Hollins v. Sneed, 6575.

Decision Date06 February 1973
Docket NumberNo. 6575.,6575.
Citation300 A.2d 447
PartiesCharles Henry HOLLINS and Ethelyn Diane Hollins, Appellants, v. Robert W. SNEED, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Irving Dross, Hyattsville, Md., for appellants.

Edwin A. Sheridan, for appellee.

Before KELLY, KERN and HARRIS, Associate Judges.

KELLY, Associate Judge:

Appellant Charles Hollins and his wife1 sued Robert Sneed, the appellee, for damages resulting from an automobile accident which occurred at the intersection of North Capitol and H Streets in this city. At trial Hollins and an eyewitness testified that he, Hollins, proceeding west on H Street, paused in the center of the intersection at North Capitol Street to make a left turn and was struck by the Sneed vehicle which was proceeding south on North Capitol at a high rate of speed through a red light. Conversely, Sneed testified that he was heading east on H Street on a green light when the Hollins vehicle, traveling west on H, suddenly turned in front of him to go south on North Capitol without reducing its speed or showing a signal, making it impossible for him to avoid the collision. The testimony of the investigating officers tended to support Sneed's version of the accident.

[1] With these divergent stories to resolve, the jury found both parties negligent, thus denying any recovery to Hollins and his wife. The one claim meriting discussion on appeal2 is that it was error to admit the testimony of one investigating officer because (1) he was not identified in answers to interrogatories as a potential witness and (2) he was allowed to testify from a police report prepared by the other investigating officer.

Officers Aulfield and Dunmeyer of the Metropolitan Police Accident Investigation Unit responded to the scene of the accident, as did one Sergeant Harring. Officer Aulfield testified for the defense that he conducted the actual investigation of the accident, the results of which investigation were corroborated by the other two men, and that he established the approximate point of impact within the intersection by the existence of skid marks and debris. Officer Dunmeyer, next on the stand, testified that he assisted at the investigation of the accident, whereupon an objection to further testimony from this officer was interposed on the ground that he had not been identified in answers to interrogatories as a witness. The objection was overruled for the reason that no interrogatory directly asked for the names of the witnesses to be called at tria1.3 Further objection was made when Officer Dunmeyer was about to testify from a police report which he had not signed. On preliminary voir dire by counsel and the court Officer Dunmeyer said that both he and Officer Aulfield had helped make out the report; that he believed he had drawn the diagram of the accident on the report; that sometimes both investigating officers signed a police report and sometimes not, and that he had examined and had concurred in the report at the time it was made. Officer Dunmeyer was allowed to continue his testimony, using the report as needed, and ultimately gave as his opinion, based on his observation at the scene of what he termed "fresh skid marks", that at the time of the accident Sneed had to be traveling east on H Street.

The fact that Officer Dunmeyer was a potential witness in the case was apparently unknown until shortly before trial when defense counsel learned of his existence from Officer Aulfield and promptly issued a subpoena for his appearance at trial. He was again subpoenaed for a continued trial date. Officer Dunmeyer appeared on the appointed day, a Friday, but the case did not get on for trial until the following Monday. It is, of course, conceivable that Officer Dunmeyer's identity was still...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • City of Fargo, Cass County v. Candor Const., Inc.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1977
    ...232 F.2d 257, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984, 76 S.Ct. 1052, 100 L.Ed. 1498. Considering all circumstances, the court, in Hollins v. Sneed, 300 A.2d 447 (D.C.App.1973), said that allowing an undisclosed witness to testify was not abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of Kansas said in Barnes v......
  • Nolan v. Nolan
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • January 5, 1990
    ...including the exclusion of evidence. See Corley v. BP Oil Corp., 402 A.2d 1258, 1261 (D.C. 1979) (expert testimony); Hollins v. Sneed, 300 A.2d 447, 449 n. 4 (D.C. 1973) (fact witness). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) advisory committee's note. Whether to impose sanctions, and if so the nature ......
  • WILLIAMS v. WASHINGTON HOSP. CENTER
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 1991
    ...557 A.2d 1306, 1309 (D.C. 1989); Bell v. Jones, 523 A.2d 982, 990 n. 11 (D.C. 1986); Corley, supra, 402 A.2d at 1261; Hollins v. Snead, 300 A.2d 447, 449 n. 4 (D.C. 1973); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 2050 at 326-28. The grant of a new trial falls within the rubric of "other action" and has ......
  • Sowell v. Walker
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • June 22, 2000
    ...court necessarily has wide discretion in these matters, and [was] not required to apply sanctions...." Id. (quoting Hollins v. Sneed, 300 A.2d 447, 449 n. 4 (D.C.1973)) (citation and internal brackets omitted). In Corley, the court went on to explain the applicable Given the wide latitude o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT