Hollis v. Lynch
Decision Date | 07 August 2015 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:14–cv–03872–M. |
Citation | 121 F.Supp.3d 617 |
Parties | Jay Aubrey Isaac HOLLIS, individually and as Trustee of the Jay Aubrey Isaac Hollis Revocable Living Trust, Plaintiff, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States, and Thomas E. Brandon, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Stephen Dean Stamboulieh, Stamboulieh Law PLLC, Madison, MS, Alan Alexander Beck, Law Office of Alan Beck, San Diego, CA, Elisha Michael Hollis, Law Offices of Elisha M. Hollis PLLC, Greenville, TX, for Plaintiff.
Daniel M. Riess, Eric J. Soskin, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
BARBARA M.G. LYNN, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 13]. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amendment and Commerce Clause claims for lack of standing is GRANTED, and Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's due process, equal protection, and Plaintiff's alternative request for declaratory relief that § 922(o ) does not apply to Plaintiff or the Hollis Trust is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Jay Aubrey Hollis brings this action in his individual capacity and as Trustee of the Jay Aubrey Isaac Hollis Revocable Living Trust ("the Hollis Trust") to invalidate the federal ban on the transfer and possession of machine guns, imposed by the Gun Control Act ("GCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 922(o ), and the National Firearms Act ("NFA"), 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq., and their implementing regulations, 27 C.F.R. § 479.105(a).
In a March 17, 2014 letter, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") advised a federal firearms licensee, Brandon Maddox, that, while the GCA contains an exception that permits a licensee to forego a National Instant Criminal Background Check on a previously-approved NFA transfer, that exception does not apply when the transferee is an unincorporated trust. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 25; Dkt. No. 1–1 (Pl.'s Ex. A) ("Dakota Silencer Letter"). The relevant part of the letter stated:
Id. (emphasis in original). Apparently encouraged by the ATF's construction of the GCA's definition of "person" in the Dakota Silencer Letter, on May 14, 2014, Plaintiff, on behalf of the Hollis Trust, applied to manufacture a machine gun by submitting ATF Form 5320.1 ("Form 1"), paid the $200 tax required by the NFA, and attached the Dakota Silencer Letter as support for approval. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 37. On September 8, 2014, ATF returned Plaintiff's Form 1 with a stamp of approval. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 38; Dkt. No. 1–3 (Pl. Ex. C).
On September 10, 2014, ATF contacted Plaintiff and informed him that his Form 1 had been approved by mistake, and Plaintiff later received another copy of his Form 1, this time with a stamp of disapproval. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 39–40; Dkt. No. 1–4 (Pl. Ex. D). A few days later, Special Agent Aaron R. Wheeler met Plaintiff and delivered a letter from ATF's Chief of the National Firearms Act Branch, which asked Plaintiff to surrender any machine gun that might have been manufactured by Plaintiff based on the mistakenly approved Form 1. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 42; Dkt. No. 1–5 (Pl. Ex. E). The letter explained that the exclusion of an unincorporated trust from the definition of "person" in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1) does not permit an individual to avoid liability under § 922(o ) by placing a machine gun "in trust":
Dkt. No. 1–5 (Pl. Ex. E).
Plaintiff argues that ATF unlawfully revoked his Form 1 approval, and contends that ATF's interpretation of the GCA is contrary to the plain language of the statute. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 47–48. On October 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, individually and on behalf of the Hollis Trust, against the Attorney General and the Director of ATF in their official capacities ("Defendants"). Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief for protection from the application of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o ), 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq., and the associated implementing regulations, 27 C.F.R. § 479.105(a), on the alleged basis that they "act as an unlawful de facto ban on the transfer or possession of a machine gun manufactured after May 19, 1986." Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that the foregoing statutes and regulations violate Plaintiff's rights under the Second Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, including its equal protection component. Id. Plaintiff also requests that the GCA be held unconstitutional as an impermissible exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.1 Id. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that § 922(o ) does not prohibit the Hollis Trust from manufacturing or possessing a machine gun manufactured after May 19, 1986, and/or that Defendants lacked authority to revoke or deny the validity of Plaintiff's approved Form 1. Id. ¶ 3.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and alternatively move for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 13.
The National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. Chapter 53, and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 44, comprise the federal framework governing the firearm market. The GCA generally makes it unlawful for a person to transfer or possess a machine gun. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o ). The NFA makes it unlawful to manufacture a machine gun in violation of its provisions. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). The NFA defines a "machinegun" as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger," or "any combination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). The GCA incorporates the NFA's definition of machinegun. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4). ATF is charged with administering and enforcing both the NFA and GCA, and Defendants oversee ATF. 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1)–(2).
As initially enacted in 1934, the NFA...
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