Hollis v. Hollis

• Decision Date: 15 May 1916
• Docket Number: 460
• Citation: 254 Pa. 90,98 A. 789
• Parties: Hollis, Appellant, v. Hollis
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

98 A. 789

254 Pa. 90

Hollis, Appellant, v. Hollis

No. 460

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 15, 1916

Argued April 27, 1916

Appeal, No. 460, Jan. T., 1916, by plaintiff, from decree of C.P. Berks Co., Equity Docket, 1914, No. 1133, in equity dismissing bill to declare an oral trust in case of John G Hollis v. Martin G. Hollis. Affirmed.

Bill in equity for the declaration and enforcement of an oral trust.

ENDLICH, J., filed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. Maria G. Hollis died Oct. 8, 1911, the owner of a candy manufacturing business and of a four-fifths interest in certain real estate in the City of Reading, (the remaining one-fifth interest belonging to a daughter, Julia, residing in Greece,) -- and leaving, besides the daughter just mentioned, another daughter, Despina, and three sons, living in this country, namely, Thamos, the plaintiff John G. Hollis and the defendant Milton G. Hollis, the eldest. The business and real estate had passed to Maria G. Hollis and her said children upon the death, in 1905, of another son, William, and the interest in the realty belonging to the children resident in this country was conveyed to her by deed of Feb. 21, 1907, in consideration of one dollar.

2. By her will Maria G. Hollis, after making a number of specific bequests and devises, including a bequest of $500 to the plaintiff "absolutely," directed the remainder of her estate, real, personal and mixed, to be divided, three-fifths to the defendant "absolutely," one-fifth "absolutely" to Thamos, and one-fifth "absolutely" to Despina, -- the defendant being named as her executor.

3. In reply to some complaint or expression of dissatisfaction by plaintiff to defendant, the latter on Nov. 29, 1912, wrote to the former a letter which makes no reference to any understanding between defendant and the testatrix, or to any wish or design on her part, concerning the share of her estate left to defendant in her will, but in which he says:

"The situation is as follows: Nobody wants to do anything unjust. The business is conducted in four equal parts -- one for Despina, one for Thamos, one for you and one for me, but for many reasons which you know, I hold your share. As far as the building is concerned, it will be in five parts. . . . You are of the same category as we are and you shall receive regularly just what is due you annually from your share of the business. As for the building, your share will be in your name. . . . You know that even though I have but one-half dollar, I will give one-half of it to Despina and the balance we will divide between us. Have confidence in me and time will tell."

4. Upon defendant's failure to account to plaintiff in respect to the business and to convey to him a one-fifth interest in the realty, this bill was brought, alleging that the gift of three-fifths of Maria G. Hollis's estate to defendant, whilst absolute on its face, was made to and accepted by him subject to a trust that the business should be in four parts, one of them to belong to plaintiff, and the realty in five parts, one of them to belong to plaintiff.

5. There is no evidence in the case connecting the letter above quoted with, and none even remotely capable of pointing to the existence of, any trust annexed to the gift in Maria G. Hollis's will to defendant or assumed by him in respect to the same. The only oral evidence there is on this subject is the positive and uncontradicted denial by defendant of any such arrangement between him and the testatrix, as well as of any knowledge on his part of the contents of the will before its probate, or of any intimation by the testatrix that it should be anything else than what it is, and an explanation of his letter to plaintiff substantially to the effect that what he meant by it was, not an admission of any obligation on his part whatever, but an assurance of his willingness further to assist the plaintiff, already considerably in his debt, to the extent of defendant's ability and of plaintiff's needs, from time to time.

II. DISCUSSION.

As in every cause in equity, so in this the question which is to be decided and upon the decision of which hinges the right of plaintiff to a decree depends upon the pleadings: Thompson's App., 126 Pa. 367; Penna. Schuylkill Val. R.R. v. Philadelphia & Reading R.R., 160 Pa. 277; Finletter v. Appleton, 195 Pa. 340; Luther v. Luther, 216 Pa. 1; Rittenhouse v. Newhard, 232 Pa. 433. The plaintiff's bill alleges as the ground of the relief sought, and the defendant's answer denies, that the gift in Maria G. Hollis's will to defendant of three-fifths of her estate "absolutely" was made and accepted subject to a trust that he would so hold and manage the same that it should enure in equal parts to the benefit of the children in this country. That the trust referred to, if any there was, was created orally is beyond question.

A trust orally annexed by a testator to a bequest or devise absolute in form, and accepted by the legatee or devisee at the time when the provision was made (or by his assent given prior to and continuing at that time) either expressly or by words or acts of encouragement, or by silent acquiescence, may be enforced in equity, because a refusal to perform the trust under such circumstances is a fraud. The doctrine and its limitations, firmly settled in the jurisprudence of this State, are illustrated by a uniform line of decisions, as the principal ones among which may be cited Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts 163; Jones v. McKee, 3 Pa. 496; Irwin v. Irwin, 34 Pa. 525; Church & Wife v. Ruland & Wife, 64 Pa. 432; Schultz's App., 80 Pa. 396; Brooke's App., 109 Pa. 188; Hodnett's Est., 154 Pa. 485; Hoffner's Est., 161 Pa. 331; McAuley's Est., 184 Pa. 124; McCloskey v. McCloskey, 205 Pa. 491; Washington's Est., 220 Pa. 204; Flood v. Ryan, 220 Pa. 450; Blick v. Cockins, 234 Pa. 261. There is no difficulty about the rule. The single issue, under the pleadings, is whether the facts and evidence in the case bring it within that rule. If they do not, the plaintiff's bill could not be supported by proof (supposing there be any) of a trust or liability subsequently assumed by defendant on the footing of a contractual arrangement between the parties or a voluntary declaration of trust by defendant, even apart from any question of consideration to support such: see Long's App., Murphy's Est., 86 Pa. 196, 204; McCloskey v. McCloskey, 205 Pa. 491, 495.

It will be noted that the establishment of a trust as alleged in plaintiff's bill would practically set aside the provisions of the will concerning the division of the testatrix's residuary estate, not only as regards the defendant, but the other brother and sister as well, who are not parties to this proceeding, -- that they would get more than the will gives them, -- that the defendant, to whom the will gives more than to the others, would get less than any of them, -- and that the plaintiff, instead of a mere...