Hollins v. Mich. Corrs. Comm'n
| Decision Date | 07 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-230 |
| Parties | J W HOLLINS, Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN CORRECTIONS COMMISSION et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 14, 2022, Plaintiff paid the full $402.00 filing fee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 5.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) ().[1]
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the Michigan Corrections Commission (MCC), [2] the MDOC, MDOC Director Heidi Washington, and the following ECF personnel:
Warden Les Parish, Administrator Kenneth T. McKee, Hearing Investigator Unknown Goodspeed, Hearing Officer S. Burke, and Officer Andrew Fuller.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 22, 2020, Defendant Fuller “forged and falsified [a] misconduct report by deleting the information in [the] misconduct report written on the computer by Officer Anthony Suarez” (not a party). (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff avers that the misconduct was initially issued to his cellmate, inmate Uphold. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fuller deleted inmate Uphold's name, number, and the area in which contraband was located, and inserted Plaintiff's name, number, and “area of control in the misconduct report for the infraction of having contraband in his controlled area.” (Id., PageID.3-4.) According to Plaintiff, the misconduct report was issued after Defendant Fuller claimed to have confiscated a bag of fermented liquid “from the side of the locker that was in Plaintiff['s] control” while conducting routine rounds. (Id., PageID.4.)
That same day, Sergeant Porter (not a party) reviewed the misconduct with Plaintiff. (Id.) Sergeant Porter wrote a statement on Plaintiff's behalf and asked him to sign the report. (Id.) Plaintiff refused. (Id.) Sergeant Porter “wrote refuses in the signature area and gave Plaintiff Hollins a copy of the ticket and contraband removal form.” (Id.) On August 25, 2020, Plaintiff received a Prisoner Accused Statement Form from Defendant Goodspeed, who instructed Plaintiff to write a statement and return the form to him. (Id.)
On August 26, 2020, Plaintiff observed Defendant Fuller and Officer Suarez conducting cell searches on “B upper pod.” (Id.) When Officer Suarez reached Plaintiff's cell, he stood outside the cell door until Defendant Fuller came to the cell. (Id.) Officer Suarez then entered the cell. (Id.) Plaintiff watched Defendant Fuller order inmate Uphold to exit the cell. (Id.) Defendant Fuller then “entered the cell and exit[ed] the cell under three minutes with a laundry bag with no distinctive view of the content.” (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Fuller threw the laundry bag into the officers' kitchenette, locked the door, and went to the officers' station. (Id.)
Later that day, Plaintiff was called “to base and reviewed on [a] misconduct report written by Defendant Fuller.” (Id.) The report indicated that during a cell search, “a milk bag with brown fermented liquid was found inside a laundry bag between the toilet and wall in Plaintiff['s] area of control.” (Id.) Plaintiff was given a photo of the seized contraband. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Fuller “wrote the [August 22, 2020] information in [the] contraband removal column, which dated back to the falsified and forged misconduct report submitted by Officer Fuller.” (Id.) Later, Plaintiff “placed in the [u]nit [m]ail [b]ox his statement requesting a photo of the contraband and any other evidence that was not in the four corners of the misconduct report; also attached were interrogatory questions for Defendant Fuller.” (Id.)
On August 27, 2020, Plaintiff was called out to see Defendant Goodspeed, who gave Plaintiff a copy of the picture of the contraband seized on August 22, 2020, and told Plaintiff “that he was not going to give the interrogatory questions to Defendant Fuller because they are not relevant.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the picture of the contraband seized on August 26, 2020, “is identical to the [August 22, 2020] contraband picture with much less content of liquid substance.” (Id., PageID.5-6.)
On September 3, 2020, Plaintiff received a pass to 5 Block “for court.” (Id., PageID.6.) He took with him a copy of his interrogatories posed to Defendant Fuller. (Id.) Minutes after Plaintiff's arrival, Defendant Goodspeed locked Plaintiff “in the cage . . .with his hands cuffed behind his back.” (Id.) He then connected remotely to Defendant Burke. (Id.) Defendant Goodspeed “read the case violation and turned the computer [to face] Plaintiff.” (Id.) Defendant Burke told Plaintiff that the hearing was for the misconduct report issued on August 22, 2020. (Id.) Defendant Goodspeed then informed Defendant Burke that he did not have the August 22, 2020, misconduct report. (Id.) He claimed that “it was stolen from his officer and he was going to talk[] to the Warden about it.” (Id.) Defendant Goodspeed brought Plaintiff out of the cage and uncuffed him. (Id.) He told Plaintiff that the hearing for the August 22, 2020, report would be held the following week. (Id.)
On September 4, 2020, Plaintiff appeared before Hearing Officer Thomas Mohrman (not a party) for the August 26, 2020 misconduct report. (Id., PageID.6-7.) Mohrman stated that the report was for “substance abuse and theft.” (Id.) Mohrman determined that the August 22, 2020, date “stated in the contraband removal column” was “harmless error.” (Id.) Mohrman found Plaintiff guilty of the misconduct “based on video showing the officer exiting the cell with [a] bag whose shape appears to contain liquid.” (Id.) He sanctioned Plaintiff with...
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