"The plaintiffs, for claim and demand against the above named defendant, allege:
"1. The plaintiffs allege that this action arises under the provisions of the Act of June 25, 1938, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S. C.A. §§ 201-219, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, a law of the United States regulating interstate commerce, and jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Section 41(8), 28 U.S.C.A. giving the District Court original jurisdiction `of all suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce,' and by Sec. 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).
"Plaintiffs bring this action for and in behalf of themselves, individually, and as agents and representatives for and in behalf of the employees of the defendant Company named in Schedules `A' and `B,' hereunto annexed and made a part hereof as though fully set forth herein, and for and in behalf of all of the employees of the defendant similarly situated to those employees named in Schedules `A' and `B' who may join herein by designating the plaintiffs as their agents and representatives to maintain this suit in their behalf. The plaintiffs herein and all of the individuals named in schedules `A' and `B' hereto annexed are or were employees of the defendant, and the plaintiffs and those joining herein and named in schedules `A' and `B,' and all others who are or were employees of the defendant and similarly situated to the plaintiffs and to those named in schedules `A' and `B' and who may join in this action by intervention, amendment, designation, or otherwise, are hereinafter collectively referred to and called the employees.
"2. That the plaintiffs have been duly authorized and designated in writing by the persons named in Schedules `A' and `B' hereto annexed to maintain this action as their agents and representatives. Plaintiffs allege that there is in this action involved to all employees a common question of law, a common question of fact, and each seeks common relief, but by separate judgment or judgments.
"3. The defendant, Federal Mining & Smelting Company, hereinafter referred to and called `the Company,' is now and at all times herein alleged was a corporation duly qualified to carry on business within the State of Idaho, and with its principal office within this state located at Wallace, Idaho.
"4. The defendant Company is now and at all times herein alleged was engaged in mining, milling, smelting, refining, processing, shipping and transporting in interstate commerce lead, gold, silver, copper, zinc, cadmium, and other minerals in and from Shoshone County, Idaho, and other counties in Idaho, and engaged in the production for and in the shipment of goods in interstate commerce, in that all of the said minerals are shipped and transported by defendant through channels of interstate commerce outside of the State of Idaho and into many of the states of the United States, and to foreign countries. The employees herein, and all those similarly situated for whom and in whose behalf plaintiffs bring this action and who are named in Schedules `A' and `B' hereto annexed, and all those who hereafter join in this action, are and at all times herein alleged were employees of defendant, directly engaged in the mining, shipping and transporting of the said minerals in interstate commerce, and in the production of said minerals for and in interstate commerce, and provided at all times herein alleged the work and labor essential to and necessary for said production and transportation of said minerals for and in interstate commerce.
"5. The defendant Company operates numerous underground mines and a mill, or mills, in Shoshone County, Idaho, at and in the vicinity of Wallace, Gem, Mullan, Page and Kellogg, Idaho; and in connection with said mining and milling operations the defendant maintains extensive surface operations, and each of its mines and mills is fenced and said underground mines and surface operations are commonly known as and hereinafter will be called the company operations. Included in said company operations and situated at each of its mines and mills are buildings housing hoisting machinery, tools, supplies, mills and timber, and there are at each of said mines and mills a supply house, tool house, mechanics' shop, repair shop, carpenter shops, wash and change rooms, storage buildings, and other buildings, all of which are necessary for and used in the mines' and Mills' production of minerals by mining on the surface and underground, and of refining, processing, and shipping of said minerals in interstate commerce. Within the said Company operations are roadways for trucks and other vehicles, electric cables and power lines, and other stationary and movable machinery and equipment. The mining of minerals and mineral ores, crushing and refining, and processing, drying, storing and shipping, are so interconnected and integrated as to constitute a continuous process arranged by the Company for and resulting in a highly efficient utilization of equipment and power, and all integrated for the production of goods for interstate commerce.
"6. Plaintiffs allege that since on or about Oct. 24, 1940 to the date of the commencement of this action, the defendant Company, in Shoshone County, Idaho, has violated the provisions of Section 7(a) (3) of said Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a) (3), in that the work week of employees herein suing and represented, has been longer than forty hours, and such employees have received no compensation for their employment in excess of forty hours per week, although they, and each of them, were entitled to a rate of pay not less that one and one-half times the regular rate at which they and each of them were employed. Plaintiffs allege that after Oct. 24, 1940 the defendant Company worked all of the employees herein suing and represented, in violation of said Act, for a period of forty-six hours per week, without paying said employees for overtime, as provided in said Act, and there is now unpaid to said employees, by defendant, their overtime wages for a period of time from June 25, 1940, to the date of the commencement of this action, to-wit: January 10, 1947, for the hours overtime in excess of said statutory limitations, as well as liquidated damages in an amount equal thereto, all as is more fully set out in 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a) (3) and § 216(b).
"7. Plaintiffs allege that the defendant Company fails to correctly record the time worked by its said employees. All underground employees were and are paid for an eight hour work shift, the eight hours extending from the time the employees enter the mine cage at the opening of the shaft until the employees emerge therefrom eight hours thereafter. All surface employees were and are paid for an eight hour work shift extending from the time when the said employees are at their positions and places of work until the time when, eight hours later, the said employees leave their places and positions of work; that ever since Oct. 24, 1940, the said defendant Company has required each of the employees in whose behalf this action is brought by the plaintiffs herein to work an extra one hour per day, or six hours per week, in addition to the time shown by the Company records so erroneously maintained as aforesaid, all of said six hours as aforesaid being worked by the employees herein in addition to the forty hours of work per week provided in the Fair Labor Standards Act hereinabove referred to, and for such overtime of one hour per day since Oct. 24, 1940 employees herein suing and represented have not been paid. That before said work shifts begin the employees enter through the Company gate at each mine and mill, and then are required to walk to the change house and put on their working clothes, and then go to the building or buildings to receive their lamps, batteries, tools, and equipment with which to work, and then go to the other building or buildings to receive their work orders...