Hollingsworth v. Vilsack
| Decision Date | 21 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | ACT. NO. 1:16-cv-675 |
| Citation | 366 F.Supp.3d 766 |
| Parties | Robert Trent HOLLINGSWORTH, et al. v. Tom VILSACK, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Christopher K. Ralston, Arthur Raymond Kraatz, Jeremy T. Grabill, Phelps Dunbar, New Orleans, LA, for Robert Trent Hollingsworth, et al.
Katherine W. Vincent, U.S. Attorneys Office, Lafayette, LA, Andolyn Reeves Johnson, U.S. Attorneys Office, Shreveport, LA, for Tom Vilsack, et al.
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) filed by the Plaintiffs, Robert Trent Hollingsworth, Jonathan Cade Pilcher, Jerry Traylor, and Louisiana Sportsmen Alliance, LLC, a Cross Motion and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) filed by the Defendants, the United States Department of Agriculture, the United States Forest Service, Tom Vilsack, Thomas Tidwell, and Tony Tooke (in their official capacities) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Forest Service"), a Memorandum in Opposition to the Forest Service's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) filed by Plaintiffs, and a Reply in Response to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) filed by the Forest Service. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion will be DENIED, the Forest Service's motion will be GRANT ED,and the case will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This case concerns an amendment to the Kisatchie National Forest Revised Land and Resource Management Plan ("Forest Plan") banning the age-old tradition of hunting deer with dogs ("dog-deer hunting") in the Kisatchie National Forest ("KNF"). This is the second instance in which the Court has reviewed the propriety of a dog-deer hunting ban in KNF. The prior challenge, in which Louisiana Sportsmen Alliance, LLC ("Alliance"), acted as the sole plaintiff, was ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Louisiana Sportsmen Alliance, L.L.C. v. Vilsack, 583 F. App'x 379 (5th Cir. 2014) ; Louisiana Sportsmen Alliance, LLC v. Vilsack, 984 F.Supp.2d 600 (W.D. La. 2013).
KNF consists of over 600,000 acres stretching across seven parishes in western Louisiana.1 The United States Forest Service, an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture, manages and protects the National Forests, including KNF.2 The United States Forest Service is responsible for, among other things, managing the recreational resources available at KNF for the public's enjoyment and benefit. See 36 C.F.R. § 200.3(b)(2)(ii)(E).
Dog-deer hunting, which has been practiced in Louisiana since at least colonial times, is an activity in which dog-deer hunters release multiple dogs into a forest to chase and drive deer out into clearings.3 In modern times, dog-deer hunters often drive in vehicles along the road tracking the dogs' movements, sometimes using electronic devices.4 "Standers" are positioned to shoot the deer when driven into clearings by the dogs.5
Historically, the Forest Service cooperated with the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries ("LDWF") to set the dog-deer hunting season on an annual basis.6 The dog-deer hunting season was incrementally decreased, however, from a high of twenty-eight days in the mid-1990s to a low of seven days in the 2007-2008 hunting season.7 The Forest Service ultimately banned the practice of dog-deer hunting in 2012, though the ban did not take full effect until 2013 because of the prior challenge to the ban in this Court.8
The Forest Service first proposed an amendment to the Forest Plan prohibiting dog-deer hunting in August 2009.9 Accordingly, the Forest Service solicited public comments via letters and posted notices of the proposed amendment.10 It received 1,237 responses to its request for comments in which 320 agreed with the prohibition and 917 opposed it.11 In 2010, the Forest Service developed an Environmental Assessment ("2010 EA"), as required by the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), that analyzed the environmental impacts of three alternatives: (1) a "no action" alternative; (2) implementation of the proposed amendment to prohibit dog-deer hunting in KNF; and (3) designation of fewer dog-deer hunting areas within KNF.12 In December 2010, the Regional Forester issued a Decision Notice ("Decision Notice") and finding of no significant environmental impact ("FONSI") selecting the second alternative, the prohibition of dog-deer hunting in KNF.13 On administrative appeal in July 2011, the Reviewing Officer reversed the decision to amend the Forest Plan on several grounds.14
Following this reversal, the Forest Service issued a new proposal to amend the KNF Forest Plan in September of 2011.15 During the second round of public comment, the Forest Service received approximately 1,279 letters, all but nineteen of which were from one form letter, and all but five of which were against the proposed prohibition.16 Around 106 emails were also submitted, all but eleven of which were for the proposed prohibition.17 The same three alternatives were used in developing a new Environmental Assessment ("2012 EA"), and the Forest Service again selected the second alternative.18 The Regional Forester issued a new Decision Notice and FONSI ("2012 Decision Notice and FONSI"), which ultimately led to another administrative appeal.19 The Reviewing Officer issued an Appeal Decision ("2012 Appeal Decision") which included five instructions that the Forest Service was required to complete before the dog-deer hunting ban outlined in the 2012 Decision Notice could be implemented.20 In response to the 2012 Appeal Decision, the Forest Service issued an Errata document ("Errata") which was accepted by the Reviewing Officer, and the dog-deer hunting ban became final.21
Upon exhausting all administrative remedies, the Alliance filed a suit challenging the dog-deer hunting ban on November 16, 2012, before this Court.22 On November 27, 2013, we issued summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service23 and dismissed the claims with prejudice.24 On appeal, the Forest Service argued for the first time that the Alliance lacked constitutional standing to challenge the dog-deer hunting ban.25 The Fifth Circuit found that the Alliance did not have standing, and thus it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal.26
The Fifth Circuit vacated this Court's dismissal with prejudice, and upon remand we dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.27
Plaintiffs commenced the present suit on May 16, 2016.28 Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the Forest Service's dog-deer hunting ban, a declaratory judgment that the ban is procedurally invalid and unenforceable, and a permanent injunction barring the Forest Service from enforcing the dog-deer hunting ban.29 On June 30, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment,30 and Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment on July 31, 2017.31 Oral argument was held on December 1, 2017.32
The Supreme Court has established that "the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ " Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Id. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations omitted). For an association to have constitutional standing to sue on behalf of its members, it must demonstrate that: "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). In the previous incarnation of this case, the Fifth Circuit held that the Alliance, then the sole plaintiff, lacked Article III standing because it failed to: (1) allege any specific facts showing a concrete injury to any one of its members; (2) allege any specific details regarding the nature and purpose of the organization; and (3) submit any declaration or affidavits from any individual members asserting that they suffered a specific harm caused by the dog-deer hunting ban. Louisiana Sportsmen Alliance, 583 F. App'x at 381.
As the Forest Service concedes, the addition of Alliance members Hollingsworth, Pilcher, and Traylor as plaintiffs, along with their sworn declarations, establishes constitutional standing. Hollingsworth's declaration states that the Alliance "is an organization of Louisiana sportsmen with a common goal of preserving the traditions and rights of the Louisiana sportsman [including] the preservation of hunting lands for its members."33 It further declares that he spent nearly $ 40,000 over five years on his hunting dogs, that he purchased his home in large part because of its proximity to the Forest and the accessibility of dog-deer hunting, and that he now incurs substantial costs to dog-deer hunt in Mississippi and/or Arkansas.34 The declarations of Pilcher35 and Traylor36 assert similar injuries as a result of Forest Service's prohibition of dog-deer hunting. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have constitutional standing to bring this suit.37
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