Hollis v. United States Glass Co.

• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MR. JUSTICE FELL:
• Citation: Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49, 69 A. 55 (Pa. 1908)
• Decision Date: 06 January 1908
• Docket Number: 118
• Parties: Hollis v. United States Glass Company, Appellant

69 A. 55

220 Pa. 49

Hollis v. United States Glass Company, Appellant

No. 118

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 6, 1908

Argued November 1, 1907

Appeal, No. 118, Oct. T., 1907, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., Jan. T., 1905, No. 1,185, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Margaret A. M. Hollis v United States Glass Company. Reversed.

Trespass to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's husband.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $4,500. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were (1) in refusing binding instructions for defendant, and (2) in refusing to withdraw a juror and continue the case because of the remarks of plaintiff's counsel quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The second assignment of error is sustained, and the judgment is reversed with a venire facias de novo.

William M. Hall, with him O. P. Metcalf, for appellant. -- The law is well settled that it is improper to show, in an action of negligence, that the defendant is insured against loss in case of recovery against it on account of its negligence Lassig v. Barsky, 87 N.Y.S. 425; George A. Fuller Co. v. Darragh, 101 Ill.App. 664; Lone Star Brewing Co. v. Voith, 84 S.W. Repr. 1100.

Rody P. Marshall, with him Thomas M. Marshall and Robert G. Woodside, for appellee.

Before FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE FELL:

It has been earnestly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the case should have been withdrawn from the jury because there was a failure to prove that the defendant had not done all that was required of it to make the place of work safe, according to the usage and custom of the business in which it was engaged, and because the plaintiff's husband assumed an obvious risk connected with his work and arising from it, of which he had full knowledge. A careful examination of the testimony leads us to the conclusion that this contention cannot be sustained on either ground. There was testimony tending to show that both the general manager of the defendant's works and the superintendent of the factory where the accident happened, had cause to know, notwithstanding the reports of inspection, that the boiler was unsafe. And it was not so clearly shown that the plaintiff's husband had charge of the boiler, and had knowledge of its condition, that the court could have considered this as established by the testimony.

The second assignment of error, however, calls for a reversal of the judgment. In addressing the jury the plaintiff's counsel said: "It is nothing to the glass company what this verdict should be; it is the insurance company that will pay the verdict. It is the fact that the president of the United States is advocating the abolition of this kind of insurance, because the existence of this kind of insurance is against public policy because it leads to a neglect of their duties by the employers. Remember, this company does not pay the verdict. Mr. Anderson has no interest in this case. The only man who has an interest in this case is Mr. Rodgers."

This was an invitation to find a verdict on false grounds, and it is open to the objections named in the opinion in Saxton v. Pittsburg Railways Co., 219 Pa. 492. In Walsh v Wilkes-Barre, 215 Pa. 226, the judgment was reversed in an action to recover damages for injury sustained on a defective sidewalk, because of the statement of counsel in addressing the jury that "the...