Hollingsworth v. Time Warner Cable

Decision Date18 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. C-030663.,C-030663.
Citation157 Ohio App.3d 539,812 NE 2d 976
PartiesHOLLINGSWORTH, Appellant, v. TIME WARNER CABLE, a Division of Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P., Appellee.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

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David M. Cook, LLC, David M. Cook, Cincinnati, and Stephen A. Simon, for appellant.

Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, PLLC, and Peter K. Newman, Cincinnati, for appellee.

WINKLER, Presiding Judge.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Patti Hollingsworth, appeals from the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Time Warner Cable, a division of Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. ("Time Warner"). Hollingsworth assigns two errors: (1) that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Time Warner and (2) that the trial court erred in granting Time Warner's motion for a protective order and denying her corresponding motion to compel discovery. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

Background Facts

{¶ 2} Hollingsworth began working for Time Warner in 1989. In 1996, Hollingsworth was promoted to the position of audit coordinator, a position she held until her termination in March 2002.

{¶ 3} In October 2000, Hollingsworth's treating physician certified that she suffered from chronic sinusitis, so Hollingsworth was granted intermittent leave from her employment pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").1 On September 4, 2001, Hollingsworth left work early because she was ill. Over the next two days, Hollingsworth's physician's office sent notes to Hollingsworth's supervisor, Theresa Johnson, confirming her excused absences. Johnson was the supervisor of the credit and collections department. On September 7, 2001, Hollingsworth learned that Johnson had contacted her physician's office about the absences.

{¶ 4} Hollingsworth immediately filed a complaint with the United States Department of Labor ("DOL") with respect to Johnson's contact with the physician's office. An investigator with the DOL conducted an investigation of the incident and determined that, with the exception of Johnson's direct contact with the physician's office regarding Hollingsworth's medical condition, Time Warner "appeared to be in full compliance with the FMLA in regard to the employment of Hollingsworth."

{¶ 5} In late November or early December 2001, Hollingsworth notified Time Warner that she was pregnant. In December 2001, her obstetrician/gynecologist certified that Hollingsworth was pregnant and that, as a result of a pregnancy-related condition, Hollingsworth would need to work intermittently.

{¶ 6} On January 8, 2002, Johnson completed a yearly performance evaluation for Hollingsworth. Out of a maximum of five points, Hollingsworth received an individual score of 4.8. The evaluation also noted, "Patti's thoroughness and attention to detail yield a quality job performance." On January 9, 2002, Connie Emerson, the manager of the credit and collections department, signed the evaluation.

{¶ 7} On January 10, 2002, Hollingsworth's attorney wrote a letter to Leroy Peyton, the vice president of human resources at Time Warner. Her attorney expressed concerns about Time Warner's treatment of Hollingsworth following her FMLA-protected absences and her complaint to the DOL. Specifically, her attorney referred to comments by her supervisors that she was not dependable and would, therefore, not be considered for a new position, and that she would be demoted to a clerical position due to her absences from work. Having received no response from legal counsel for Time Warner, Hollingsworth's attorney sent followup letters to Peyton on January 18, February 6, and February 14, 2002.

{¶ 8} Meanwhile, on January 16, 2002, Emerson investigated a customer's account following a complaint. Emerson contacted one of Time Warner's lobby representatives, Tisia Hill, who stated that she had made a mistake while posting the customer's payment on the account. Hill later admitted that she had kept the customer's $100 cash payment but had entered a bankruptcy adjustment on the customer's account to hide her actions. On January 18, 2002, Hill was terminated. Emerson then directed her subordinates to conduct a review of Hill's account adjustments. During that review, Emerson learned that the amount of money that had been stolen was over $18,000.

{¶ 9} On February 19, 2002, Emerson signed an employee-performance notice that indicated that Hollingsworth should be terminated for having improperly audited the adjustments of cash-handling lobby representatives and for having thus allowed an estimated $18,000 in thefts to occur. Emerson also noted that Hollingsworth's audit report had failed for months to include customer accounts from Green Township.

{¶ 10} On March 4, 2002, Hollingsworth was terminated by Time Warner. Johnson signed an employee-termination evaluation for Hollingsworth, which noted her poor job performance. Specifically, Johnson noted Hollingsworth's "failure to follow appropriate audit procedures which led to substantial loss of cash."

{¶ 11} Hollingsworth sued Time Warner for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio's public policy, for discrimination and retaliation under the FMLA, and for pregnancy discrimination and retaliation under state and federal law. Time Warner filed a motion for summary judgment. Upon its finding that no genuine issues of material fact remained and that Time Warner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court granted the motion. This appeal followed.

Motion for Summary Judgment

{¶ 12} In her first assignment of error, Hollingsworth argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Time Warner. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.2 In this case, Time Warner was entitled to summary judgment only if (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact, (2) it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appeared that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion when viewing the evidence in favor of Hollingsworth, and that conclusion was adverse to Hollingsworth.3

{¶ 13} In pursuing summary judgment, the moving party has the burden to identify "those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential elements of the nonmoving party's claims."4 When the moving party discharges that burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts by the means listed in Civ.R. 56(E) to show that a triable issue of fact exists.5

Pregnancy Discrimination

{¶ 14} In her complaint, Hollingsworth alleged that Time Warner had discriminated against her in violation of both federal and state law because she was pregnant.

Prima Facie Case Under the Federal "Pregnancy Discrimination Act"

{¶ 15} Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.6 In 1978, Congress amended Title VII to include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA").7 The PDA makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge an employee due to "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."8

{¶ 16} Ohio courts have concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction with federal courts over actions brought pursuant to Title VII.9 In analyzing Title VII claims, courts employ the framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.10 Under the McDonnell Douglas test, to prevail on a claim of pregnancy discrimination, the employee has the initial burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination.11 If the employee successfully demonstrates her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.12 The burden then shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the articulated reason is merely a pretext for the discrimination.13

{¶ 17} To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the employee must demonstrate that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position that she lost, and (4) that she was replaced by a person outside the protected class, or that "a comparable non-protected person was treated better."14

{¶ 18} Similarly, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the PDA if she shows that (1) she was pregnant, (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and (3) she was qualified for the job she lost. As to the fourth element, the analysis of claims under the PDA is slightly different from the analysis of other sexual-discrimination claims under Title VII.15 "While a Title VII sexual-discrimination claim generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that the employee who received more favorable treatment be similarly situated `in all respects' citations omitted, the PDA requires only that the employee be similar in his or her `ability or inability to work.'"16

{¶ 19} In this case, Time Warner does not dispute that Hollingsworth established the first three elements of her prima facie case. With respect to the fourth element, Hollingsworth presented evidence demonstrating that a genuine issue of fact remained as to whether other employees, similar in their abilities to work, received more favorable treatment. Specifically, Hollingsworth presented evidence that Roxanne Roberts and Annette Hampton, nonpregnant employees who conducted the audit procedures during Hollingsworth's absences, had made mistakes similar to the ones for which she was discharged, but that they were not disciplined or discharged. Accordingly, Hollingsworth presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima...

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