjudgment motion. That amendment alleges that because Wells did not have a valid license as a homebuilder pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 34-14A-1 et seq. (), he lacked standing to enforce the parties' contract. Attached to the amended postjudgment motion was an affidavit from the executive director of the Homebuilders Licensure Board stating in unequivocal terms that Wells did not hold and had not ever held a valid homebuilders' license pursuant to the homebuilder licensure statute. The Hollingers' amended postjudgment motion cites Hooks v. Pickens, 940 So.2d 1029 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), in support of the proposition that Wells is statutorily barred from bringing an action to enforce the parties' contract pursuant to Ala.Code.1975, § 34-14A-14.
On July 3, 2007, the Hollingers submitted additional evidentiary materials in support of their postjudgment motion. That submission included another affidavit from the executive director of the Homebuilders Licensure Board authenticating business records showing that in 1999 the Lowndes County Commission had elected to make the homebuilder licensure statute applicable in Lowndes County and various notices to that effect published in and around Lowndes County at that time.
On July 9, 2007, Wells filed a motion seeking to strike the Hollingers' amended postjudgment motion and the affidavits and other evidence submitted in support of that motion as untimely filed. The trial court held a hearing on the postjudgment motion and the motion to strike. The trial court did not rule upon Wells's motion to strike. The postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law. The Hollingers timely appealed.
At the July 11, 2007, hearing on the Hollingers' postjudgment motion, the Hollingers argued, as they do on appeal, that Wells lacked standing and was not entitled to bring or maintain an action because he was statutorily barred from filing the action. See § 34-14A-14. The Hollingers specifically cited Hooks v. Pickens, supra. According to the transcript of the hearing on the postjudgment motion, the Hollingers also cited State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025 (Ala.1999), in support of the proposition that Wells lacked standing, that the trial court had not been invested with subject-matter jurisdiction, and that the judgment was, therefore, void; the Hollingers also provided the court with a copy of the opinion in State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, supra. The Hollingers' arguments on appeal are the same as their arguments at the hearing on the postjudgment motion.
At the hearing on the postjudgment motion, Wells argued that the amended postjudgment motion and the affidavits and other evidence submitted in support of that motion were untimely filed and should be stricken. On appeal, Wells argues that the amended postjudgment motion, the affidavits, and the other evidentiary submissions were untimely and that the Hollingers failed to show that the homebuilder licensure statute was applicable to Wells.
Regarding Wells's argument that the amended postjudgment motion, the affidavits, and the evidentiary submissions were untimely, we note that "the trial court has discretion to allow an amendment to a motion for new trial to state an additional ground after thirty days from the final judgment, if the original motion was timely filed and is still before the court when the amendment is offered." Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 430 So.2d 426, 428 (Ala.1983); see also Barnes v. George, 569 So.2d 382, 384 (Ala.1990); and Slaton v. Slaton, 542 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Ala.Civ.App.1989).
Regardless, the issue of standing implicates a court's subject-matter jurisdiction and is a jurisdictional prerequisite to every case that can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d at 1028. The Alabama Supreme Court has stated:
."
State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d at 1028; see also McCurdy v. L.C. Props., L.L.C., 781 So.2d 991, 993 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) ( ).
In State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, supra, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the City of Gadsden had not suffered an injury to a "legally protected right," because the City "had no legal right to prosecute or to begin [a forfeiture] action" and because "the City was statutorily barred from commencing or prosecuting th[e] action." 740 So.2d at 1028.
In Hooks v. Pickens, supra, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of an unlicensed homebuilder and remanded the case. In that case, Jimmie Lucile Hooks entered into a contract with Theodore Pickens, doing business as Pickens Home Repair ("Pickens"), to complete remodeling work. Hooks became dissatisfied with the remodeling work and refused to pay Pickens.
Pickens sued Hooks alleging breach of contract and seeking damages for labor, materials, and interest. Hooks counterclaimed, seeking damages for completion of the work to her satisfaction. Hooks filed a motion for a summary judgment 940 So.2d at 1030. The trial court denied Hooks's motion for a summary judgment, tried the case, and entered a judgment in favor of Pickens.
This Court, determining the meaning of the homebuilder licensure statute and the legislative intent in enacting the statute, stated:
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